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i 
Abstract 
 
This research looks at the ethnographies Mules and Men (1935) and Tell My Horse: 
Voodoo and Life in Haiti and Jamaica (1938) by Zora Neale Hurston focusing on 
representations of Time and the anthropologist’s body. Hurston was an African-
American anthropologist, folklorist, and novelist who conducted research particularly 
between the end of the 1920s and the mid-1930s. At first, her fieldwork and writings 
dealt with African-American communities in Florida and Hoodoo practice in Louisiana, 
but she consequently expanded her field of anthropological interests to Jamaica and 
Haiti, which she visited between 1936 and 1937. The temporal and bodily factors in 
Hurston’s works are taken into consideration as coordinates of differentiation between 
the ethnographer and the objects of her research. In her ethnographies, the 
representation of the anthropologist’s body is analysed as an attempt at reducing 
temporal distance in ethnographical writings paralleled by the performative experience 
of fieldwork exemplified by Hurston’s storytelling: body, voice, and the dialogic 
representation of fieldwork relationships do not guarantee a portrayal of the 
anthropological subject on more egalitarian terms, but cast light on the influence of the 
anthropologist both in the practice and writing of ethnography. These elements are 
analysed in reference to the visualistic tradition of American anthropology as ways of 
organising difference and ascribing the anthropological ‘Others’ to a temporal frame 
characterised by bodily and cultural features perceived as ‘primitive’ and, therefore, 
distant from modernity. Representations and definitions of ‘primitiveness’ and 
‘modernity’ not only shaped both twentieth-century American anthropology and the 
modernist arts (Harlem Renaissance), but also were pivotal for the creation of a modern 
African-American identity in its relation to African history and other black people 
involved in the African diaspora. In the same years in which Hurston visited Jamaica 
and Haiti, another African-American woman anthropologist and dancer, Katherine 
Dunham, conducted fieldwork in the Caribbean and started to look at it as a source of 
inspiration for the emerging African-American dance as recorded in her ethnographical 
and autobiographical account Island Possessed (1969). Therefore, Hurston’s and 
Dunham’s representations of Haiti are examined as points of intersection for the 
different discourses which both widened and complicated their understanding of what 
being ‘African’ and ‘American’ could mean. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
The present thesis is inspired by the idea, expressed by Edward W. Said, that 
“anthropological representations bear as much on the representer’s world as on who or 
what is represented”1 within ethnographic texts that, in Trinh T. Minh-ha’s words, “can 
be determined as fictions from the standpoint of language”2 in the context of a social 
science such as anthropology which has defined its professional expertise as a “frontier 
knowledge born on a frontier between cultures.”3  The ethnographies Mules and Men 
(1935)
4
 and Tell My Horse: Voodoo and Life in Haiti and Jamaica (1938)
5
 by Zora 
Neale Hurston and Island Possessed (1969)
6
 by Katherine Dunham will be taken into 
consideration as case studies for “the critique of the anthropologist-as-subject”7 
inhabiting their texts and for the analysis of their ways to represent themselves in 
fieldwork in relation to the ‘Others’ of anthropological inquiry. 
The work of Zora Neale Hurston (1891-1960), African-American 
anthropologist, folklorist, writer, and choreographer, has been the object of much 
interest in American Studies from the late 1970s onwards. After a quite solitary death 
and the going out of print of all her books, her work was rediscovered by the African-
American writer Alice Walker
8
 who, together with the scholar Robert E. Hemenway
9
, 
rekindled the interest in Hurston’s flamboyant personality and her artistic 
accomplishments within the context of the 1920-black-modernist movement of the 
Harlem Renaissance and in subsequent decades. Walker set the tone for the recuperation 
of Hurston’s work envisaging her as one of the main foremothers for the tradition of 
African-American writing by women; ‘Zora’ was recuperated as a functional answer to 
                                                 
1
 Edward W. Said, “Representing the Colonized: Anthropologist’s Interlocutors”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 
15, No. 2 (Winter, 1989), 224. 
2
 Trinh T. Minh-ha, Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 70. 
3
 Ugo Fabietti, Antropologia culturale. L’esperienza e l’interpretazione (Roma-Bari, Italia: Gius. Laterza 
& Figli, 2001), xii: “Se l’antropologia è un sapere critico è perché essa è un sapere di frontiera che nasce 
sulla frontiera tra culture.” My attempt at translation: “Anthropology is a critical knowledge because it is 
a frontier knowledge born on the frontier between cultures.” 
4
 Zora Neale Hurston, Mules and Men (New York: Quality Paperback Books, 1990: 1935). 
5 Zora Neale Hurston, Tell My Horse: Voodoo and Life in Haiti and Jamaica (New York: Quality 
Paperback Books, 1990: 1938). 
6
 Katherine Dunham, Island Possessed (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994: 
1969). 
7
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Civilization Folded Back: Poems by Stanley Diamond”, Dialectical 
Anthropology 11 (2-4), 1986, 267. 
8
 See, for instance, Alice Walker “Zora Neale Hurston: A Cautionary Tale and a Partisan View” and 
“Looking for Zora” in Alice Walker, In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose by Alice 
Walker (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), 83-116. 
9
 Robert E. Hemenway, Zora Neale Hurston: A Literary Biography (Urbana, Illinois: University of 
Illinois Press, 1980: 1977). 
  
 
 
2 
the need of significant references for burgeoning black writers in the United States and 
a useful connection between experimental literature, orality, and folkloric art.
10
 
Although the complexities of Hurston’s character were hinted at, the most controversial 
aspects of her personality, work, and statements were mostly ignored. This produced an 
opposite tendency of criticism which tried to counterbalance so-called  ‘Hurstonism’11, 
or what was perceived as the acritical and idealised rehabilitation of Hurston’s 
contribution to the arts and letters. In particular, Hazel Carby expressed concerns about 
the presumed authenticity of Hurston’s depiction of African-American traditions and on 
the decontextualization of her production.
12
  
The idea for this thesis was born in a spirit of sincere admiration of Hurston’s 
contribution to American literature and cultural anthropology, but also with a certain 
degree of awareness of the many threads interlacing in her work and biography which 
make the reading of her production particularly challenging. In particular, this thesis is 
located in the context of works, such as the study by Anthea Kraut, which “seeks neither 
to venerate nor to critique Hurston for her commitment to a rural, black, and southern 
folk tradition, but rather to further scrutinize how she depicted that tradition.”13 In order 
to provide a contextualized analysis of this tradition, it seems important to grasp the 
connection between Hurston’s writing, her involvement in anthropological theory, and 
her position between different disciplines and practices: while Kraut accounts for the 
obscured presence of Hurston in dance studies, the present thesis is concerned with her 
absence from the history of cultural anthropology. In fact, a lot of questions raised in 
her ethnographic writings, about the presence of the anthropologist in fieldwork, the 
relationship with the research subjects, the controversial distinction between the stages 
of observation and interpretation, and the representation of these elements in 
ethnography, have been the subject of debates occurring in American cultural 
anthropology from the 1980s, as attested by the publication of Writing Culture: The 
Politics and Poetics of Ethnography (1986) edited by James Clifford and George E. 
                                                 
10
 See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of Afro-American Literary Criticism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989: 1988). 
11
 Ann duCille, The Coupling Convention: Sex, Text, and Tradition in Black Women’s Fiction (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
12
 Hazel Carby, “The Politics of Fiction, Anthropology, and the Folk: Zora Neale Hurston” in Geneviève 
Fabre and Robert O’ Meally (eds.), History and Memory in African-American Culture (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 28-44. 
13
 Anthea Kraut, Choreographing the Folk: The Dance Stagings of Zora Neale Hurston (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 9-10. 
  
 
 
3 
Marcus.
14
 The shortfalls of their interesting project, focused on the meaning of aesthetic 
choices in ethnography, were highlighted in Ruth Behar’s and Deborah A. Gordon’s 
Women Writing Culture (1995) which stressed the connection between representational 
features of ethnographic texts and the gender of theory.
15
 Thus, my analysis takes as its 
point of departure an outline of the anthropological context which shaped the tradition 
of theory to which Hurston belonged; in such a tradition, ‘culture’ as the pivotal concept 
of anthropology shows its entanglement with ‘race’ and both ideas are connected to 
theories and representations of the black (woman) body as ‘natural’, ‘savage’ and 
‘primitive’ which will problematize Hurston’s and Dunham’s choice to represent 
themselves as embodied characters in the framework of their ethnographies. 
In the first sections of Chapter One, therefore, the embodied aspect of 
primitiveness is treated in the context of the anthropological fairs taking place between 
the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The fairs are 
considered as a concrete example of hierarchical visual representation, but also as a 
possibility to speak out for some of the ‘Others’ of American anthropology, namely 
Native and African Americans. The following section of the chapter discusses ‘culture’ 
as the foundational concept of anthropology and its connections and differences with 
the humanistic meaning of the term in relation to some of the works by Franz Boas, the 
so-called father of American cultural anthropology, and one of the most important 
African-American intellectuals of the twentieth century, W. E. B. Du Bois. This section 
is aimed at considering both the legacy of the humanistic connotation in anthropology 
and the ‘democratization’ of the concept in the Boasian understanding of the term, so 
that the category of humanistic culture could open to include the contribution of African 
Americans in the Western arts. In the final section of this chapter, folklore as the core of 
the anthropological meaning of culture is analysed as an issue central to the emergence 
of a creative African-American identity both in anthropology and in black modernism, 
particularly in the 1920s movement of the Harlem Renaissance. The issue of African 
continuities in the Americas and their significance for the modern African-American 
identity is structured through the analysis of the main concepts in the works by the 
Jewish-American anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits and the African-American 
philosopher Alain Locke, especially in relation to his contribution to the Harlem 
Renaissance. The relationship between primitive, culture, and folklore is particularly 
                                                 
14
 James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997: 1985). 
15
 Ruth Behar and Deborah A. Gordon (eds.), Women Writing Culture (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
California: University of California Press, 1995). 
  
 
 
4 
significant for the emergence of an artistic, anthropological, and critical African-
American consciousness in the twentieth century; the incidence of African-American 
culture on American society and history had been denied by racism which tried to 
justify itself through scientific theories associating ‘non-white’ people to the primitive 
and the atavistic. The existence of African-American culture was later questioned by 
sociological approaches which tried to compensate for economic and social 
disadvantages in the African-American communities presenting them as basically 
deprived of both civil rights and a worthy culture by a history of slavery, segregation, 
and prejudice. From this perspective, ‘folklore’ was at risk to be read as ‘second-class’ 
or a surrogate for culture; its central position in Boasian anthropology, the Harlem 
Renaissance, and the study of other cultures of black diaspora in the Americas (and 
particularly in the Caribbean) offered a positive reconsideration of its presence in the 
United States, of its connections with African origins, and of its African-American 
rewritings. 
In this context, the role of the body in knowledge production will be taken into 
account as suggested by the Australian feminist Elizabeth Grosz whose work Volatile 
Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (1994) dealt with the invisibility of the 
philosopher’s body in the texts he produced.16 The representation of the embodied 
presence of the black woman researcher in ethnography raises important questions in 
relation to the portrayal of the black (female) body in literature, popular culture, and 
anthropology; as seen in Chapter One, modernity defined itself through the 
identification of a primitive Other distanced through bodily and temporal coordinates; 
hence, the representation of body in Hurston’s ethnography will be connected to the 
treatment of Time in anthropology in an analysis reminiscent of Johannes Fabian’s Time 
and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (1983) and his considerations on 
the use of Time in order to establish distance towards alterity in ethnographic texts.
17
 
The temporal and bodily elements enter into contact in the performative aspects of 
Hurston’s ethnography: orality will be explored as a possibility to introduce both body 
and the sharing of Time in fieldwork in the writing of ethnography. Chapters Two and 
Three will focus, respectively, on the representations of body and Time in Mules and 
Men considering them as the two main coordinates according to which the contrast 
between ‘modernity’ and ‘primitiveness’ has been articulated in the representations of 
                                                 
16
 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994). 
17
 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002: 1983). 
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cultural anthropology. In particular, the role of the body in relation to the strategies of 
distancing present in the ethnographical canon will inform my analysis of the ways in 
which Hurston was able to represent herself within her ethnography articulating the 
question of distance from or proximity to the anthropological ‘Other.’ Mules and Men is 
based on her fieldwork in Florida and Louisiana at the end of the 1920s: in her 
expedition, she visited both Eatonville, the community in which she grew up, and other 
African-American communities in Florida and New Orleans in which she dealt with 
differences of gender, class, and social status.  
Performance and representation of the body in writing also constitute the main 
connection between Hurston’s and Dunham’s works. Dunham (1909-2006) was one of 
the most important African-American dancers and choreographers of the twentieth 
century whose training in social anthropology with Alfred Radcliffe-Brown and 
Melville J. Herskovits marked her artistic endeavours through the creation of an original 
method and performative style which blended the traditions of African diasporic people 
in the Americas in a series of completely original and innovative shows. While most 
studies have mainly focused on her dance performances and biography
18
, this thesis 
tries to deal with the representations of body and performance in her writing considering 
her work as an example of autoethnography. Although the space dedicated to Dunham 
in the present analysis is limited, her presence is not subordinated to Hurston’s; on the 
contrary, it supplies an important counterbalance in the sketching of the context in 
which Hurston’s work took form and meaning. Both Hurston and Dunham visited the 
Caribbean in the mid-1930s and the role of this area, and of Haiti in particular, for both 
American anthropology and the African-American artistic imagination will be taken 
into account in Chapter Four; in this context, Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic: 
Modernity and Double Consciousness (1993) constitutes an important influence in my 
analysis of the diasporic dimension of African-American anthropology as conducted in 
the United States and the Caribbean.
19
 In particular, the dialectic relationship between 
‘roots’ and the homonym ‘routes’ as delineated by Gilroy20 constitutes the point of 
departure for an analysis of African-American anthropology considered as a constant 
renegotiation between the search for African roots and the exploration of alternative 
routes to envision an African-American critical and artistic identity trying to connect 
                                                 
18
 See, for example, Vèvè A. Clark and Sara E. Johnson (eds.), Kaiso! Writings by and about Katherine 
Dunham, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005) and Joyce Aschenbrenner, Katherine 
Dunham: Dancing a Life (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2002). 
19
 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (London: Verso Books, 1993). 
20
 See ibid., 19. 
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with other black people involved in the American diaspora. This analysis is also 
indebted to Talal Asad’s study on the relationship between British social anthropology 
and colonial expansion in so-called Third World territories
21
; the Caribbean will be 
considered as a pivotal area for both US imperialism and European colonialism and, as 
suggested by Herskovits, as a ‘laboratory’ for American cultural anthropology. As 
underlined by Asad, “the really interesting questions concern[ed] the ideological 
conditions of anthropology, and the implications of these conditions for its discourse”22; 
my attempt is to draft the contours of the African-American anthropological discourse 
in the passage from the United States to the Caribbean and its connections with and 
differences from anthropology at large and the emergent African-American modernist 
arts and criticism. 
 In relation to the Caribbean, the question of bodily ‘resemblance’ seems 
important for the potentialities of the ethnographer’s acceptance within the studied 
community. Nonetheless, factors of difference like nationality, language, and cultural 
frameworks, complicate the issues at work within Hurston’s and Dunham’s fieldworks 
and the ways of applying their anthropological methodologies. For these African-
American women anthropologists, the Caribbean could represent a ‘laboratory’ to 
question the possible links between Africa and Africa-America and delineate African 
legacies in the New World in a more precise manner in order to create and represent 
black diasporic identities in anthropology and art; at the same time, the contact with the 
Caribbean complicated their understanding of what being ‘African’ and ‘American’ 
could mean. In this study, therefore, the question of Du Bois’ concept of double 
consciousness
23
 is at work in important ways and, particularly, in the analysis of a 
double status shaped by the affinity with the United States at a national level while 
trying to envision a wider community linked to the transposition of Africa onto 
American ground. Above all, in the Caribbean area, the role of Haiti emerges as both a 
first example of emancipation and a place rich in myths and traditions of African legacy 
linked, in particular, to the practice of Vodoun. From this perspective, the Caribbean 
will be considered both as a geopolitical and historical area, but also as a trope in the 
discourse of both the African-American arts and the American anthropological 
imagination at large. 
                                                 
21
 Talal Asad, (ed.), Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1998: 
1973). 
22
 Talal Asad, “Anthropology and the Analysis of Ideology”, Man, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Dec., 
1979), 607. 
23
 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: New American Library, 1995: 1903). 
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Chapter 1: “Ethnographers in a Footnote”:  American Cultural 
Anthropology, Folklore, and the Harlem Renaissance between 
Primitivism and Modernism 
 
I began reading all I could find on the subject of “The Negro and His 
Folkways and Superstitions.” There were Botkin and Puckett and others, 
all white, most racist. How was I to believe anything they wrote, since at 
least one of them, Puckett, was capable of wondering, in his book, if 
“The Negro” had a large enough brain? 
Well, I thought, where are the black collectors? Where is the black 
anthropologist? Where is the black person who took the time to travel the 
back roads of the South and collect the information I need… where was 
this black person? 
And that is when I first saw, in a footnote to the white voices of 
authority, the name Zora Neale Hurston.
24
 
 
In this account of her search for reliable sources for a short story on Voodoo, the 
African-American writer Alice Walker underlines the main focus of the present chapter, 
namely the relationship between anthropological theory and race, culture, and folklore 
in the United States between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and their 
articulation of questions and answers in relation to the role of the primitive within 
modern sciences, art, and society. Asking “where is the black anthropologist?” 
presupposes another crucial question, that is “what does black mean in American 
anthropology?” while articulating “a discourse of race that interrogates whiteness” as 
well;
25
 only after considering the role of ‘race’ and later ‘culture’ in American 
anthropological theory, in fact, is it possible to recognize the impact of anthropologists 
of different ethnic backgrounds within the discipline and in the renewal of its 
ethnographical practices. Furthermore, it is pivotal to understand how anthropology and 
society mutually influenced each other in order to represent blackness while 
constructing whiteness and assigning meaning to each of them throughout American 
history. In turn, the conjoined agency of scientific authority and institutional control 
was able to affect politics and history in relation to segregationist measures in the first 
part of the twentieth century, and desegregation procedures and civil rights movements 
in the second half of the 1900s. This change of perspective, although prompted by 
historical processes and financial interests, had been made possible by the ‘cultural turn’ 
in anthropology, that is, the significant shift within what is commonly defined as ‘the 
                                                 
24
 Alice Walker, In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose by Alice Walker (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), 11. [Emphases in the original] 
25
 bell hooks, “Critical Interrogation: Talking Race, Resisting Racism”, Inscriptions, no. 5, 1989, 162. 
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study of the humankind’ from a biological to a cultural framework of reference. Such a 
shift constituted a progressive, though controversial, separation from disciplines like 
zoology and biology, at first considered strictly related to anthropology, and the 
development of an interest in the environmental causes which affect human 
development. 
In this brief introductory section to the chapter, the term ‘development’ is here 
deliberately employed to focus the reader’s attention on the connection between a main 
methodological approach in anthropology and a main trope exceeding it, i.e. between 
‘evolutionism’, particularly in the guise of a social Darwinism affecting the discipline 
from its outset
26
, and what is at the same time its theoretical assumption and 
representational by-product, the lingering presence of the ‘primitive.’ This trope is 
fundamental to the understanding of the hierarchical construction of race in 
anthropology and the use of it in American society; the concepts of ‘primitive’, 
‘primitiveness’, and ‘primitivism’ were indeed forces operating in the representations 
and works of African Americans throughout the twentieth century, the measure against 
which their endeavours were judged, the criterion according to which their need for 
equal rights and their position in American society were assessed, and their search for 
cultural origins framed. The idea of the ‘primitive’ constantly shows the paradox of its 
presence: it is something to overcome in order to accomplish the mission of 
‘modernity’, but its removal would mean the loss of the fundamental principle through 
which modernity distinguishes itself from its supposed past while measuring the extent 
of its accomplishments. The ‘primitive’ is, at the same time, ‘who or what comes 
before’ and ‘who or what remains’ in order to fulfil one of its primary functions, namely 
the celebration of modern civilization and progress; in fact, as observed by Bruno 
Latour, “[f]or traditional anthropologists, there is not – there cannot be, there should not 
be – an anthropology of the modern world”27 whereas ‘modern’ is defined according to 
Sandra Harding referring to “kinds of society governed by the kind of rationality for 
                                                 
26
 Lee D. Baker underlines the role of just few ethnologists in the shaping of anthropology as science in 
the United States at the end of the nineteenth century: the “naturalist and explorer John Wesley Powell, 
who was the research leader, Frederic Ward Putnam, the museum builder whose academic focus was 
American archaeology, and Daniel G. Brinton, the academician who was professor of ethnology at the 
Academy of Natural Sciences in Philadelphia… Although none of these ethnologists was a strict Social 
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which Western science provides the model.”28 The celebration of this modernity took a 
primary form of visual and pragmatic representation in the context of the 
anthropological fairs being held in various American and European cities between the 
end of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. 
 
1.1 “A quiet unconscious schooling to the thoughtful people”29: social science and 
the spectacle of race at the world’s fairs 
 
“The General Motors tower rises, a bright orange tribute to Modernism, 
over the wigwams and tepees and hogans of the oldest Americans, over 
the dances and feathers and beads in the Indian stadium… ‘What a 
distance we have come’, is the theme of the World’s Fair, but nowhere 
does it come so sharply to the visitor as when he attends the Indian 
ceremonials.”30 
 
Whether one turns to the Seattle fair, where schoolchildren poked Igorot 
women with straw, or the Omaha, Buffalo, and St. Louis fairs, where 
Geronimo sold his autograph for ten cents, the expositions… gave 
millions of Americans first-hand experience with treating nonwhites 
from around the world as commodities.
31
 
 
As noted by Anne McClintock in relation to imperialism, it can be said of world’s fairs 
that their emergence coincided with a historical juncture during which “commodity 
racism became distinct from scientific racism in its capacity to expand beyond the 
literate.”32 In fact, for millions of Americans the international exhibitions constituted an 
occasion to be instructed on the marvels of industrial modernity and progress while 
having a first-hand experience of commodities from around the world and of the people 
producing them. 
  
Between 1876 and 1916, nearly one hundred million people visited the 
international expositions held at Philadelphia, New Orleans, Chicago, 
Atlanta, Nashville, Omaha, Buffalo, Saint Louis, Portland, Seattle, San 
Francisco, and San Diego… Fairs provided manufacturing and 
commercial interests with opportunities to promote the mass 
consumption of their products… [while] ideas about race, nationality, 
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and progress… molded the fairs into ideologically coherent “symbolic 
universes” confirming and extending the authority of the country’s 
corporate, political, and scientific leadership.
33
 
 
Actually, the distinction between people and goods was rather weak as Robert W. 
Rydell demonstrates when commenting on the location of the Philippines Reservation at 
Louisiana Purchase Exhibition, or the St. Louis World’s Fair, in 1904. The pavilion, 
situated next to the American Indian Reservation, was “an exhibit of 1,200 Filipinos 
living at the center of the fairgrounds”34 standing as a symbol of the newly acquired 
imperial supremacy of the United States which were finally able “to compete with the 
colonial displays that European powers had been building into European fairs since the 
1851 London Crystal Palace Exhibition.”35 In particular, apart from the proximity with 
American Indians, Filipinos were located amongst disparate goods and items; their 
positioning in this context was a clear signal of the place they would have come to 
occupy within the political and economic influence of the United States. In fact, “[they] 
would not only be producers and consumers in the American empire, but could be 
regarded and manipulated as commodities themselves. By objectifying the Filipinos, 
this exhibit also had the effect of confirming in white Americans a sense of their own 
racial and cultural superiority;”36 besides, in the analysis of Georg Lukács, “the 
commodity lies on the threshold of culture and commerce”37 and the fairs could be 
certainly considered an adequate representation of such a threshold, suspended as they 
were between educational purposes and business goals and objectives. 
The effect of racial and cultural supremacy was typically based on the optical 
display of goods and peoples in the attempt of ordering them on the basis of their 
supposed distance from or closeness to the ideal of progress and modernity celebrated 
throughout the exhibitions: 
 
[…] woven into the dream world of goods was a hierarchical continuum 
of material and racial progress that signified nothing so much as the 
distance travelled from “savagery” to “civilization.” And in a world alive 
with Social-Darwinian ideas of evolution, displays of material and 
natural abundance became an outward sign of inward racial “fitness” and 
culture.
38
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The educational aspect of the fairs was variously stressed by the politics supporting 
their organization which involved the theoretical contribution of social and natural 
scientists;
39
 in fact, the exhibitions had an enormous impact in popularizing science and 
creating consensus in relation to new ways of production and consumption while 
diverting the general attention from ongoing financial crises and social contradictions 
within the American society of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From 
many angles, they represented that threefold definition of ‘reproduction’ (of labour, of 
submission to ideology, and of its manipulation) provided by Louis Althusser: 
 
[t]he reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its 
skills, but also at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the 
ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to 
manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation 
and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the 
ruling class ‘in and by words’ [par la parole].40 
 
Fairs constituted a discourse connecting the nineteenth to the twentieth century 
through the tropes of progress and civilization and had reproductive effects in terms of 
representations of ‘alterity’ – mainly embodied by Native Americans – and significant 
omissions, usually in relation to the role of African Americans in that same history of 
progress. As observed by Lee D. Baker in relation to the 1904 Louisiana Purchase 
Exposition, “the overarching theme the fair organizers promoted was still unbridled 
American progress – but not for the Negro. African Americans were systematically 
erased from the representation of American industrial and cultural progress.”41 In so 
doing, the display of technological skills in comparison to ‘less advanced’ stages of 
development was intended to have an effect on the mass audience in order to favour 
widespread acceptance of the dominant ideology while attempting to manipulate public 
opinion in relation to imperialistic claims and the rising interests of corporations. Fairs 
constituted occasions to dominate not only “‘in and by words’ [par la parole]”, but also 
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and predominantly ‘in and by images’, par tableaux42, whether they were tableaux 
vivants as in the case of Indian villages’ reproductions or ‘still lives’ composed by 
manufactured products and handmade goods.  
It is important to remember that these international exhibitions started to be 
organized a couple of decades after the invention of photography in 1839 and shared 
with this innovation the will to document, represent, and order.
43
 McClintock rightly 
comments that “photography shifted the authority of universal knowledge from print 
language to spectacle. If the camera’s claim to truth rested on the science of optics, its 
effect was to reorder, at a stroke, the hierarchies of world history.”44 The fairs were, in 
fact, suspended between the desire for order and comparison expressed in various ways 
throughout the natural and social sciences and the centrality of the optical spectacle in 
mass representation relating the field of photography to the growing advertisement 
industry. Proceeding into the twentieth century, the optical perspective became pivotal 
in the elaboration of what Rydell calls “the exhibition culture in the 1920s – a culture 
that included department stores, museums, and local fairs.”45 This visual element also 
shaped what McClintock considers to be two main tropes of the “imperial science of the 
surface”, namely “panoptical time” and “anachronistic space.”46 In the case of world’s 
fairs, these two tropes functioned together in the visual display of culture and in the 
reconstruction of places where time appeared as arrested in an indeterminate, yet 
distant, past; the “visual paradigm” made it possible to represent “evolutionary progress 
as a measurable spectacle”47 in ways similar to the depiction of “the family tree of 
man”48 already circulating in scientific contexts. The first-hand experience of ‘alterity’ 
that many visitors had in these international exhibits was regulated by a panoptical 
conception of time as “the image of global history consumed – at a glance – in a single 
spectacle from a point of privileged invisibility.”49 The visual display and displacement 
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of the ‘Other’ was finally regulated by the coordinates of Time and its effects on the 
‘body’ understood as those fields where the border between ‘civilization’ and 
‘savagery’ was defined through visible signs of definitive distance from one another. 
Within this ocularcentric context, where visual representation proliferates and 
‘alterity’ becomes spectacle, the role of subaltern voices is central in order to focus on 
the possibilities for agency dwelling in the interstices between ethnology and 
entertainment. Even though, in the present analysis, it is not possible to give a complete 
history of the complex relationship between the popularization of science and the 
advent of mass production in its various forms of media, consumerism, and leisure 
industry, a study of some of the texts which can frame such relationships during the 
world’s fairs will be proposed as a sort of counternarrative to the official records of 
history and science. These counternarratives enable the reader to appreciate a set of 
alternative representations germinating within (and despite of) American consciousness. 
In this chapter, an analysis of a public speech, a pamphlet, and a popular ballad will 
serve as examples of articulation of alternative voices in contrast to the dominant 
discourse of the fairs in order to sketch the possibilities for “an account of radical 
historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects.”50 The first two 
texts have a historical background in the context of one of the most important American 
fairs in the nineteenth century, namely the World’s Columbian Exposition held in 
Chicago in 1893 in order to celebrate the first four hundred years of American 
discovery while the last text is grounded in African-American folklore as collected by 
the black anthropologist and novelist Zora Neale Hurston during her period of fieldwork 
in Florida in the late 1920s.  
 
1.2 “Can the subalterns speak?” … and do they write? “The Red Man’s Greeting” 
and “The Reason Why the Colored American Is Not at the Columbian Exposition” 
(1893) 
 
Simon Pokagon’s “The Red Man’s Greeting” and “Why the Colored American Is Not at 
the Columbian Exposition”, edited by the African-American sociologist Ida B. Wells 
with the contribution of the major activist and orator Frederick Douglass, offered to 
their authors the possibility to enter the discursive realm of history whereas scientific 
theorizing, in its narrative of evolution, progress, and modernity, was deliberately 
ignoring a wider historical contextualization. Both texts are a reaction to the 
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organization of the World’s Columbian Exposition held in Chicago in 1893 in order to 
celebrate the four-hundredth anniversary of the American discovery; both texts show a 
problematic relationship to the rhetoric of progress, but they spread out from different 
mainstream attitudes towards the ‘Others’ of American society, namely Native and 
African Americans. In particular, according to the analysis by Anna R. Paddon and 
Sally Turner, although limited, the activities of African Americans at the fair served as 
“foundations for black political, social, and artistic movements in the twentieth 
century.”51   
The reader will be confronted with two written texts, but the main performative 
difference between them is their original status as a spoken and a written text. This 
difference in status accounts for a difference in visibility linked to a representational 
presence of the ‘vanishing American’ and the invisibility reserved to African Americans 
throughout the fair, but in the present analysis the pamphlet will be framed within the 
speeches that Douglass had the opportunity to give in order to honour the participation 
of Haiti in the international fair. In order to provide a basic visual context for these 
texts, it is here useful to remember that, as reported by Elliott M. Rudwick and August 
Meier, “[b]ecause all its buildings had white exteriors, the fair was called ‘The White 
City;’ but Negro visitors dubbed it ‘the great American white elephant’, or ‘the white 
American World’s Fair.’”52 
Simon Pokagon’s “The Red Man’s Greeting” (originally “The Red Man’s 
Rebuke”) is, in fact, the written version of the speech Pokagon gave at the opening 
ceremony of the fair. The Cambridge History of American Literature is eloquent in its 
description of the visual effect Pokagon’s speech should have produced at the fair: 
 
The fair’s opening-day ceremony commemorating Columbus’s first 
voyage to America featured speeches by an array of white dignitaries, but 
before the addresses from politicians and fair organizers, a Native 
American, Simon Pokagon, came forward to ring a replica of the Liberty 
Bell. The resulting tableau was an elegant solution to the problem of how 
to express the aspirations of a democratic republic in an age of empire. 
The sight of a Native American sounding the state symbol of US 
sovereignty created a continuity of national meaning by way of balanced 
contrast, the red body linked with the state symbol of liberty. The visual 
symbol could achieve in a single moment what the speeches could only 
                                                 
51
 Anna R. Paddon and Sally Turner, “African Americans and the World’s Columbian Exposition”, 
Illinois Historical Journal, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), 19. 
52
 Elliott M. Rudwick and August Meier, “Black Man in the ‘White City’: Negro and the Columbian 
Exposition, 1893”, Phylon (1960-), Vol. 26, No. 4 (4th Qtr., 1965), 354. 
  
 
 
15 
attempt in a temporal sequence: the formal equipoise necessary to 
contain the internal tensions of an empire of liberty.
53
 
 
How was Pokagon’s body different from the other Native-American bodies at the fair in 
their double presence of appearances in Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show and ‘living 
artefacts’ in the anthropological pavilions? As observed by Sacvan Bercovitch and 
Cyrus R. K. Patell, “Pokagon, a Powatoni from Southern Michigan, was… considered a 
hybrid, a civilized Native American… deemed a fitting figure for the amalgam of 
Native-American origins and a US global destiny.”54 His presence there thus constituted 
that connector between the idealized representations of entertainment and 
anthropological shows and the results of progress celebrated throughout the exposition. 
Although similar in appearance to those other bodies, Pokagon’s presence was marked 
by a difference because, through his speech, he embodied that movement intervening 
between the ‘then’ of those anthropological representations fixed in an ahistorical past 
and the ‘now’ of scientific progress and technological accomplishment, namely the 
effects of ‘civilization’ on a person in the flesh and, as he was speaking on behalf of 
Native Americans, on the people he was there to represent as well. As noticed by 
Bercovitch and Patell, “[f]or all its ability to reduce people to pictures, the arena of 
racial spectacle was still a public space in which an English speaker like Pokagon could 
convert his value as a picture into a form of popular authority, in order to redirect his 
own iconic status as a representative Native American.”55 
The reader is here confronted with the dichotomy inherent in the word 
‘representation’ according to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s critique of its use within the 
philosophical tradition: making reference to Karl Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte (1852), Spivak makes an essential distinction between Darstellung and 
Vertretung;
56
 both terms can be translated into English as ‘representation’, but they refer 
to different representative realms as the first is linked to aesthetics and the second to 
politics. According to Spivak, by ignoring “the aesthetic dimension of political 
representation”57, Western intellectuals end up silencing subaltern voices58, already 
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silenced by dominant historical accounts. In the particular case under examination, 
Pokagon is indeed passing from the realm of representation as Darstellung controlled 
by the organisation of the fair and, although unable to completely divide himself from 
such representation and the meanings ascribed to it by his audience, carries out a 
transition to the alternative meaning of representation, Vertretung, or representation as 
“speaking for.”59 
As for the opportunities of representation for African Americans throughout the 
fair, it is possible to focus on a representational shift by analogy performed through a 
double strategy of concealment of African Americans and concomitant exhibition of 
people from Africa and the Caribbean. Lee D. Baker reminds us that: 
 
[t]he limited representation of African Americans in Chicago needs to be 
juxtaposed with the extravagant representation of indigenous folk 
throughout the Americas, black folk from other places in the diaspora, 
and the foreign nationals who perform on the midway… The Chicago 
World’s Fair occurred at the height of the campaign to assimilate the 
Indian.
60
 
 
The referral of representation in terms of Darstellung provokes interesting effects on the 
political possibilities of representation as Vertretung as is noticeable in Douglass’ words 
when he states “as if to shame the Negro, the Dahomians are… here to exhibit the 
Negro as a repulsive savage.”61 This association with the savage and the primitive 
which includes Douglass’ observations within a rhetoric of civilization and progress 
produces a further shift in the speeches he had the occasion to give during the fair, well 
before the contested “Colored American Day” in August 1893, which were delivered in 
the Haitian Pavilion at the beginning of the same year. “Haiti Among the Most 
Civilized Nations of the Earth” and “Haiti and the Haitian People” are speeches 
delivered to commemorate and celebrate the birth of Haiti as “an independent black 
republic”62 marking the ninetieth anniversary of Haitian independence from France.  
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What emerges from these speeches is that, given the impossibility of 
autonomous representation for African Americans and the undesired representational 
association with people from Africa who were seen as primitive subjects destined to be 
swept away by Western imperialistic expansion, the interstice of choice offered by the 
analogical mode of representation is traceable in the possibility of deciding, from a 
subject position, the target of such association; the role of Haitian people in Douglass’ 
speeches is a reversal of the analogical strategy, providing African Americans with a 
positive Darstellung in order to reach significant Vertretung as “the Haitian people were 
battling not just the French but also what Douglass terms ‘the ruling race of the world’: 
whites both within and beyond the borders of Haiti.”63  
In fact, Frederick Douglass’ homage to Haiti is an example of a discursive 
strategy able to destabilize the minstrel mask, or the mask imposed on African 
Americans both by science and society at large, according to the complementary axes of 
“mastery of form” and “deformation of mastery.”64 These two positions informing later 
African-American artistic forms and creative expression seem revealing of what Slavoj 
Žižek describes as “two closely linked perspectives between which no neutral common 
ground is possible.”65 Through the strategies of mastery of form and deformation of 
mastery, Douglass – like later Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. DuBois – was 
indeed able to displace the minstrel mask of anthropological representation while 
causing a shift in its perception which opened it to new possibilities for representation 
and new definitions; namely, if direct representation was not possible for African 
Americans, they had an opportunity for representing themselves autonomously through 
shifting the coordinates towards Haiti, as a part of the Americas and a first pragmatic 
example of freedom and independence for black people in the New World.
66
 As we will 
see later in this chapter, it is exactly this opening towards new possibilities for outdated 
models and stereotypes that marks the black cultural movement of the Harlem 
Renaissance in the second decade of the twentieth century. These new possibilities were 
already germinating in Douglass’ times framed by the language of civilization and 
progress in which modernity was both contrasted to the primitive and marked by a sense 
of “decadence – of the passing of the old order.”67  
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In both Pokagon’s and Douglass’ speeches the audience is confronted with a 
representational reassignment thanks to the choice of different temporal and spatial 
coordinates: a shift in history for Pokagon who refers to the historical truth hidden by 
the celebration of American discovery and progress; a shift in geography for Douglass 
who sees Haiti as an aspiration for African Americans. The coordinate of history is 
nonetheless important in the pamphlet “Why the Colored American Is Not at the 
Columbian Exposition” in which Douglass ascribes to historical factors, namely to the 
slavery system, the lack of representation for African Americans at the fair: “So when it 
is asked why we are excluded from the World’s Columbian Exposition, the answer is 
Slavery.”68 Robert Steven Levine comments on Douglass’ contribution to the pamphlet 
observing that “[i]n the tradition of his 1857 address on West Indies emancipation, [he] 
underscores the role of black agency in achieving freedom for blacks in the American 
hemisphere, holding up Haiti as ‘the original pioneer emancipator of the nineteenth 
century.’”69 In this context, it is important to underline that the stylistic strategy used by 
Douglass in the introductory section of the pamphlet is opposite to the analogical mode 
detected in the Haitian speech: in fact, in order to direct the attention to the unfair 
treatment African Americans have been exposed to during the organization of the 
exposition, Douglass opts for an antithetical structure to strengthen his point. He states: 
“[t]here are many good things concerning our country and countrymen of which we 
would be glad to tell in this pamphlet, if we could do so, and at the same time tell the 
truth.”70 The contrast is even heightened by Douglass’ choice to articulate his position 
within that same rhetoric of progress to which the previous pages have made reference 
and which constituted the ideological basis for the exposition.  
 
We would like for instance to tell our visitors that the moral progress of 
the American people has kept even pace with their enterprise and their 
material civilization; that practice by the ruling class has gone on hand in 
hand with American professions; that two hundred and sixty years of 
progress and enlightenment have banished barbarism and race hate from 
the United States; that the old things of slavery have entirely passed 
away, and that all things pertaining to the colored people have become 
new; that American liberty is now the undisputed possession of all the 
American people… that mobs are not allowed to supersede courts of law 
or usurp the place of government; that here Negroes are not tortured, 
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shot, hanged or burned to death merely on suspicion of crime and 
without ever seeing a judge, a jury or advocate; that the American 
Government is in reality a Government of the people, by the people and 
for the people, and for all the people… that this World's Columbian 
Exposition, with its splendid display of wealth and power, its triumphs of 
art and its multitudinous architectural and other attractions, is a fair 
indication of the elevated and liberal sentiment of the American people, 
and that to the colored people of America, morally speaking, the World's 
Fair now in progress, is not a whited sepulcher. All this, and more, we 
would gladly say of American laws, manners, customs and Christianity. 
But unhappily, nothing of all this can be said, without qualification and 
without flagrant disregard of the truth.
71
 
 
The pamphlet is dedicated to “the seeker after truth” and has a preface in 
English, French, and German. It is exactly this ideal reader in search for the truth that 
Douglass is addressing here; what emerges from this passage is a dichotomous 
relationship between what he defines as ‘moral progress’ as contrasted to ‘material 
progress.’ The violence directed against African Americans is both historical as rooted 
in the slavery system, but also painfully ‘modern’ in its new forms of segregation, 
lynching, and attempts at hampering African-American progress itself. Douglass 
observes that “[t]he enemies of the Negro see that he is making progress and they 
naturally wish to stop him and keep him in just what they consider his proper place.”72 
In fact, he is here addressing the paradox at the very heart of modern American 
citizenship: on the one hand, in order to be part of it, immigrants, Native Americans, 
and African Americans – through different modalities – are asked to completely adhere 
to the system; on the other, though, that same system rejects them when the assimilation 
seems the most ‘successful.’ In this sense, the pamphlet anticipates the structure of an 
African-American journal like The Crisis, edited by W. E. B. Du Bois in the 1910s-
1920s, in which the denunciation of acts of violence against African Americans was 
juxtaposed to the detailed account of their achievements in business and education in 
order to “replace derogatory images of African Americans with ones that draw attention 
to their achievements and their contributions to American society and culture.”73 
By framing his introduction in the context of the ‘progress’ that served as the 
main theme for the fair, Douglass exposed the inconsistencies in the advancement 
project where phases of seeming emancipation were, indeed, marked by the same 
ideologies and attitudes which had previously justified and validated the system of 
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slavery. As observed by Paul Gilroy, “the moral and political problem of slavery 
loomed large not least because it was once recognised as internal to the structure of 
western civilisation and appeared as a central political and philosophical concept in the 
emergent discourse of modern English cultural uniqueness.”74 From this perspective, 
the enfranchisement of African Americans would have been just an apparent sign of 
progress as Douglass “listed the rights that African Americans still did not have, 
although they had been free Americans for thirty years.”75 No material progress was, in 
fact, feasible if not accompanied by that ‘moral’ change that would have tackled the 
problem of social inequality. After the paradoxes of assimilation and emancipation, a 
third and final inconsistency emerges in the comparison between the pamphlet and 
Douglass’ lecture on Haiti: although the American perception of the island is linked to 
metaphors of barbarism and savagery in their different forms of “voodoism, fetishism, 
serpent worship, and cannibalism”76, the presence of Haiti at the Columbian Exposition 
“is a proof that she has the courage and the ability to stand up and be counted in the 
great procession of our nineteenth century’s civilization.”77 Furthermore, as a first 
example of emancipation for black people in the New World, Haiti has a very peculiar 
place in Douglass’ discourse: if, on the one hand, he underlines the limits of its 
achievements because of what he defines as “this revolutionary spirit of Haiti [which] is 
her curse, her crime, her greatest calamity and the explanation of the limited condition 
of her civilization”78; on the other, the Caribbean island stands as the highest example of 
‘civilization’ (“Haiti is fortunate. She has in many things been first”79) because “its 
present inhabitants are still more interesting as having been actors in great moral and 
social events.”80 Haiti, as “the cradle in which American religion and civilization were 
first rocked”81: 
  
[…] has been made the theatre of great events. She was the first of all the 
Atlantic world, upon which the firm foot of the progressive, aggressive 
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and all-conquering white man was permanently set. Her grand old 
tropical forests, fields and mountains, were among the first of the New 
World to have their silence broken by trans-Atlantic song and speech. 
She was the first to be invaded by the Christian religion and to witness its 
forms and ordinances.
82
 
 
Haiti, in its history and very existence, incarnates the paradoxes of ‘civilization’ when 
faced with the incongruities of slavery, systematic violence and the civilizing message 
of Christianity because “[i]n thinking of Haiti, a painful, perplexing and contradictory 
fact meets us at the outset. It is: that negro slavery was brought to the New World by the 
same people from whom Haiti received her religion and her civilization.”83 By using the 
“Spanish Christians” as a convenient figure of displacement for the US’ own 
idiosyncrasies, Douglass is finally able to articulate a condemnation of that same system 
which exploited and destroyed according to a teleological Weltanschauung, as a 
“narrative of a chosen people or chosen community (communauté élue)”84, whose 
progress ends up with the reduction of people to obstacles to be exploited, dominated, 
and either assimilated or finally deleted.  
Douglass’ unveiling of the intrinsic moral fallacies of the system is echoed by 
Pokagon’s speech; after mentioning the feeling of “Christian charity”, he concludes 
with the following words: 
 
[n]o cheer of sympathy is given us; but in answer to our complaints we 
are told the triumphal march of the Eastern race westward is by the 
unalterable decree of nature, termed by them “the survival of the fittest.” 
And so we stand as upon the seashore, chained hand and foot, while the 
incoming tide of the great ocean of civilization rises slowly but surely to 
overwhelm us.
85
 
 
Through the words “the survival of the fittest” and their reference to social Darwinism, 
Pokagon underlines the migration of the teleological perspective from the context of 
religion to that of science: in this new framework, the idea of ‘civilization’ does not lose 
its sacred character, but finds a new mission in the project of modernity. As Renato 
Rosaldo comments, “[t]he process of modernity involves a movement from religion and 
metaphysics to art, morality, and science. Hence the ideological equation of the modern 
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with the superiority of high culture and the traditional with the inferiority of popular 
culture.”86 
This new project shows here its menacing side for the ‘Others’ of American 
history:  the contrast between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ stands for the incapacity and 
unwillingness to overcome the historical inequalities inherent in a system straining to 
maintain them. It is useful, therefore, to look at modernity in the context of a 
‘traditional’ art form such as the ballad confronting itself with new material, namely the 
emerging industrial contexts of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth century when black people had to face the material consequences of such an 
idea of progress. The anthropologist and folklorist Zora Neale Hurston, who collected 
the ballad “John Henry” among other songs and tales during her fieldwork in Florida at 
the end of the 1920s, stated that “John Henry has no place in Negro folk-lore except in 
this one circumstance.”87 The ‘circumstance’ of the folksong is a challenge between an 
African-American railroad worker (a “steel driver”) and a machine, namely a steam 
drill; John Henry wants to demonstrate that he can beat the technological innovation in 
hammering spikes, “and asks his boss for a 9-pound hammer saying that if he has a 
good hammer he can beat the steam drill driving.”88 
 
John Henry driving on the right hand side, 
Steam drill driving on the left, 
Says, ‘fore I’ll let your steam drill beat me down 
I’ll hammer my fool self to death, 
Hammer my fool self to death. 
 
John Henry told his Captain, 
When you go to town 
Please bring me a nine pound hammer 
And I’ll drive your steel on down, 
And I’ll drive your steel on down.89 
 
Houston A. Baker has noticed that, in this folksong, the contest between man and 
machine “reflects more than a simple contest; what we have in ‘John Henry’ is the 
essential dichotomy of the nineteenth-century industrial revolution and the twentieth-
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century age of technology.”90 The destiny of the labourer is, sadly, to be crushed within 
an economy in which he could not be seen as the one capable to master such new 
technology, but as the tool that technology could replace.  
 
John Henry told his Captain, 
Man ain’t nothing but a man, 
And ‘fore I’ll let that steam drill beat me down 
I’ll die with this hammer in my hand, 
Die with this hammer in my hand.
91
 
 
Both in its style and content, the ballad helps us in articulating several questions 
concerning widespread notions about ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition;’ Hurston underlines 
“the comparative newness of the song by the fact that he [John Henry] is competing 
with something as recent as a steam drill”92 while showing the presence of 
interpolations derived from English ballads
93
 in order to emphasize the dynamic and 
hybrid character of the folklore she collected. According to Harding’s definition of 
‘suturing’, this ballad could be considered as a moment of suture between tradition and 
modernity
94
, in which technological innovations are not ‘value-neutral;’ on the contrary, 
“they can have politics.”95 In fact, technological change always entails 
 
the struggles over which social groups will get to design, use, or repair 
new technologies and their required material environments, and which 
ones will benefit from these. Who will get the highly skilled, highly paid, 
and high-status educations and jobs and who will end up with the 
minimally skilled, low-paid, and low-status jobs, or even with no jobs?
96
 
 
Without the ‘moral’ change envisioned by Douglass, technological innovation 
becomes just another coordinate of disenfranchisement in the poetics and politics of 
modernity conceived as that unstoppable progress which, in Pokagon’s conclusion to 
his speech, will sweep away all that is perceived as an obstacle to its ideal 
accomplishment. As we will see in the next sections of the present chapter, the poetics 
and politics of modernity and primitiveness influenced both the very notion of ‘culture’ 
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in its anthropological and humanistic meanings and the notion of ‘folklore’ as used in 
anthropology and modernist art. 
 
1.3 The cultural turn in anthropology and the black man’s culture: Franz Boas 
and W. E. B. Du Bois 
 
Culture embraces all the manifestations of social habits of a community, 
the reactions of the individual as affected by the habits of the group in 
which he lives, and the product of human activities as determined by 
these habits.
97
 
 
Patience, humility, and adroitness must, in these growing black youth, 
replace impulse, manliness, and courage. With this sacrifice there is an 
economic opening, and perhaps peace and some prosperity. Without this 
there is riot, migration, or crime. Nor is this situation peculiar to the 
Southern United States, is it not rather the only method by which 
undeveloped races have gained the right to share modern culture? The 
price of culture is a Lie.
98
 
 
In the first of the two quotations provided here, Franz Boas, the so-called ‘father’ of 
American cultural anthropology, was trying to shape his own definition of ‘culture’ in 
relation to one of the first definitions of the term which had been provided some fifty 
years before, in 1871, by the English anthropologist E. B. Tylor: “Culture, or 
Civilization, taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities acquired 
by man as a member of society.”99 George W. Stocking, Jr. keenly observes that 
“Edward Burnett Tylor created a science by defining its substance – culture. But 
story
100
 recognizes also that Tylor did not invent the word, that it had been and 
continues to have now a congeries of ‘humanist’ meanings in addition to its ‘correct’ 
anthropological meaning.”101 The aim of this part of the chapter is to show the 
intersection between the anthropological and the humanist meanings of the term 
‘culture’ and its connection with the concept of ‘race’, which preceded and 
accompanied its elaboration; the works of Franz Boas and W. E. B. Du Bois, two of the 
most prominent figures of American anthropology and sociology, will be here used as 
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pivotal examples of how the discourse on culture was articulated in anthropology 
between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century and the 
impact that theories of culture had on African-American culture and its reception in 
American society at large. Lee D. Baker remarks that, although their theories were not 
widespread from the start, they influenced the subsequent research as “[b]oth men laid 
the scientific foundation for studying race and culture in the social sciences for the 
balance of this century”102 while being, in their respective fields, “the leading 
spokesperson[s] against Social Darwinism and for liberal reform.”103 
The intersection between the anthropological and humanist meanings of 
‘culture’ is particularly interesting as it can be used to underline one of its assumptions 
and the significance of this premise in the reception of different cultures within the 
anthropological canon: although a sheer separation cannot be established, it is quite 
clear that only one of the two connotations can be directly related to writing and 
literacy. Stephan Feuchtwang has stressed the role of literacy as “one of the main 
criteria of social classification in anthropology and what is central to its studies: 
preliterate people”104 while underlining the unequal power relations inherent in its 
practices as “a lack of challenge by its subjects, unable to read the finished work.”105 
According to Raymond Williams, 
 
[w]e use the word culture in… two senses: to mean a whole way of life – 
the common meanings; to mean the arts and learning – the special 
processes of discovery and creative effort. Some writers reserve the word 
for one or other of these senses; I insist on both, and on the significance 
of their conjunction. The questions I ask about our culture are questions 
about deep personal meanings. Culture is ordinary, in every society and 
in every mind.
106
 
 
In questioning the conjunction of the two meanings of the term and their deeper 
implications in everyday life, the role of historical processes and social inequalities in 
the distribution of knowledge must be addressed from the particular context of 
American society where ample sectors of the population had been excluded from 
education within an economical system that used biological racism in order to maintain 
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and justify its inequalities. Anthropology at its outset was both a product of this system 
– in the sense that its theories were directly influenced by the prejudice spreading from 
social interactions – and a support to that same system as research was generally 
financed and directed in order to strengthen the inequalities from which it stemmed. In 
the history of the discipline in the United States, therefore, the ‘cultural turn’ coincided 
with Boas’ decision to distinguish language and culture from race whereas his emphasis 
on the central role of the environment in shaping and influencing the people who inhabit 
it constituted a landmark which not only affected all the subsequent theory and research, 
but also – as demonstrated by Lee D. Baker – showed the decisive impact that 
anthropology can have on social change and the way in which society can borrow some 
anthropological concepts while apparently ignoring others. It is through these practices 
of borrowing and concealment that anthropology could be used to support segregation 
before and desegregation after.  
Apart from the pre-literate/literate tension, it is possible to observe another area 
of friction between these two ideas of culture, namely the plural meaning of 
anthropological ‘culture’ thanks to the Boasian introduction of the particularity of 
cultures, on the one hand, and the universalizing aspiration of ‘culture’ in its humanist 
understanding, on the other. During the evolutionist phase of anthropology, the 
acknowledgement of different cultural contexts had been connected to the generalizing 
project of culture in its humanist sense, so that the different cultures encountered in the 
colonial context and in the American westward expansion had been ranked according to 
their supposed closeness to or distance from the Western ideal of culture. In Tylor’s 
definition, the contiguity of the term with ‘Civilization’ (capitalized by the 
anthropologist himself) becomes apparent while, within the ordering project, its 
connection with ‘Race’ was marked by a biological determinism used to demonstrate 
that people considered as racially inferior were unable to attain the highest degree of 
culture understood as Civilization. In the passage from ‘culture’ to ‘civilization’, the 
gap between the two (“culture as a whole way of life” and “culture as the arts and 
learning”) appears connected in the telos of material progress; arts and learning, in fact, 
are inextricably linked to that “whole way of life” from which they came to light. As 
early as 1894, in an address to the Section of Anthropology of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science entitled “Human Faculty as Determined by 
Race”, Boas had identified the boundaries between race and civilization in scientific 
discourse; although as observed by Stocking, “one is struck by the limits of Boas’ 
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critique”107 at the time because “he had not achieved [yet] a fully developed notion of 
the cultural determination of behavior as an alternative to the prevailing racial 
determinism”108, still his critique of the predominant ideas on the connection between 
race and cultural value was groundbreaking. He, in fact, noticed that, 
 
[a]s the civilization is higher, we assume that the aptitude for civilization 
is also higher; and as the aptitude for civilization presumably depends 
upon the perfection of the mechanism of body and mind, the inference is 
drawn that the white race represents the highest type of perfection.  In 
this conclusion, which is reached through a comparison of the social 
status of civilized man and of primitive man, the achievement and the 
aptitude for an achievement have been confounded. Furthermore, as the 
white race is the civilized race, every deviation from the white type is 
considered a characteristic feature of a lower type.
109
 
 
Boas was not calling into question the achievements of Western civilization in 
comparison with the achievements of other societies, but what he underlined is that 
there was no reason to think that the state of things at the time reflected an inner 
superiority of Western people or their greater aptitude towards civilization. Throughout 
his speech, he contextualized modern accomplishments within a history in which other 
people had already been able to achieve the highest degree of ‘progress’ and 
‘development.’110 Furthermore, he stressed that cultural achievements were never “the 
product of the genius of a single people”111, but were the consequence of an exchange 
between different groups in which every one gave their contribution as “[i]deas and 
inventions were carried from one to the other.”112 
In this early speech it is already possible to see the outline of one of Boas’ main 
contributions to the cultures/culture conflict, namely the concept of ‘cultural relativism’, 
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or the idea that, although some universal traits could be observed in all societies (for 
instance, the presence of religion or art), there was no evidence to suppose a 
development towards a same universal ideal as all cultures were influenced by 
environmental and historical factors. More importantly, the present state of a culture did 
not account for its past; that is, phases which could be perceived as more ‘advanced’ 
could have actually preceded the current one.  Boas himself underlined the importance 
of historical factors in destabilizing the concept of ‘primitiveness’ in another early text, 
his 1889 paper “The Aims of Ethnology”: 
 
I have used throughout the expression “primitive people”… I hope that in 
so doing I have not created the impression that we are dealing with 
peoples living in an original state of simplicity and naturalness as 
Rousseau conceived of them. On the contrary, we must keep in mind that 
even a primitive people has had a long history behind it. It may have 
gone through states of higher civilization and then, due to the gradual 
loss of inventions and ideas, have sunk down again to a lower state; or it 
may have climbed more slowly but surely up to its present level.
113
 
 
The idea of the coexistence of several cultures derived from a different conception of 
the ‘human’ influenced by the German tradition of thought in which Boas had been 
formed, namely the Humanitätsideal, or ideal of humanity, promoted by Johann 
Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) and Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) in 
opposition to the Enlightenment ideal of humanity. As noted by Matti Bunzl, “[i]n 
contrast to a uniform development of civilization, they had argued for the uniqueness of 
values transmitted throughout history” by the Volksgeist or “spirit of the people.”114 
Stocking connects this current of thought to a particular form of polygenist tradition 
distinct from “the specific naturalistic scientific current within pre-Darwinian 
ethnology”115, namely “a broader romantic current of racial thought that tended to see 
races in organismic, superindividual terms, as entities that had a common genius or soul 
that expressed itself in specific cultural forms and institutions, and whose existence on 
earth followed the human life cycle.”116 From this tradition, nonetheless, Boas was able 
to theorize the coexistence of human groups characterized by cultural traits which had 
                                                 
113
 Franz Boas, “The Aims of Ethnology” in ibid., 68. 
114
 Matti Bunzl, “Boas, Foucault, and the ‘Native Anthropologist’: Notes toward a Neo-Boasian 
Anthropology”, American Anthropologist, Vol. 106, Issue 3, 2004, 437. 
115
 George W. Stocking, Jr., “The Turn of the Century Concept of Race”, Modernism/Modernity, 1.1. 
(1994), 12. 
116
 Ibid. 
  
 
 
29 
individual value and meaning and, therefore, had to be studied independently and not 
within a comparative, universal framework.  
In the excerpt from “The Aims of Ethnology”, not only is the reader confronted 
with the coexistence of different peoples and cultures, but also with the coexistence of 
several times and historical eras in the present; Boas’ acknowledgement of simultaneous 
cultures had the potential to disrupt the teleological scheme of progress and its narrative 
of endless development. The kind of historical movement described in the passage, in 
fact, cannot be represented by a linear outline, but more appropriately by a fragmentary 
motion where the present aspect of things can only represent the current state of 
development, which is not considered as representative of a people’s past or future 
possibilities. Even though the trope of the primitive still lingers in Boas’ text, the very 
reformative gesture was to ascribe an independent historical course to the so-called 
‘primitive peoples’, namely to peoples often without written historical records that 
could refute the universal narrative of western history. Boas’ acknowledgement, 
therefore, did not constitute a final relegation of the anthropological ‘Other’ to a 
different time – although this risk was still inherent to anthropological theory and 
practice
117
 – but a consideration of “the fundamental differences in ideals of distinct 
types of civilization”118 which led him to the question: “Have we the right to give our 
modern ideals the stamp of finality?”119  
Bunzl further underlines the importance of the historical factor in his analysis of 
the lecture “Anthropology” delivered by Boas at Columbia University in 1907, in which 
the anthropologist stressed the relevance of “two historical questions” in the 
development of anthropological theory, namely “Why are the tribes and nations of the 
world different, and how have the present differences developed?” Boas’ perspective 
was innovative because he saw these questions as pivotal in the study of any people, not 
merely so-called ‘primitive’ ones, claiming that “‘this limitation of the field’ [the stress 
on primitive peoples] was ‘more or less accidental’, a function of the fact that ‘other 
sciences occupied part of the ground before the development of modern 
anthropology.’”120 Bunzl also notices that Boas’ anthropology was informed “in terms 
of human history, conceived both in global and particular terms”121 which can be 
connected again to the German intellectual tradition of the Humanitätsideal and which 
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would constitute the basis for the elaboration of culture areas “conceived not as 
individual cultures but as aggregations of cultures… with the emphasis on past, rather 
than present, zones of cultural interaction”122 in the works of Edward Sapir and Alfred 
Kroeber, two of Boas’ first students. The advantage the other disciplines had on 
anthropology was represented by the possibility of using evidence based on written 
texts “that allowed the reconstruction of culture history using the philological methods 
developed in 19
th
 century Germany.”123 Bunzl finally revises Stocking’s reflections on 
the role of history in the elaboration of Boas’ culture concept, claiming that 
 
[i]n a radically universalizing move, Boas sought to extend such 
philological work to all humans, implicitly arguing that the domain of 
culture (conceived in a fairly traditional humanistic sense) was not 
unique to literate groups. If other disciplines accounted for the culture 
history of the “civilized” world, it was incumbent on anthropology to do 
the same for the “primitive” part of humanity.124 
 
In analysing the history of anthropology, it is clear that the emphasis on ‘primitive 
peoples’ was no accident; on the contrary, the economic and political domination of the 
peoples encountered in the colonial expansion boosted the birth and beginnings of 
anthropological research. Hence, the need to define and represent these same peoples as 
inferior, dependent, and primitive in order to justify the control exercised on them and 
their lands and to promote an ideal of colonization as the propagation of modern 
civilization. Nonetheless, Boas’ contribution – entangled as it was in the power relations 
inherent to the conditions of fieldwork and research funding – was stressing the 
plurality not only of other peoples and cultures, but also of other histories which were 
unknown and neglected because of imperial and colonial coordinates of power and the 
lack of written records produced by the people who were the protagonists of those 
histories, and not just objects in the grand narrative of western, capitalized ‘History.’ In 
his attempt to “extend such philological work to all humans”, Boas was affirming his 
belief in “the ways in which the ‘genius of a people’ integrated the elements that the 
almost accidental accumulation of historical processes brought together in a single 
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culture”125, but the problem which the new direction of anthropology had still to face 
was the control which the ethnologist could exert on the material s/he was collecting. 
Although Boas always attested to the importance of native informants in the collection 
of oral material to be recorded in fieldwork and successively interpreted in written 
ethnographies, the introduction of the coordinate of history made more evident the 
idiosyncrasies inherent in the project of ethnography and in the concept of ‘participant 
observation’, namely the assumption that the anthropologist could be an observer who 
was involved in native everyday life without either influencing it or being finally 
overcome by it.  
Notwithstanding these problems, which have informed both anthropological 
practice and theory, Boas was starting a process of potential opening and 
democratization of the modern concept of ‘culture’ which, as emphasized by Stocking, 
was “accompanied by a critique of evolutionism”126 that started to take form in the 
1890s, during Boas’ early stage of his academic career in the United States after having 
left Germany in 1887.  In 1904, Boas finally wrote that “the grand system of the 
evolution of culture, that is valid for all humanity, is losing much of its plausibility. In 
place of a single line of evolution there appears a multiplicity of converging and 
diverging lines which it is difficult to bring under one system.”127 
Both Boas’ critique of the disposition of items in the anthropological museums 
and his early contact with W. E. B. Du Bois, with its emphasis on the importance of the 
African heritage for the African-American identity, can be contextualized within this 
theoretical framework defining itself in sheer opposition to the theories of biological 
determinism and social evolutionism. Boas’1887 debate with Otis T. Mason, curator of 
the ethnological section at the United States National Museum, as underlined by 
Stocking, involved the concepts of causality and classification and was aimed at 
emphasizing the importance of dividing the artefacts collected in separate geographical 
areas instead of ranking them according to a universal evolutionist paradigm, as was 
customary at the time. Boas’ request was supported by his belief that “though like 
causes have like effects, like effects have not like causes.”128 Stocking further adds that 
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[i]mplicit in the issue of the likeness of effects was the general problem 
of classification, which is a focus of concern in much of Boas’ early 
work. At various points Boas attacked what he was wont to call 
“premature” or “arbitrary” classification. The attack on Mason in fact 
centered on Mason’s attempt to define “families, genera, and species” of 
ethnological phenomena that could then be treated comparatively. 
Involved in this was the determination of “like effects” by prior 
definition.
129
 
 
Boas was basically arguing against both the abstractions that were inherent to that 
system of classification and the limits of the observer’s perspective, which could 
mistakenly liken items and phenomena that were only apparently similar. Boas’ early 
reflections on the classification of items are here used in order to underline both his way 
of breaking with the anthropological theories which preceded him and his way of 
articulating his vision of anthropology as an empirical and grounded study of culture 
from a historical and psychological perspective.  
In this context, the recovery of hidden or ignored histories is a fundamental step 
in the analysis of a people’s present state. These thoughts informed Boas’ lecture at 
Atlanta University in 1906 during which his first encounter with Du Bois and an 
audience of African-American university students was marked by an appeal to recover 
their African past defined as a counter-narrative to the rhetoric excluding black people 
from progress and development. Boas pointed out the racist assumptions of 
anthropology as evolutionary theories tended “to interpret as racial character what is 
only an effect of social surroundings”130 and also asked a fundamental question: “Does 
race limit the ability to achieve civilization?”131 Lee D. Baker summarizes Boas’ 
conclusions in relation to African Americans and racism in the United States in these 
terms: 
 
[h]e also explained that the primary reason for African American 
inequality was racism, suggesting “that the old race-feeling of the 
inferiority of the colored race is as potent as ever and is a formidable 
obstacle to its advance and progress.” He advised scientists to focus on 
how much Negroes have “accomplished in a short period against heavy 
odds” because “it is hardly possible to say what would become of the 
negro if he were able to live with the whites on absolutely equal terms.” 
Boas concluded that “historical events appear to have been much more 
potent in leading races to civilization than their faculty, and it follows 
                                                 
129
 Ibid., 2-3. 
130
 Lee D. Baker, From Savage to Negro, 104. 
131
 Boas quoted in ibid. 
  
 
 
33 
that achievements of races do not warrant us to assume that one race is 
more highly gifted than the other.”132 
 
As seen previously, Boas did not renounce the category of race, and kept on conducting 
anthropometrical measurements as it was customary in the scientific practice of the 
time, but he progressively downsized the importance of the physical data by showing 
how the assumptions inherent to its elaboration were abstractions having no actual 
correlatives at an empirical level.
133
 In fact, in his essay “The Occurrence of Similar 
Inventions in Areas Widely Apart” (1887), Boas stated that “[t]he object of our study is 
the individual, not abstractions from the individual under observation.”134 This research 
attitude was particularly evident in his report on the children of immigrants, Changes of 
Bodily Forms of Descendants of Immigrants (1912), which with the support of “more 
than 500 pages of painstaking statistics, graphs, and formulas”135 constituted an attack 
on the theories of eugenics in its attempt “to prove that the so-called inferiority of 
Eastern European immigrants was erroneous.”136 
 
Although Boas was characteristically cautious, he stated that “we are 
therefore compelled to draw the conclusion that… the adaptability of the 
immigrant seems to be very much greater than we had a right to suppose 
before our investigations were instituted… [N]ot even those 
characteristics of a race which have proved to be most permanent in their 
old home remain the same under the new surroundings; and we are 
compelled to conclude that when these features of the body change, the 
whole bodily and mental make-up of the immigrants may change. 
These results are so definite that, while heretofore we had the right to 
assume that human types are stable, all the evidence is now in favor of a 
great plasticity of human types, and permanence of types in new 
surroundings appears rather as an exception than as the rule.”137 
                                                 
132
 Ibid. 
133
 As observed by Stephen J. Whitfield, still in 1937, “Boas could not jettison the term [race]. Indeed a 
paper that he presented in Paris… [in that year] argued for the reality of race, which ‘must be conceived 
as a biological unit, as a population derived from a common ancestry and by virtue of its descent 
endowed with definite biological characteristics.’” Nonetheless, the definitive contribution Boas made to 
the theory of race, and what finally transformed its definition, was his assertion that “environmental 
influences can alter the biological inheritance that is bequeathed to us.” Finally, in order to further 
underline Boas’ distancing from both deterministic racialism and the German notion of Volksgeist which 
had informed his early thought, Whitfield reminds us that: “He also persuaded Du Bois to jettison what 
remained of the racialism that stamped The Souls of Black Folk, and to scrap the notion of innate group 
characteristics.” See Stephen J. Whitfield, “Franz Boas: The Anthropologist as Public Intellectual”, paper 
presented at the First Annual Conference on Public Intellectuals “Speaking Truth to Power”, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, MA, 23-24 April 2010. Available online as “Culture Hero: The Anthropologist as 
Public Intellectual” at: www.firstofthemonth.org/archives/2012/04/culture_hero.html. Last accessed on 
11 May 2012. 
134
 Stocking, A Franz Boas Reader, 3. 
135
 Lee D. Baker, From Savage to Negro, 106. 
136
 Ibid. 
137
 Boas quoted in ibid., 106-7. 
  
 
 
34 
 
Boas’ report used the same tools of eugenics in order to prove them unreliable at an 
empirical level, even though “[e]ugenicists [finally] helped to write sterilization laws 
and anti-immigrant legislation, including the sweeping immigrant-quota scheme 
embodied in the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924.”138 In the words of Werner 
Sollors, the “way of looking at America as immigration”139 made widely popular by 
John F. Kennedy’s A Nation of Immigrants (1964) was not mainstream yet, but this 
approach to American society can be found at its outset in Boas’ research as an attempt 
to start interpreting “America not narrowly as immigration but more broadly as ethnic 
diversity… includ[ing] the pre-Columbian inhabitants of the continent, [and] the 
kidnapped Africans and their descendants… – though they, too… [were] not classic 
immigrants.”140 Boas’ personal background as a German Jewish immigrant and his 
fieldwork both among the immigrants and the Inuit and Native American peoples 
supported his belief and interest in the geographical and historical conditions which had 
moulded the current state of cultures in the United States. 
Compared to the experience of both Native Americans and immigrants, though, 
the historical factor raised some important questions in relation to African Americans. 
In fact, while most immigrants could refer to a motherland to which they could ascribe 
their cultural legacy and ethnic heritage
141
, and Native Americans were still in their 
lands although displaced and dispossessed, diaspora had completely uprooted African 
Americans from their different histories, cultures, and languages in Africa while slavery 
and segregation – their most recent past in the New World – had produced a social 
context in which their representation as historical subjects had been hindered by the 
need to maintain them in a subaltern position as an economic resource to be exploited 
and abused. In A People’s History of the United States, Howard Zinn describes the early 
presence of blacks in the Americas as follows: 
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[t]heir helplessness made enslavement easier. The Indians were on their 
own land. The whites were in their own European culture. The blacks 
had been torn from their land and culture, forced into a situation where 
the heritage of language, dress, custom, family relations, was bit by bit 
obliterated except for the remnants that blacks could hold on to by sheer, 
extraordinary persistence.
142
 
 
As hinted above, the focus in Boas’ Atlanta speech in 1906 – the same year of 
the Atlanta Race Riot – is particularly important as it allowed African history to enter 
into the context of African-American culture not as a narrative of backwardness, but as 
a positive cultural heritage. It also marks the first encounter between Boas and Du Bois 
with whom he had been corresponding since the previous year, but never met in person 
before. Rachel Farebrother observes that “Boas’s efforts to ‘decouple the primitive from 
the atavistic’ by explaining cultural difference in historical rather than biological terms 
meant that his ideas were a valuable resource for Du Bois’s anti-racist project.”143 The 
event and the impact it had on Du Bois’ successive works, research, and political 
commitment are recorded in Black Folk Then and Now (1939): 
 
Franz Boas came to Atlanta University where I was teaching History in 
1906 and said to the graduating class: You need not be ashamed of your 
African past; and then he recounted the history of black kingdoms south 
of the Sahara for a thousand years. I was too astonished to speak. All of 
this I had never heard and I came then and afterwards to realize how the 
silence and neglect of science can let truth utterly disappear or even be 
unconsciously distorted.
144
 
 
Lee D. Baker contrasts Boas’ 1906 speech at Atlanta University with “The Negro 
Brain” written in the same year by Robert Bean and published in the Century Magazine. 
In the article, Bean stated that, 
[t]he Caucasian and the negro are fundamentally opposite extremes in 
evolution. Having demonstrated that the negro and the Caucasian are 
widely different in characteristics, due to a deficiency of gray matter and 
connecting fibers in the negro brain… we are forced to conclude that this 
is is [sic] useless to try to elevate the negro by education or otherwise 
except in the direction of his natural endowments.
145
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‘Education’: this is the connector between the anthropological and humanist meanings 
of culture; in anthropology, it denotes the tension between enculturation as “[t]he 
aspects of the learning experience which mark off man from other creatures, and by 
means of which, initially, and in later life, he achieves competence in his culture”146 and 
acculturation defined in broad terms as “an individual brought up in one country, 
transported into another;”147 in Bean’s racial determinism, it becomes the connector 
between race and culture;
148
 and in American history, one of the most debated topics in 
the battle for equal rights and opportunities for African Americans. As observed by 
Houston A. Baker,  
 
[e]ducation – the process of developing knowledge, mind, skill, and 
character – has played a vital role in the black American experience. 
From Jamestown to the present day, black preachers, prophets, and 
protesters have championed the value of education in the black man’s 
struggle for freedom and equality... Education as a road to freedom, 
therefore, was an established tradition among black Americans…149 
 
In this context, culture as “the arts and learning” in its humanistic understanding shows 
its entanglement with culture as “a whole way of life” according to its anthropological 
definition whereas in the so-called ‘complex societies’ the first meaning of the term is 
separated from the second on the basis of coordinates of class, race, and gender. 
According to the explanation of the two separate meanings provided by Melville J. 
Herskovits, 
 
[i]t is scarcely necessary to differentiate the concept of culture used as a 
tool in the study of man, from the popular meaning of the term 
“cultured.” Yet for those unfamiliar with anthropological usage, the 
application of the concept “culture” to a digging-stick or a cooking recipe 
necessitates some readjustment in thinking. A popular concept of culture 
comes within the terms of what may be called a boarding-school 
definition, and is the equivalent of “refinement.” Such a definition 
implies the ability of a person who has “culture” to manipulate certain 
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aspects of our civilization that brings prestige. In reality, these aspects 
are principally the possession of those persons who have the leisure to 
learn them. For the scientist, however, a “cultured person”, in the popular 
sense, commands but a specialized fragment of our culture, sharing more 
than he suspects with the farmer, the bricklayer, the engineer, the ditch-
digger, the professional man. The rudest economy, the most frenzied 
religious rite, a simple folktale, are all equally a part of culture. The 
comparative study of custom shows us this very clearly. In small isolated 
groups, where the economic base is narrow, and technical knowledge is 
slight, there is no room for the social stratification that must be present if 
a person, “cultured” in the popular sense, is to have the economic 
resources essential for his support while he devotes himself to his 
avocation.
150
 
 
 
‘Refinement’, ‘prestige’, ‘leisure’, and finally ‘economic resources’ denote the main 
features of humanist culture and social stratification; under such circumstances, to reach 
such level of ‘refinement’ with its subsequent ‘prestige’, meant to deal with a system 
which was basically preventing large parts of the population from having access to it on 
the basis of racial prejudice and class distinction according to the boundaries established 
by what Du Bois defined as the main issue of the twentieth century: “the problem of the 
color-line.”151 Nonetheless, education was not the only right of which African 
Americans and other ethnic minorities had been deprived, within a historical situation in 
which they had been disenfranchised of the most basic human rights for centuries.  
The perspectives of the two most important African-American leaders at the turn 
of the twentieth century, namely Du Bois himself and Booker T. Washington, strongly 
diverged on this subject. In fact, whereas Du Bois supported an idea of education as 
access to Western ‘high’ culture – befitting his own personal academic trajectory as the 
first African American who earned a doctorate from Harvard University and his studies 
in philosophy and the social sciences both in the US and in Germany – Washington, an 
ex-slave who had finally become the founder and principal of the most important 
African-American college in the South of the United States, Tuskegee Institute, felt that 
the African-American youth needed to be trained in the professions in order to master 
modern technology and have access to financial independence. Lee D. Baker observes 
that “Washington’s strategy… emphasized vocational training and devalued university 
education.”152 Returning for a moment to the analysis of the ballad “John Henry” in the 
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previous section of this chapter, what Washington saw as valuable training for African-
American students was that kind of technical knowledge which would have allowed 
John Henry not to see himself as a tool to be finally substituted by the steam drill, but 
the skilled technician whose expertise and proficiency would have been appreciated by 
a society in which, according to Washington’s famous “Atlanta Compromise”, “[i]n all 
things that are purely social we [white and black Americans] can be as separate as the 
fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.”153 Houston A. 
Baker describes the Washingtonian professional as “the educated black American [who] 
could be a ‘useful’ citizen, an improver of the community, a clean and well-mannered 
manual laborer of high moral character. Moreover, such a black man… would not 
trouble himself with social equality.”154 As observed by Susanna Ashton, Washington’s 
philosophy “was accepted, and even hailed, by many in the African American 
community as the best that could be expected from the segregated South.”155 
Nonetheless, Washington’s address at the 1895 Cotton States Exhibition in Atlanta had 
“many disturbing consequences, not the least of which was the implicit sanctioning of 
general bigotry.”156 Washington was trying to provide access for African Americans to 
the economic resources and technical skills essential to their advancement in a modern 
society; at the same time, though, he was taking care of reassuring white Americans that 
this change would not challenge their status quo and would be for the common good 
and advancement of the United States according to what “Washington felt… [as] a 
social and educational philosophy that was compatible with the times.”157 Washington’s 
view could be read as a version of the American Dream which he considered available 
to African Americans at the time; “[t]he American Dream held out the promise to all 
men: through industry, self-reliance, and individual talent the limitless vista of progress 
were theirs.”158 
Whereas Washington focused on the industrious side of the American Dream, 
Du Bois’ philosophy of the “Talented Tenth” was pointing at the “individual talent” in 
Huggins’ definition of that same dream. Du Bois believed that the Washingtonian 
perspective on education for African Americans was narrow and limited as asserted in 
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his reflections on the aims of a “true college [that] will ever have one goal, - not to earn 
meat, but to know the end and aim of that life which meat nourishes.”159 Du Bois’ own 
approach to culture was influenced by the humanist tradition, but also modified by the 
opening provided by Boasian anthropology with its focus on history, the African past, 
and its inclusion – on equal terms – of cultural traditions different from the European. In 
fact, although not exempt from a certain degree of essentialization, when applied to the 
humanistic understanding of the term, Boas’ anthropological approach could promote 
an opening of the Western artistic canon to other traditions, namely a possibility for 
inclusion of African-American culture into American art and an act of recognition of the 
influence of the first on the latter. Furthermore, this inclusion could represent one of the 
American elements allowing the cultural tradition of the United States to differentiate 
itself from the European. 
The problem emerges when it is taken into account that, according to Houston 
A. Baker, “one index of black American culture is the extent to which it repudiates the 
culture theorizing of the white Western world.”160 W. E. B. Du Bois was basically 
suspended between a humanist ideal of culture inherited by Matthew Arnold, the new 
definition of anthropological culture provided by Boas through Herder’s legacy, and the 
awareness that what was specific to African-American culture could constitute an 
alternative source of acknowledgement for black intellectuals and artists, one that would 
have allowed them to acquire independence from a system of judgement which 
repudiated their achievements as a way of defining itself. As noted by Toni Morrison,  
 
[a]s a metaphor for transacting the whole process of Americanization, 
while burying its particular racial ingredients, this Africanist presence 
may be something the United States cannot do without. Deep within the 
word “American” is its association with race. To identify someone as 
South African is to say very little; we need the adjective “white” or 
“black” or “colored” to make our meaning clear. In this country it is quite 
the reverse. American means white, and Africanist people struggle to 
make the term applicable to themselves with ethnicity and hyphen after 
hyphen after hyphen.
161
 
 
Morrison’s comment on the struggle over the hyphen connecting the word 
‘African’ to ‘American’ has to be looked at as the accomplishment of an identity 
passing through several stages before reaching its current status. In fact, the inclusion of 
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the ‘American’ element into an integrated definition of the black identity in the United 
States was a conquest derived from the positive appropriation of the word ‘Negro’ by 
the black artists and intellectuals in the 1900s. The transition from the ‘Old Negro’ to 
the ‘New Negro’, namely the inspirational figure of the Harlem Renaissance, to 
‘American Negro’ and, finally, ‘African American’ marks the attempt at integration of 
what Du Bois defined as that double consciousness which was a distinctive mark of the 
black experience in the United States. The definition of ‘American’ as white, contrasted 
with the concomitant rejection of the (black) ‘Other’, certainly has historical and 
economic reasons; nonetheless, it could be traced back to (white) America’s own 
cultural anxiety about “what culture is, what is distinctively American culture, and what 
of value America has contributed to Western civilization.”162 Huggins, commenting on 
the role of public schools for the definition of cultural heritage in the education of both 
white and black American students, notes that 
 
[t]he object of American public schools was to make their charges 
American; which meant a rounding off of points of difference. Oriental 
and Jewish children were able to retain the gift of their past through 
special schools. But Negro children were swept into the cultural blender 
with other Americans, pulled into the vortex of Anglo-Saxon norms. 
Having no known culture to deny, the Negro was doubly damned. For 
when he discovered the emptiness and soulessness of the bland amalgam, 
or when he saw that the ultimate truth of the lie was that you had to be 
white, he had no place to return to… Like white children, black children 
were taught that the speech of their fathers was not proper English 
speech. They were encouraged to leave behind their dialects and regional 
and ethnic idioms. The tales that they had heard the old folks tell were 
not the stuff of culture; they would read Jane Austen and Thackeray and 
dream of English romance. Nor were the special rhythms of their speech 
suitable for poetry when Keats and Shelley were the models. In time, 
they could learn to accept the spirituals, with their decorum and simple 
majesty, but never the more spirited gospel songs and surely not the 
profane blues. Culture was something distant and alien – generally 
English – to be studied… and fitted on like a suit of clothes.163 
 
By integrating the terms ‘African’ and ‘American’, therefore, the black intellectual was 
mediating among several degrees of consciousness and inheriting, together with the 
double perspective that Du Bois assigned to the African-American experience, the 
multiple perspectives on the Western cultural tradition transmitted by the emerging 
American canon. This context of ‘culture-in-the-making’ may be the proper background 
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which favoured the black American intellectual’s search for different ways to root and 
authenticate his/her production, in the attempt to overcome the “rounding off of points 
of difference”164 imposed by basic education.165 Michael A. Gomez observes that the 
essence of African Diaspora and of Du Bois’ ‘twoness’ is, in fact, “the unattainable 
nature of the polarities: Africa, once lost, has yet to be recovered; whereas America, as 
an ideal, has yet to become home”166, although, as noted by Winfried Siemerling, Du 
Bois’ efforts “to combine the words ‘American’ and ‘Negro’ harmoniously in a 
collective self-assertion of the ‘American Negro’ are staged… within a logic of 
recognition that is defined by ‘American’ values.”167 In relation to this polar tension, 
Gilroy has observed that it was at first impossible for Du Bois to include contemporary 
Africa into an idea of modernity which took shape in the nineteenth century and in 
which Africa could only emerge “as a mythic counterpart to modernity in the Americas 
– a moral symbol.”168 From this context, Africa could not be recuperated as it was 
constructed as a functional ‘Other’ for highlighting the modernity of the ‘New World’ 
while America continued to reject the African-American presence on the basis of the 
association with the ‘Dark Continent.’ Gilroy makes further reference to Boas’ 
influence on Du Bois’ decision to map the history of Africa when “[he] began to retell 
the narrative of western civilization in systematic ways that emphasized its African 
origins and expressed a deeper disengagement from modern forms of thought that were 
discredited by their association with the continuing practice of white supremacy.”169 Du 
Bois’ plea for education and his perspective on culture must, therefore, be taken into 
account within this context and in the light of his own observations in the review of his 
major work The Souls of Black Folk for the Independent in 1904 when he characterized 
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the book’s style as “African” adding that “the blood of my fathers spoke through me 
and cast off the English restraint of my training and surroundings.”170 
In The Souls of Black Folk, “the book that made him a leader of black 
Americans”171 and “one of the most important models for thinking about cultural 
difference today”172, even the references to the most established Western philosophical 
tradition embodied by Hegel’s theories are transformed by what Ashton describes as “a 
new way of thinking about documentary evidence… Du Bois ‘authenticated’ himself 
with sorrow songs, with personal narrative of spiritual ascendancy, and with the explicit 
rejection of extraneous documentation.”173 In particular, Ashton refers to Robert 
Stepto’s analysis of The Souls of Black Folk when he observes that, 
 
[Du Bois] not only assumes the responsibilities for authenticating his 
voice and tale, but also advances a new scientific standard for what 
constitutes authenticating evidence. He seeks nothing less than a new 
narrative mode and form in which empirical evidence, scientifically 
gathered in a literal and figurative field (e.g. the Black Belt), performs 
the authenticating chores previously composed by white opinion.
174
 
 
The coexistence and integration of different cultural traditions in The Souls of Black 
Folk is evident in the quotes that open every one of the chapters: Byron and Schiller, 
The Song of Solomon, and the Negro songs are all used as epigraphs. Thomas Hibbs, 
quoting Zamir, has noticed that “the ‘historical knowledge’ embodied in the spirituals 
‘reverses the flow of knowledge and power’ from any kind of elite to ‘the black 
masses;’”175 also the linguistic choices effected by Du Bois seem to be in line with such 
a reversal of the flow of knowledge.  This important formal feature of Du Bois’ text, 
which Dale E. Peterson has identified as the “dialogue of the double epigraphs”176 
taking place at the beginning of each chapter, invites “the reader… to intuit the spiritual 
equivalence between a few lines of European lyric poetry and selected bars of black 
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melody;”177 in fact, the use of German together with standard and vernacular English 
refers to different linguistic traditions coexisting and being used as equal forms of 
authentication for the essays. In this regard, Peterson adds that Du Bois was 
“experimenting with the possibility of conveying in the medium of print the notion 
advanced by Herder that song is the oral writing of folk experience.”178  
This acknowledgment on equal terms of coeval traditions can be considered a 
transposition to the level of culture of the Hegelian symmetrical recognition preceding 
the dialectical relationship between master and slave. Siemerling has underlined the 
connection between the Hegelian vision on social contact and economic exploitation 
and Du Bois’ ideas on culture when he notes that “since recognition after this struggle is 
validated only by the one who has lost it… only the reciprocal recognition of equals can 
validate both sides, and result in the kind of recognition Du Bois seems to have in mind 
when he formulates the ‘end of this striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom of 
culture.’”179 Frantz Fanon had already noticed that “[t]here is at the basis of Hegelian 
dialectic an absolute reciprocity that must be highlighted”180, and in reading Du Bois’ 
double consciousness according to Fanon’s analysis of Hegelian self-consciousness181, 
it is possible to speculate that recognition and reciprocity were being acknowledged in 
the same African-American consciousness as thought by Du Bois, that is, his stance 
towards multiple cultural legacies expresses his “desire, the first stage that leads to the 
dignity of the mind”182, of being actively engaged with those traditions considered as 
equal contributors to the foundations of his (double) self-consciousness. This kind of 
consciousness can be read as a prefiguration of the black postmodern consciousness 
described by bell hooks in terms of “yearning… [as] a common psychological state… 
cutting across boundaries of race, class, gender… the longing for a critical voice”183 in 
cultural matters. Cultural recognition on equal terms, therefore, though not exhaustive 
of Du Bois’ broader political programme, seems to be coherent with his project on 
culture and the specific role that black artists and intellectuals could have within 
Western and, in particular, American culture. As noted by Rath, in fact, “Du Bois never 
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relinquished his Euro-American training and heritage… he forged a philosophy that 
accounted for the multiplicity of his experience as an African American.”184 
The very notion of Africa and the meaning that Africa can have within the 
Americas would become central for the artistic and national identities of African-
American intellectuals in the United States throughout the twentieth century. The 
interest and fascination for Africa, both in cultural anthropology and in the modernist 
arts, was marked by its connection to the primitive, primitivism, and nature; both in its 
praise of an alleged pristine state of humanity or in its fear of its ungovernability and 
irrationality, this interest presumed a lack of temporality and history whereas, for Du 
Bois and the African-American artists and intellectuals of the 1900s, Africa had to be 
recovered as a source of historical legitimacy. Rath notes that Du Bois’ “Africa was 
made of the ideas and feelings he claimed to share with 10 million Americans whose 
ancestors slavery had brought. His Africa was a way of life more than a place.”185 
Reclaiming Africa was not an easy intellectual move if it is taken into consideration the 
role of Africa as margin for the delineation of a world history in which its presence 
actually marked an absence. As suggested by Peterson, the same notion of ‘soul’ in Du 
Bois’ text and subsequent African-American literature could be the result of the 
expulsion of peoples, such as Africans and Slavs, “from modern Europe’s philosophy of 
history”, namely “from the world-historical ‘spirit.’”186 
 
In the magisterial progress of civilization forecast by Hegel’s master plot, 
the Africans had literally no script assigned to them: 
“The Africans, however, have not yet reached recognition of the 
General… Thus we find nothing else than man in his immediacy… The 
Negro represents the Natural Man in all his wildness and indocility; if we 
wish to grasp him, then we must drop all European conceptions. What we 
actually understand by “Africa” is that which is without history and 
resolution.”187 
 
The words “a whole way of life” transform the idea of ‘Africa’ as a geopolitical 
entity into ‘Africa’ as a cultural referent for black America which, according to Houston 
A. Baker, can be defined precisely as “a whole way of life that includes its own 
standards of moral and aesthetic achievement.”188 In the reference to a “whole way of 
life”, it is possible to trace a direct connection to the anthropological definition of 
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‘culture’ while the allusion to aesthetic and moral categories of evaluation associates it 
with ‘culture’ in its literary and artistic meaning; in particular, black America as a way 
of life provided the African-American intellectual with an array of critical categories 
which, while destabilizing the canon, allowed for an opening to his/her presence. 
Although in the case of the Harlem Renaissance such an opening was favoured by the 
interest and funding of white patrons, the possibility of making themselves heard not 
only as producers, but also as critics of culture was an unprecedented chance for African 
Americans to enter the historical discourse and represent themselves within it. As 
observed by Du Bois, who can be rightly considered a precursor of this tendency among 
African-American intellectuals, his intention was neither to “Africanize America”189 nor 
“bleach his Negro soul.”190 His ultimate goal would be “to merge his double self into a 
better and truer self… to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an 
American.”191 In this regard, Siemerling notes that “[w]hile the merging of a ‘double 
self into a better and truer self’ seems to indicate a dialectic synthesis and teleology, this 
merging implies here also, on the contrary, a stubborn maintenance and separation of 
the particulars.”192 
Despite the undeniable difficulty of such a project due to the overwhelming 
presence of the ‘color line’ throughout American society, this was not impossible when 
we realize that Du Bois considered the contribution of African-American culture to be 
fundamental in the delineation of what was properly ‘American’ within American 
culture itself as attested, for instance, by his approach to music as one specific cultural 
trait, when he stated that “there is no true American music but the wild sweet melodies 
of the Negro slave.”193 This ‘twoness’ also constitutes the perspective through which, 
according to Siemerling, Du Bois was able to abandon the singularity of Hegelian Geist 
for the plurality of the ‘souls’ of his title: as seen in reference to Boas’ attitude towards 
the idea of Volksgeist, Du Bois “[i]n focusing on the ‘unhappy consciousness’ rather 
than on the metaphysical schema of history in the Phenomenology… is rejecting idealist 
teleologies.”194 The application of a teleological project to American society and, more 
specifically, to race relations had led to a confusion between “a physical accident”195 
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(whiteness) and “a moral deed – to draw unreal distinctions among human souls.” Both 
science and religion, as tenets of Western modern civilization, were responsible in the 
propagation of such confusion. In particular, regarding science, Du Bois denounced its 
degree of complicity with social prejudice by observing that, 
 
[m]entally the blight has fallen on American science. The race problem is 
not insoluble if the correct answer is sought. It is insoluble if the wrong 
answer is insisted upon as it has been insisted upon for thrice a hundred 
years. A very moderate brain can show that two and two is four. But no 
human ingenuity can make the sum three or five. This American science 
has long attempted to do. It has made itself the handmaid of a miserable 
prejudice. In its attempt to justify the treatment of black folk it has 
repeatedly suppressed evidence, misquoted authority, distorted fact and 
deliberately lied. It is wonderful that in the very lines of social study, 
where America should shine, it has done nothing.
196
 
 
The “lie of culture” emerges here as the involvement of social science with pre-
existing prejudices which tried to find legitimacy through scientific authority. The 
African-American intellectual finds himself/herself dealing with more than one cultural 
tradition; in fact, the acquisition of competence within the framework of Western ‘high’ 
culture is to be related to ‘traditional’ culture, which is not understood anymore as 
simply the object of anthropological interest, but mainly as a source of critical 
knowledge, an alternative method of analysis which possesses the potentiality of 
highlighting the inconsistencies inherent to the racist assumptions of scientific 
knowledge and cultural elitism. In this regard, Néstor García Canclini notes that “in 
modern societies the same person may participate in diverse folkloric groups, and is 
capable of being synchronically and diachronically integrated into various systems of 
symbolic practices.”197 It is precisely for this reason that the ideas of ‘modernity’ and 
‘progress’ cannot be absorbed unquestioningly as ‘improvement’, but have to be related 
with the (often denied) existence of coeval temporalities within the same social 
structure. In particular, Du Bois did not detect the roots of racism in a past order, but 
within modernity itself as Julia E. Liss explains in the following passage: 
 
[u]nlike Boas, who saw racism as a survival of a primitive tendency of 
hatred of the stranger… Du Bois thought that racism and color conflict 
were modern predicaments tied to the distinct development of “modern 
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world commerce, modern imperialism, the modern factory system and 
the modern labor problem [which] began with the African slave trade.” 
(1917, Du Bois)
198
 
 
This does not mean that Du Bois did not recognize the element of hatred in such an 
unequal social structure, but he did not ascribe it to a less developed stage of history; on 
the contrary, the elevation of racial hatred to a tenet of society constituted the very basis 
of modern economy and organization of labour which made ‘progress’ and 
‘development’ finally possible with the support of both science and religion. This latter 
had become “a gospel of human hatred and prejudice” which, while not speaking out 
against the unfair treatment reserved to African Americans, finally diminished “any 
reasonable statement or practice of the Christian ideal.”199 
 
The using of men for the benefit of masters is no new invention of 
modern Europe. It is quite as old as the world. But Europe is proposing to 
apply it on a scale and with an elaborateness of detail of which no former 
world ever dreamed. The imperial width of the thing – the heaven-
defying audacity – makes it modern newness.200 
 
Du Bois denounced the role of education in propagating and promoting a system 
such as the one described above, and he saw teaching as responsible for the “atrophy of 
soul”201, namely the cause of both mental and moral suffering in the white folk of the 
United States whenever they draw those “unreal distinctions among human souls”202 
which substantiated the racist thought into everyday social interactions. In this regard 
Rath observes that “[f]or Du Bois the color line was not a problem of persons”203, but 
precisely a matter of these interactions, “of the warped relations – power relations – that 
stood between white and black.”204 In this context, as noted by Alex R. Schäfer, 
‘culture’ and ‘moral development’ could be used as “a new rationale for discrimination 
that had little in common with the cultural cross-fertilization that Du Bois had 
envisaged.”205 Because of this, the role of the black man or woman of culture in the 
process of change and so-called ‘progress’ had to be defined and questioned; from this 
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perspective, it is possible to apply Canclini’s thoughts on the meaning of being cultured 
in dependent societies to the situation of African Americans at the beginning of the 
twentieth century: in both contexts, writing – or more generally, producing culture – 
meant “to occupy a space that is already occupied.”206 In fact, while recognizing the 
complicity of education with an unjust economic and social system, Du Bois also 
acknowledged the role of culture in the struggle for freedom and enfranchisement 
throughout the history of African Americans. In “Of Our Spiritual Strivings”, the essay 
opening The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois reports how “the vain search for freedom”207 
was transformed into “a new vision”208 at the end of the nineteenth century thanks to the 
perspective offered by the “ideal of book-learning”209: 
 
[…] a new vision began gradually to replace the dream of political 
power, –a powerful movement, the rise of another ideal to guide the 
unguided, another pillar of fire by night after a clouded day. It was the 
ideal of “book-learning;” the curiosity, born of compulsory ignorance, to 
know and test the power of the cabalistic letters of the white man, the 
longing to know. Here at last seemed to have been discovered the 
mountain path to Canaan; longer than the highway of Emancipation and 
law, steep and rugged, but straight, leading to heights high enough to 
overlook life.
210
 
 
In this regard, Schäfer justly observes that “Du Bois stressed education and cultural 
refinement as the path to racial equality and justice, deemphasizing both Booker T. 
Washington’s bootstrap ideology and the liberal rights discourse.”211 Although 
Washington was probably right in stressing the importance of financial independence 
and technical knowledge within the developing American industrial system, the rhetoric 
of progress had indeed transposed the “racialist belief in fixed biological deficiency”212 
onto “the notion of cultural deficiency”213: within such a system, it is evident that 
technical specialization by itself would have not guaranteed a proper evaluation of the 
African-American contribution to modern society. Du Bois seems to question not only 
Washington’s idea that technical education is to be emphasized in the training of 
African-American youth to the detriment of intellectual refinement, but also the 
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mindless adherence to a system of exclusion that such a training would imply and 
support. Within the particular trajectory of African-American education, therefore, what 
Gomez defines as “autodidactic tradition” gains in importance: 
 
[t]he autodidactic tradition was… an indispensable means of navigation 
against the stiff and disorienting headwinds of a master narrative that, in 
its quest to rewrite histories in ways that served imperial, colonial, and 
capitalist interests, took every precaution to write subject populations and 
cultures out of history, or to at least render them as inconsequential...
214
 
 
Because of such a narrative and epistemological attitude towards ‘history’, the 
idea of ‘progress’ itself is overtly challenged by Du Bois, as it is possible to see in one 
of the essays published in The Souls, “Of the Meaning of Progress”, reporting on a 
small African-American community in Tennessee where he taught at the start of his 
career. Du Bois stresses the simplicity and roughness of the place, the “longing to 
know” 215 of his students, and “the fine faith the children had in the wisdom of their 
teacher.”216 He also describes the “honest efforts” 217 of some of the inhabitants “to be 
decent and comfortable” 218, “their knowledge of their own ignorance”219, and the 
doubts of some of them (particularly “the old folks”)220 about “book-learning.”221 He 
adds details about the conditions of life of his students’ families, paying attention to the 
variety within the community: while some of them were neat, others were not;
222
 the life 
of some was pleasant, although difficult, the life of others was seriously marked by 
poverty.
223
 The smallness of this community does not prevent him from seeing it as a 
‘world:’ 
 
I have called my tiny community a world, and so its isolation made it; 
and yet there was among us but a half-awakened common consciousness, 
sprung from common joy and grief, at burial, birth, or wedding; from a 
common hardship in poverty, poor land, and low wages; and, above all, 
from the sight of the Veil that hung between us and Opportunity. All this 
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caused us to think some thoughts together; but these, when ripe for 
speech, were spoken in various languages.
224
 
 
It is interesting that his use of the pronoun ‘us’ makes Du Bois a member of the 
community although both his education and temporary position within it could suggest 
his different standing in American society; but this is not the case as the ‘Veil’ 
represents the very “embodiment of the color line”225 the overwhelming presence of 
which he had already described in the life of any African American regardless of his/her 
education and social position.
226
 In this regard, Daphne Mary Lamothe argues that “if 
Du Bois’ image of the veil in The Souls of Black Folk is a potent figure for racial 
divisions and inequality, then the act of raising the veil signals the ethnographer’s skill 
in cross-cultural transit and translation.”227 As for the “various languages” to which Du 
Bois makes reference, what he actually refers to are the different interpretations of their 
present and future conditions provided by the members of the community. These 
different readings of or attitudes towards the present are influenced by their knowledge 
as historical subjects. In fact, 
 
[t]hose whose eyes twenty-five and more years before had seen “the 
glory of the coming of the Lord,” saw in every present hindrance or help 
a dark fatalism bound to bring all things right in His own good time. The 
mass of those to whom slavery was a dim recollection of childhood 
found the world a puzzling thing: it asked little of them, and they 
answered with little, and yet it ridiculed their offering. Such a paradox 
they could not understand, and therefore sank into listless indifference, or 
shiftlessness, or reckless bravado. There were, however, some–such as 
Josie, Jim, and Ben–to whom War, Hell, and Slavery were but childhood 
tales, whose young appetites had been whetted to an edge by school and 
story and half-awakened thought. Ill could they be content, born without 
and beyond the World. And their weak wings beat against their barriers,– 
barriers of caste, of youth, of life; at least, in dangerous moments, against 
everything that opposed even a whim.
228
 
 
The vision of the Veil and a “half-awakened common consciousness” characterize and 
unite these interpretations of American society despite different attitudes towards its 
history and the meaning of such history for African Americans. According to Du Bois, 
in order to transform partial consciousness into double consciousness and, in so doing, 
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acquire a more comprehensive view of history and society, liberal arts education was 
essential. In fact, as noted by Schäfer in his discussion of the influence of German social 
thought on Du Bois’s theories,  
 
[a]ccording to Schmoller [Du Bois’s mentor in Germany and the most 
eminent exponent  of the German historical school of economics] and Du 
Bois, two major steps were required to ensure… human moral self-
realization within an ever more sophisticated and interdependent social 
organism. First, the submerged moral feelings needed to be transformed 
into clearly spelled out ethical premises in order to be an effective 
element of cultural advancement. "The idea of justice is, like other moral 
ideas, not imparted to men by some revelation," Schmoller noted; "in 
many it works only as a vague feeling. In the course of history it 
develops, for the majority, into clear conceptions, standards and 
conclusions." The key to this process was liberal arts education. Ethical 
development was part of a cultural and civilizational process, which 
Schmoller defined, quite traditionally as an advance in rationality. In 
turn, Du Bois's studies under Schmoller strengthened his faith in 
education, in "accomplished moral intelligence", and in the ideal of 
cultivated men. “The aim of the higher training of the college is the 
development of power, the training of the self whose balanced assertion 
will mean as much as possible for the great ends of civilization," Du Bois 
asserted; "we must give to our youth a training designed above all to 
make them men of power, of thought, of trained and cultivated taste." It 
was on this basis that he rejected Booker T. Washington’s philosophy of 
self-help as an undue reduction of liberty to technical training and 
business success. Freedom of spirit and self-reflection were more 
important for the ethical advance of blacks than were technical 
understanding, competitive achievement, and business skills. As his 
mentor Schmoller had asserted, "spiritual and literary powers must first 
prepare the terrain and make old Mother Earth ready to conceive a new 
child, before the time for practical things comes." Second, the social and 
economic structure of society had to be brought in line with the new 
ethical ideas of justice.
229
 
 
The ethics implicit in a formative experience as the one envisioned here can attenuate 
the accusation of elitism towards Du Bois’ own attitude in relation to Western high 
culture and his ideal of the ‘Talented Tenth’ as the leading fraction of the race. Houston 
A. Baker’s observation about the fact that “[w]hile elevating the black intellectual, Du 
Bois perhaps depressed the masses too far”230 should be contextualized in the light of an 
opening of intellectual wealth to a greater section of African Americans and of Du Bois’ 
cultural references to the spiritual wisdom of the folk. Although he did recognize that a 
training in liberal arts was not the kind of education which could be suitable to 
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everybody, still he underlined that the propensity for it could not be established 
exclusively on a racial basis and its usefulness for African Americans was evident in the 
strengthening and articulation of that consciousness which would have been just half-
awakened either by forced ignorance or incomplete training.  In the essay “Of the 
Training of Black Men”, Du Bois exposes his views on the necessity of educating 
African Americans according to the highest standard for the security of American 
society as a whole, 
 
I insist that the question of the future is how best to keep these millions 
[of African Americans] from brooding over the wrongs of the past and 
the difficulties of the present, so that all their energies may be bent 
toward a cheerful striving and coöperation with their white neighbors 
toward a larger, juster, and fuller future. That one wise method of doing 
this lies in the closer knitting of the Negro to the great industrial 
possibilities of the South is a great truth. And this the common schools 
and the manual training and trade schools are working to accomplish. But 
these alone are not enough. The foundations of knowledge in this race, as 
in others, must be sunk deep in the college and university if we would 
build a solid, permanent structure. Internal problems of social advance 
must inevitably come,– problems of work and wages, of families and 
homes, of morals and true valuing of the things of life; and all these and 
other inevitable problems of civilization the Negro must meet and solve 
largely for himself, by reason of his isolation; and can there be any 
possible solution other than by study and thought and an appeal to the 
rich experience of the past? Is there not, with such a group and in such a 
crisis, infinitely more danger to be apprehended from half-trained minds 
and shallow thinking than from over-education and over-refinement?
231
 
 
From this perspective ‘civilization’ and ‘progress’, far from being certain outcomes of 
industrialization and modernity, would result from an ethical attitude towards social 
challenges attained through and stimulated by a kind of education taking into account 
the human and intellectual experiences of black students because the final “function of 
the Negro college”232 should be “to develop men.”233 Such a formative experience 
should focus on “the unknown treasures of their inner life”234 providing them with the 
means to “give the world new points of view and make their loving, living, and doing 
precious to all human hearts.”235 The effects of ‘progress’ alone can be devastating if 
not supported by a concomitant effort to develop such an ethical attitude as 
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demonstrated by Du Bois’ return to the small Tennessee community in which he lived 
as a young teacher. 
 
My log schoolhouse was gone. In its place stood Progress; and Progress, 
I understand, is necessarily ugly… As I sat by the spring and looked on 
the Old and the New I felt glad, very glad, and yet…236  
 
How shall man measure Progress there where the dark-faced Josie lies? 
How many heartfuls of sorrow shall balance a bushel of wheat? How 
hard a thing is life to the lowly, and yet how human and real! And all this 
life and love and strife and failure – is it the twilight of nightfall or the 
flush of some faint-dawning day? 
Thus sadly musing, I rode to Nashville in the Jim Crow Car.
237
 
 
The impoverishment striking the community is not an exception, rather it is a sign that, 
as Schmoller underlined, “the economic organization of a people is not a product of 
nature; … it is primarily a product of the respective ethical views about what is right 
and just in the relationship between the different social classes.”238 If such ethical views 
are ignored by economy and education, the outcomes of civilization do not equate with 
social and financial improvement, but finally contribute to the undermining of the 
delicate balances on which small and isolated communities, such as the one described 
by Du Bois, rested. 
As noted by Schäfer, “The Souls of Black Folk… advances the vision of ‘proud, 
enduring hyphenation’ based on the confluence of spiritual and social evolution;”239 this 
positive hyphenation could only be the result of the synergetic acquisition of culture and 
consciousness by African Americans as the progressive knowledge of historical events 
shaped the relationship between African continuities and American rewritings.
240
 From 
this perspective, the desire to make “the African connection”241, although a “frustrating 
task”242, was anticipated by Du Bois and shared with both cultural anthropology and the 
modernist arts as he “began to explore a model of agency that drew on African as well 
as European precedents.”243 In the following section, the consciousness of these two 
“unreconciled worlds”244 existing at the same time will be used to analyse how the 
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question of African continuities in the Americas was treated in Melville J. Herskovits’ 
anthropological research and the meaning of Africa as a cultural referent for the creation 
and artistic expression of a black modern identity in the United States. In the end, Du 
Bois’ ideas on the importance of culture and education were directed towards the 
accomplishment of such an identity through the expression of a “double consciousness” 
which could become both a social and artistic hermeneutic tool and a factor in the 
ethical and political acknowledgement of African-American humanity. The task of the 
black intellectual was finally inscribed in the possibility of overcoming the presence of 
the ‘color line’ and lifting the Veil: 
 
I sit with Shakespeare and he winces not. Across the color line I move 
arm in arm with Balzac and Dumas, where smiling and welcoming 
women glide in gilded halls. From out of the caves of evening that swing 
between the strong-limbed earth and the tracery of the stars, I summon 
Aristotle and Aurelius and what soul I will, and they come all graciously 
with no scorn nor condescension. So, wed with Truth, I dwell above the 
Veil.
245
 
 
1.4 Discovering Africa while singing America: modernist attempts at African-
American representation 
 
The bigotry of civilization which is the taproot of intellectual prejudice 
begins far back and must be corrected at its source. Fundamentally it has 
come about from that depreciation of Africa which has sprung up from 
ignorance of her true rôle and position in human history and the early 
development of culture. The Negro has been a man without a history 
because he has been considered a man without a worthy culture.
246
 
 
 
What is Africa to me: 
Copper sun or scarlet sea, 
Jungle star or jungle track, 
Strong bronzed men, or regal black 
Women from whose loins I sprang 
When the birds of Eden sang? 
One three centuries removed 
From the scenes his fathers loved, 
Spicy grove, cinnamon tree, 
What is Africa to me?
247
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245
 Ibid., 139. 
246
 Arthur A. Schomburg, “The Negro Digs Up His Past” in Alain Locke (ed.), The New Negro: Voices of 
the Harlem Renaissance, (Touchstone: New York, 1997 – 1925), 237. 
247
 Countee Cullen, “Heritage” in ibid., 250. 
  
 
 
55 
 
I, too, sing America.   
 
I am the darker brother. They send me to eat in the kitchen  
When company comes,  
But I laugh,  
And eat well,  
And grow strong.   
Tomorrow, I'll be at the table  
When company comes.  
Nobody'll dare  
Say to me, "Eat in the kitchen,"  
Then.   
 
Besides,   
They'll see how beautiful I am  
And be ashamed—   
 
I, too, am America.
248
 
 
The American historian James T. Campbell observes that “[a]s paradoxical as it may 
sound, Africa has served historically as one of the chief terrains on which African 
Americans have negotiated their relationship to American society.”249 In his preface to 
Campbell’s text, David Levering Lewis adds, “[t]o put the matter more poetically, when 
an African American asks, ‘What is Africa to me’, he or she is also asking, ‘What is 
America to me?’”250 The juxtaposing of the extract by Countée Cullen and the poem by 
Langston Hughes, two of the most representative figures of the Harlem Renaissance or 
New Negro movement, articulates the kind of tension described by Campbell as defined 
by the search for African origins and continuities in the Americas both in cultural 
anthropology and black modernism. Such a tension, which is essential for the 
elaboration of a positive identity characterised as a point of departure for political 
representation and artistic expression, is reflected both in the anthropological research 
and the dilemmas of American society in the first half of the twentieth century. Lee D. 
Baker’s analysis illuminates the conjunction between changing perspectives in social 
sciences and the role of race and culture in the acquisition of civil rights for African 
Americans. As he underlines, the question “[d]id the Negro have culture?” is first of all 
a political question more than an empirical one;
251
 still, this same question is able to 
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influence the empirical and theoretical bases of a discipline. Anthropology and 
sociology, in fact, concentrated respectively on tradition and modernity
252
 and provided 
different answers in different times to the question asked above. In relation to African-
American culture at the beginning of the 1900s, it is possible to notice a certain degree 
of ambiguity in relation to the very existence of a distinctive African-American culture 
in opposition to the recognition, by the 1920s, of specific Native-American cultures.
253
 
Baker quotes Boas’ “Introduction” to the Handbook of American Indian Languages in 
which he stated that “the North American negroes, [were] a people by descent largely 
African; in culture and language, however, essentially European.”254 In 1925, in his 
contribution for The New Negro, the anthology of the Harlem Renaissance edited by the 
African-American philosopher Alain Locke, the anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits 
maintained a very similar position; in this regard, Baker notices that: “both Boas and 
Herskovits were trying to argue that blacks were not unlike whites and therefore should 
not be subjected to discrimination.”255 Both Boas’ reference to the history of Africa in 
Du Bois’ recollection of their first encounter and Herskovits’ subsequent interest in the 
African continuities among the Saramaccan Maroons of Suriname account for a tension 
within anthropological theory and practice which was absent in the concept of culture in 
relation to African-American communities as defined by Robert E. Park of the Chicago 
School of Sociology. Park maintained that “the Negro, when he landed in the United 
States, left behind him almost everything but his dark complexion and his tropical 
temperament.”256 If compared to Boas’ statement above, it is possible to see that the 
distance between the two was not so extreme at first
257
, but the discrepancy between 
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cultural anthropology and sociology grew larger as “[t]he Boas influenced project 
privileged history, diffusion, and continuities, which… helped to shape African 
American culture” while social scientists influenced by Park’s theories, and particularly 
the African-American sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, committed themselves to an uplift 
project which basically saw African-American cultural differences as the result of a 
history marked by economic deprivation and social disenfranchisement.
258
 Ultimately, 
Negro culture constituted a deviation from the white standard “determined by 
educational and economic factors as well as by social isolation.”259 
 
These social scientists usually pointed to statistics that compared 
Negroes’ deviations to a white standard, which underscored the high 
number of female-headed households and fictive kin relations, and these 
so-called deviant practices were conflated with high rates of crime, 
disease, and poverty. Together, they became indelible signs of deviant 
behavior or a pathological culture… Even at the height of the Harlem 
Renaissance, the heritage project was simply dwarfed by the uplift 
project.
260
 
 
While the New Negro Movement referred to Boas’ work in order to 
acknowledge a specific African-American cultural tradition
261
, the origins of 
nineteenth-century-folklore studies can be found in the work of John Wesley Powell, 
the head of the Bureau of Ethnology from 1879 to 1902. Powell focused on American 
Indian folklore, collecting it in an evolutionary perspective “that saw all society 
developing through four levels of progress. Three of these stages – savagery, barbarism, 
and civilization – were already realized, but in the future an additional level, that of 
‘enlightenment’, would be achieved.”262 In his view, it is possible to identify the 
beginning of an uplift project which marked part of folklore studies, as attested in the 
foundation of the Hampton Folk-lore Society in 1893 which was the first institution to 
express interest in African-American folklore;
263
 the association explained its concern 
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with “so-called cabin people”264 as a way “to make missionaries more efficient health-
care providers.”265 In the 1800s, this missionary intent coexisted with two main 
approaches to folkloric content, namely the literary
266
 and the anthropological approach. 
The foundation of the American Folklore Society in 1888 favoured the latter largely 
because of the influence of the folklorist William Wells Newell and Boas
267
, who were 
“the major forces in the early years of the AFS, Boas maintaining that role for half a 
century.”268 In this context, the study of folklore became part of a broader 
anthropological interest characterised by an increasing professionalization of its 
standards and “a systematic approach.”269 
In the very concept and definition of the term ‘folk-lore’, in its original 
hyphenation, it is possible to find an area of blurring between ‘culture’ and ‘race’ as 
“[l]ore means learning; folk, as I shall here use the word, means race. The Folk-lore of 
Negroes in the United States then, is the learning of knowledge peculiar to the Negro 
race… which they brought with them from Africa.”270 An element to underline here is 
the shift from a biological to a cultural concept of race to be found in the perspective of 
‘race’ not as a quasi-ontological state of being, but something to be acquired in a 
process of learning. The uplift project was based, on the other hand, on the assumption 
that another kind of learning could substitute and therefore modify the very essence of 
race, making it invisible, or at least negligible. In the definition of ‘folk’ as ‘race’ and in 
its contiguity with ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’, which is the meaning that folklore will 
acquire in its progression as a discipline influenced by anthropology, ‘class’ makes its 
appearance as a significant factor for the acquisition of other kinds of learning that can 
guarantee access to the category of ‘Americanness.’ On the whole, from the perspective 
of uplift, ‘cultural’ specificities characterizing ‘race’ were consigned to a framework of 
deprivation, which once modified, would spontaneously elide those perceived 
differences.  
Gershenhorn observes that Herskovits’ position focused on the idea that “black 
assimilation into American culture and preservation of the African heritage were not 
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mutually exclusive. Nor was cultural change a one-way street.”271 Herskovits had 
arrived at such a view following a significant change in perspective from his initial 
contribution in The New Negro and his subsequent research in the Americas and West 
Africa in order to identify African traits in American cultures. His essay in The New 
Negro, entitled “The Negro’s Americanism”, starts with a description of Harlem which, 
although considered at the time as quintessentially African American, “a metonymic of 
African America in general”272, was in his eyes “a community just like any other 
American community”273, so that what was considered the cradle of modern African-
American culture was for him “a typical American community”274 where “once in a 
while an element peculiarly Negro does manifest itself.”275 Although racial prejudice 
had prevented black workers from joining the white unions
276, according to Herskovits’ 
observations, “the general economic motif comes in for much more attention then the 
problems which are of interest to the Negro per se.”277 
A key factor which marked Herskovits’ research on African elements in the 
Americas and significantly changed his perspective on the cultural traditions of black 
people in the New World was folklore in its definition of oral ‘folk literature’, “arising 
out of but distinct from cultural custom.”278 The basis for this was his own research in 
Dahomey (Benin) in 1931. Herskovits especially focused on the performative style and 
the context of oral folk literature that became the objects of his in-depth analysis more 
than the actual folkloric texts. As noticed by the anthropologist Kevin A. Yelvington, in 
the period during which American cultural anthropologists started to become interested 
in folklore, “in the Caribbean as elsewhere… folklore was used as a plank in nationalist 
arguments”279: scholars such as Antonio S. Pedreira in Puerto Rico and anthropologists 
such as Jean-Price Mars in Haiti and Fernando Ortiz in Cuba connected the study of 
folklore to the rise of national pride and the construction of a national identity.
280
 The 
possibility of maintaining a nucleus of tales and characteristic ways of expression 
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through folklore constituted the core of Herskovits’ ‘Africanist Turn’; in fact, 
Yelvington observes that “[f]olklore figured prominently in this new theoretical 
orientation. Folklore was conceived by Herskovits as one element of culture, such as 
religion or kinship, that could survive more or less intact…’281 In Life in a Haitian 
Valley (1937), Herskovits assigned to folklore a central role in the survival of African 
culture in the Americas, describing it as “[t]he trait of African culture that has survived 
most tenaciously in all the New World, even when European influence has been 
strongest.”282 Yelvington further notices how, during the years, Herskovits moved from 
the Boasian concept of ‘survivals’ to that of African ‘retentions’ implying a higher 
degree of conceptualization and reinterpretation in the conservation of African elements 
in African-American culture.
283
 
The folkloric element was also central to the project of modernism in general 
and to that of the Harlem Renaissance in particular. In Alain Locke’s view, folklore 
would have been essential in the transformation of the African-American common 
experience into ‘a common consciousness’284, particularly important for a movement 
which represented a section of diverse African-American groups in the United States 
constituted by the migration of people from the rural South and the West Indies to the 
cities in the North of the United States. Between 1910 and 1930, in fact, about six 
millions of African Americans had left the Southern states in order to look for jobs and 
a better life in the urban centres of the North. 
 
Here in Manhattan is not merely the largest Negro community in the 
world, but the first concentration in history of so many diverse elements 
of Negro life. It has attracted the African, the West Indian, the Negro 
American; has brought together the Negro of the North and the Negro of 
the South; the man from the city and the man from the town and the 
village; the peasant, the student, the business man, the professional man, 
artist, poet, musician, adventurer and worker, preacher and criminal, 
exploiter and social outcast. Each group has come with its own separate 
motives and for its own special ends, but their greatest experience has 
been the finding of one another.
285
 
 
By juxtaposing Locke’s description of Harlem with Herskovits’, the reader becomes 
aware that the apparent adherence to the wider context of modern New York travels 
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through coordinates of class and competence while what may have characterised the 
area as specifically African American was the particular outlook that those people from 
the South and the Caribbean cast over such a context and the possibilities it offered to or 
denied them; in fact, the degree of alienation that the new black immigrants had to face 
was probably what posited the question of ‘difference’ both as a resource – in the case 
of the Harlem Renaissance and the subsequent research by Herskovits – and a problem 
as sensed by both mainstream sociology and the American society at large. The modern 
urban environment is the twentieth-century context from which African-American 
history could be read and evaluated as resource or deprivation, pride or unassimilated 
presence.  
The particular reception of folklore within such a context and the possibility of 
using it as a basis for a modern model of racial self-representation as implied in the 
Harlem Renaissance project reveals a web of connections and interactions between class 
and race, cultural politics and economics. As observed by Vladimir Propp, folklore 
studies defines itself as “an ideological discipline”286 marked from the very beginning 
by a set of premises and principles whose aim is to distinguish the objects of its study 
from other areas of culture and, especially, ‘high’ culture. In this regard, Canclini 
observes that folklore is “a label that indicated its differences with respect to art as 
much as the subtlety of the cultured gaze, which was capable of recognizing the value 
of the generically human even in the object of the ‘others.’”287 Propp underlines several 
important aspects of folklore studies, but two are particularly useful for the present 
analysis: first, the connection with modernity as “[i]ts methods and aims are determined 
by and reflect the outlook of the age”288 and second, its focus on “only one stratum of 
the population studied… namely, that of the peasantry.”289 Propp also comments on the 
temporal preoccupations that mark contemporary studies on folklore: “[i]n the West it is 
the poetical works of the peasants and always of the contemporary peasants that are 
studied, though only insofar as their contemporary culture has preserved elements of the 
past. The subject is ‘living antiquity.’”290 According to Propp, this is a specific limit of 
folklore studies because of the dynamic character of folklore
291
 and its existence prior to 
the constitution of peasantry as a class; in so doing, Propp identifies a much more varied 
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background in folkloric production as folklore becomes for him “the art of the 
oppressed classes, both peasants and workers, but also of the intermediate strata that 
gravitate toward the lower social classes.”292 
 Besides, folklore shows some significant connections to both anthropology and 
literature. In fact, although at least at the beginning, anthropology and folklore studies 
tried to distinguish their respective fields of research according to geographical areas of 
interest related to international borders for anthropology and national boundaries for 
folklore, so that “if a French scholar studies French songs, this is folklore, but if the 
same scholar studies Albanian songs, this is ethnography”293, Propp highlights the 
international aspect of folklore
294
 and its constitution as a science which “embraces the 
art of all people, no matter who studies them.”295 The interconnectedness between 
folklore studies, anthropology, and literature is even enhanced by the fact that “[n]one 
of the humanities, be it ethnography, history, linguistics, or the history of literature, can 
do without folklore.”296 The relationship of folklore to literature posits some important 
questions on how it can be used as a validation for literary identities and what its 
distinction from literature says of its status within it. As Propp rightly observes, 
literature as well is the product of a particular class of society and when folkloric 
themes and modes of expression find their way through literature in moments of 
stylistic revisions, the tension between two different, although complementary, 
traditions can be both a resource and a problem. 
In the case of a modernist movement such as the Harlem or New Negro 
Renaissance, the challenge and problematic gesture consists in placing the folkloric 
element at the core of a literary project as, while folklore is strictly linked to literature, 
its presence presupposes a set of questions on the nature of authorship, originality, and 
the changeability/stability of art. In fact, “not only is there a close tie between folklore 
and literature, but folklore is a literary phenomenon. Like literature, it is verbal art;”297 
nonetheless literature and folklore differ in significant ways
298
 and their relationship can 
become further complicated by their complementary difference:  
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[o]ne of the most important differences is that literary works invariably 
have an author. Folklore works, on the contrary, never have an author… 
It has long been known that literature is transmitted through writing and 
folklore by word of mouth… this distinction…  captures the innermost 
difference between the functioning of literature and folklore. A literary 
work, once it has arisen, no longer changes. It exists only when two 
agents are present: the author (the creator of the work) and the reader. 
The mediating link between them is a book, manuscript, or performance. 
A literary work is immutable, but the reader always changes… Folklore 
also presupposes two agents, but different agents, namely, the performer 
and the listener, opposing each other directly, or rather without a 
mediating link…. Performers do not repeat their texts word for word but 
introduce changes into them. Even if these changes are insignificant (but 
they can be very great), even if the changes that take place in folklore 
texts are sometimes as slow as geological processes, what is important is 
the fact of changeability of folklore compared with the stability of 
literature.
299
 
 
Folklore, as described in the extract above, would be characterised by anonymity, 
orality, directness (performer and listener interact in the course of a direct 
confrontation), and changeability while literature would be an authorial endeavour by 
means of a written, and therefore fixed, medium of communication connecting the 
writer to the reader. Movement and change are important features when related to 
folklore and the evaluation of its producers, ‘the folk’, who were usually seen as static 
human relics of a previous age as figures such as “the vanishing American” or “the 
disappearing Negro… as the central trope of the [modernist] movement”300 seem to 
suggest.  
The challenge of modernism, and especially black modernism, was therefore to 
include that folklore as a means of authentication for a literary project that could be 
considered of national and international significance. American modernists turned to 
folklore as a way of defining their national specificity when confronted with European 
modernisms in an international arena while African-American modernists discovered in 
American folklore both their presence as subjects and their stereotyped representation. 
Therefore, when Henry Louis Gates speaks of a “two-toned heritage”301, he is not only 
defining the hybrid legacy of black and white linguistic interactions in the United 
States, but also addressing the intermingling of different versions of American history 
and diverging interpretations of Americanness. From this perspective, it seems 
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appropriate to apply to the North American context the analysis of Brazilian modernism 
by Aracy Amaral as reported by Canclini when he notices that for American 
modernists, “to be cultured it is no longer indispensable, as it was in the nineteenth 
century, to imitate European behaviors.”302 Canclini interestingly adds that “[t]he 
modernists drank from double and facing fountains: on the one hand, international 
information… on the other, ‘a nativism that would be evidenced in the inspiration and 
search for our roots.’”303 In fact, “[a]lthough the internationalizing trend has been 
characteristic of the vanguards, we note that some united their experimental search in 
materials and languages with an interest in critically redefining the cultural traditions 
from which they were being expressed.”304 
As Michael North reminds us, these two modernisms cannot be understood 
without reference to each other, but especially “without reference to the language they 
so uncomfortably shared”305, namely the language in which folklore was expressed, and 
this language was dialect. From this perspective, the role of the lower classes became 
central; North quotes Ambrose Gonzales, a white American dialect writer of the 1920s, 
who supported the pivotal role of peasantry as “conservators of speech”306 and 
‘authentic’307 American heritage. North also adds:  
 
[a]nd yet, on the other hand, black English had long been considered not 
just corrupt in itself but also the cause of corruption in others… Writers 
like Kennedy and Gonzales do not disavow such notions: the black 
speakers in their works are abundantly provided with the sort of 
malapropisms that have always characterized literary representations of 
“broken English”… the language included in [their] works… is both 
broken and pure, twisted and authentic.
308
 
 
Thus, while dialect was regarded as a ‘purer’ idiom because it freed expression from the 
constraints of standardized usage and mainstream education
309
 and revealed the creative 
and expressive potential of language, “black speech… [was] mocked as deviant”310 
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although being recognised as “the only true voice of the South.”311 African-American 
modernism, as a consequence, saw folklore as a collective, oral enterprise as delineated 
above
312
, but added to it the distinctive dimension of repudiation of “the culture 
theorizing of the white Western world.”313 This act of rebellion has been, indeed, 
necessary for African Americans in order to experiment in the arts during and after the 
Harlem Renaissance. Together with “the call for an appreciation of popular forms”314, 
bell hooks reminds us that “[w]hatever African-Americans created in music, dance, 
painting, etc., it was regarded as testimony, bearing witness, challenging racist thinking 
which suggested that black folks were not fully human, were uncivilized, and that the 
measure of this was our collective failure to create ‘great’ art.”315 hooks’ words echo the 
“Preface” by James Weldon Johnson to his Book of American Negro Poetry (1922) 
when he observes that “[t]he final measure of the greatness of all peoples is the amount 
and standard of the literature and art they have produced.”316 
More than a simple alternative to the white standard, African-American folklore 
in black modernism – as it has been underlined before in the case of Du Bois’ The Souls 
of Black Folk – “performs the authenticating chores previously composed by white 
opinion.”317 From the direction suggested by Du Bois’ Souls, the anthology The New 
Negro, edited by Alain Locke, can be seen as a continuation of a project that is 
informed by the collective aspect of folklore as it underlines the passage from the “story 
of ‘I’ to a story of ‘We.’”318 The Harlem Renaissance, far from being a failure according 
to Higgins’ famous evaluation of the movement319, would represent one of the most 
accomplished examples of modernism because of its close connection to and creative 
use of folkloric materials. In fact, North comments on Alain Locke’s observations on 
the significance of Harlem in the wider context of the avant-garde noticing that the 
“effort toward an indigenous American cultural renewal” had found “a natural ally in 
the black movement that has come to accept ‘the folk music and poetry as an artistic 
heritage.’”320 The New Negro can be defined as the ‘autobiography of a generation’ – 
actually, of different generations – of African-American artists, scholars, and 
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intellectuals living in Harlem in the 1920s. Like any self-portrait, the anthology 
provides a description while omitting significant traits: Anne Elizabeth Carroll has 
praised both the collective dimension of the anthology and its interdisciplinary 
structure, but has also highlighted its unifying impulses and attempts at 
simplification.
321
 Even more importantly, what emerges from Carroll’s analysis is a 
particular attention to the visual elements throughout the anthology which, thanks to the 
pictures and designs by Winold Reiss and Aaron Douglas, focus on “the link between 
African Americans and Africans and turn that link into a motif of the book.”322  
The visual emphasis that the anthology puts on the African element present in 
African-American folklore and culture is important as it has constituted a major point of 
critique of the movement and a main area of interest both for black modernism and 
anthropology. The Harlem Renaissance was contributing to a wider context of 
recuperation of African motifs as expressed by both the European avant-garde and the 
concomitant direction of ethnographic research. In this regard, John C. Charles notices 
that “Locke’s call for a cultural reconnection with Africa was part of his overall cultural 
nationalist project.”323 Charles positions Locke within a “history of African American 
leaders and intellectuals who advocated greater interest in Africa;”324 such an interest 
often involved a messianic attitude exercised by African-American spokespeople 
towards the continent of their ancestors. From this perspective, “evangelical ‘civilizing,’ 
or ‘uplift’”325 was promoted as a mission towards “their ‘benighted’ African 
brethren.”326 Charles also quotes historian Kevin Gaines who has observed that African 
Americans thought of themselves as “privileged agents of progress and civilization for 
the disadvantaged black majority.”327 This “civilization ideology” was not exempt from 
imperialist beliefs and missionary activities in many ways similar to the general attitude 
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Western countries maintained towards their colonies.
328
 Although Charles 
acknowledges the fact that Locke was critical towards missionary projects as he saw 
them as “a corollary of modern imperialism”329, and that he shared with anthropology 
“the emergent cultural relativism”330 of his age, nonetheless “when Locke [in his essay 
‘The New Negro’] describes the relationship between African Americans and Africans, 
his language conveys… unquestioned power, asymmetry, and sense of presumption.”331 
From this context, Harlem becomes “the metropole, the center of global race 
leadership.”332 The major tension provoked by such a rhetoric in the context of the 
Harlem Renaissance deals, once again, with the representative possibilities for a New 
Negro who was “prototypically modern and Western”333, while Africa – which, together 
with African-American folklore, constituted the source of such a modern identity – 
“was considered the antithesis of the modern West.”334 The representation of Africa was 
rather uncertain within this framework since “if Africa provided an ‘authentic’ and 
‘classic’ artistic tradition – a usable past for African American artists – it continued to 
represent a usable present as a source of exotic signs.”335  
In the present study, the role of Africa within the Harlem Renaissance is 
considered as both a source of inspiration and a cultural and political ‘elsewhere’ from 
and to which discourses regarding the primitiveness of black Americans and their 
supposed exoticism within national borders could be transposed and distanced in order 
to define a modern African-American identity.  Africa provided the black artist and 
intellectual with a tradition that was felt as ‘authentic’ and ‘classical’ while trying to 
dismiss the unwanted association with its primitivism. The fact is that this act of 
recuperation was not independent from previous theoretical assumptions on the ‘nature’ 
of both Africans and African Americans because the funding for many of the artistic 
endeavours which marked the age of the New Negro was actually coming from white 
patrons who were expecting to find the primitive and the exotic within the urban context 
of the modern metropolis as, in Canclini’s words, “the simultaneous exaltation of 
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aesthetic modernism and social premodernity are shown to be compatible.”336 What 
indeed was happening could be described as a progressive detachment from the folk per 
se while folklore was used as both method and basis for literary and artistic endeavours. 
In fact, according to Canclini: 
 
[t]he literary gaze at patrimony, including visual culture, contributed to 
the divorce between the elites and the people. In societies with a high rate 
of illiteracy, documenting and organizing culture chiefly through written 
means is a way of reserving memory and the use of symbolic goods for 
the few. Even in countries that incorporated large sections of the 
population into the formal education in the first half of the twentieth 
century… the predominance of writing implies a more intellectualized 
mode of circulation and appropriation of cultural goods, foreign to the 
subaltern classes, who were accustomed to the visual elaboration and 
communication of their experiences.
337
 
 
From this context, it could be useful, as Canclini suggests, to overcome the opposition 
between traditional and modern taking into account three factors highlighted by 
Raymond Williams: the archaic, the residual, and the emergent. Commenting on 
Williams’s distinction, Canclini observes that,  
 
[t]he archaic is what belongs to the past and is acknowledged as such by 
those who today relive it, almost always ‘in a deliberately specialized 
way.’ On the other hand, the residual is formed in the past but is still 
active within cultural processes. The emergent designates new meanings 
and values, new practices and social relations.
338
 
 
What can this mean in relation to the distinction between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Negro within 
the Harlem Renaissance? The idea here is that for black modernism Africa could 
constitute the archaic, African-American folklore could be associated with the residual, 
and the emergent would have been personified by the New Negro in the context of 
modern New York. While the residual had to be seen as an active part of the emergent 
in order to acquire a new, fuller meaning for the rising African-American identity, the 
archaic had to be recuperated as an authoritative legacy living throughout both the 
residual and the emergent. In order for this to be possible, a whole corpus of 
representations coming from scientific studies, sabotaged histories, and ‘common’ 
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beliefs had to be rewritten and their narratives disentangled in order to reclaim some 
form of legacy without, at the same time, reclaiming its prejudices. Although Charles’s 
analysis of Locke’s Africanism has many good points, he only partially takes into 
account such a context while seemingly ignoring the potential of Africa as a referent for 
more than artistic freedom both for Locke and the Harlem Renaissance. It is appropriate 
to say that Locke could not completely disentangle himself from the uplift project – 
which, at any rate, was not exclusively addressed to Africans – but saw in Africa the 
potential for freeing African-American art and expression from a controversial 
inheritance while at the same time reclaiming a privileged connection compared to the 
wider context of American modernism. In his essay “The American Negro As Artist” 
(1931), Locke writes:  
 
[s]urely we should expect the liberating example of such an [African] 
aesthetic to exert as marked an influence on the work of the 
contemporary Negro artist as it has already exerted on leading modernists 
like Picasso, Modigliani, Matisse, Epstein, Lipschitz, Brancusi, and 
others. Indeed we may expect even more with a group of artists 
becoming conscious of an historical and racial bond between themselves 
and African art. For them, rather than just a liberating idiom or an exotic 
fad, African art should work with all the force of a rediscovered folk-art, 
and give clues for the repression of a half-submerged race soul.
339
 
 
The resurgence of Africa is paralleled by the “downfall of classic models and Caucasian 
idols”340 which, through a reversal of the discourse associating African traits to infancy, 
are – in Locke’s vision – related to “the childhood period of American Negro art”341 
while the rediscovery of the African legacy would be a sign of “the growing maturity of 
the young Negro artist, the advent of a representatively racial school of expression, and 
an important new contribution… to a whole body of American art.”342  
Locke’s reversal of the rhetoric associating the Negro with childish behaviour 
and partial development is at the basis of Melville Herskovits’ project aimed at 
dismantling the myth of a Negro past in order to substitute this construction with an 
image as free as possible from outdated stereotypes and prejudice. Therefore, in The 
Myth of the Negro Past, Herskovits deconstructed the whole structure of a myth which 
had been used to validate race prejudice in the United States. Herskovits started his 
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analysis from the widespread assumption that African Americans were ‘naturally’ 
childlike and thus more inclined to be submissive and challenged the common beliefs in 
relation to their aptness for slavery, their origins (it was generally assumed that slaves 
came from lower strata of society), and the idea that African cultures were so 
underdeveloped that they had left no traces in American culture. Because of all these 
reasons, the American Negro was considered without a past. Trying to dismantle the 
whole apparatus while introducing a historical perspective on it, Herskovits’ work 
constituted a careful collection, comparison, and analysis of materials and data coming 
from different regions of the United States and from Western Africa which highlighted 
– among many other things – differences and specificities of African survivals and 
retentions in American cultures
343
, the influence of migration in shaping the black 
American experience
344
, the degree of identification with or detachment from white 
values
345
, and the existence of forms of resistance alternative to direct opposition to the 
slavery system.
346
 In 1940, Herskovits had already asserted the liminality of the 
African-American heritage which was, in his words, “neither purely African nor purely 
European, but represents, in varying degrees, a syncretism of the dual heritage of 
Europe and Africa.”347 Gershenhorn also underlines how the idea of African-American 
culture was embedded into a project of historical recuperation echoing, in certain ways, 
the project set forth by the Harlem Renaissance. He observes that, 
 
Herskovits… refuted the present focus of most studies of the “Negro 
problem,” arguing for “a thoroughgoing historical attack of the Negro 
problem. In the tangled skein of American Negro culture history, the 
African threads are meaningless unless we arrive at a comprehension of 
the mechanisms whereby such Africanisms as may be discovered were 
perpetuated, and how they were rewoven with yarn from other 
sources.”348 
 
The historical look at African traits in the Americas is what connects the research of the 
Harlem Renaissance with the concomitant research by Herskovits in cultural 
anthropology. Apart from that, an important aspect of the collection and analysis of 
folklore is the context in which it was produced and acquired significance. Such a 
context is so important because it allows the ethnographer and artist to trace not only the 
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historical relevance of marginalised experiences in the Americas, but also to understand 
continuities in the everyday lives of people suspended between ideas of ‘primitivism’ 
and ‘modernity.’ This allows him to draw a comparison between religion and 
technological innovation which is used as a metaphor to conclude this chapter. 
 
Religion is close to the everyday experience of the West African. 
Supernatural forces are potentially dangerous, it is true, but so are wild 
animals or illness. An analogy can be drawn in terms of our own reaction 
to electricity and automobiles. For those who work with either or benefit 
from the use of either, the potential dangers – of shock or of accident – 
are considerable. Yet, if we are normal, we do not set up phobias which 
preoccupy our waking moments and torment our sleep with nightmares 
concerning electricity and automobiles. For if these are dangerous, they 
are also helpful; if they can harm us when not handled properly, their 
proper use is beneficial. So with the West African’s gods, and so with his 
magic. What can potentially harm, if not handled properly, can also be of 
the greatest aid; and just as we have specialists who see to it that our 
electrical devices are properly insulated and our automobiles are in 
proper working order, so in West Africa priests and diviners and dealers 
in magic charms are likewise on hand to exercise proper control.
349
 
 
Through this comparison, Herskovits shows the connection between two aspects 
apparently far from one another. Religion, and by extension folklore, in Canclini’s 
words, has a function in the everyday lives of the peoples who produce them as 
technical innovations have a function within modernity. The separation between the two 
spheres, anyway, is marked – both in art and anthropology – by coordinates ascribing 
specific meanings to the temporal and embodied presence of the anthropologist and 
his/her ‘objects’ of study; such a separation is responsible for the epistemology of 
anthropology which delineates a marked separation of the anthropologist from the 
‘Other’ of anthropological enquiry. This Other is relegated to ‘primitiveness’ on the 
basis of supposed distance from the modern perspective of anthropology and this is the 
main reason why Herskovits’ association between ‘ancestral’ religion and modernity is 
so important. In the following chapters, the reader will be confronted with the extent of 
such assumptions in ethnographic practice and anthropological theories when the 
anthropologist’s presence is marked by racial and/or gendered characteristics which 
closely associates her/him to the ‘objects’ of her/his study. As observed by Paul Gilroy 
in relation to modern black political culture, it is true for early cultural anthropology as 
well that it “has always been more interested in the relationship of identity to roots and 
                                                 
349
 Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past, 74. 
  
 
 
72 
rootedness than in seeing identity as a process of movements and mediation that is more 
appropriately approached via the homonym routes.”350 Representations of body and 
Time in Zora Neale Hurston’s ethnography, therefore, will be here used as a way of 
complicating the question of rootedness while recording the movements involved in the 
delineation of routes which can articulate the relationship between the anthropologist, 
her practice, and subjects suspended between tradition and modernity, history and myth. 
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Chapter 2: Anthropological Distance and the Body in Zora Neale 
Hurston’s Mules and Men 
 
This chapter attempts to analyse the representation of the woman anthropologist’s body 
in the 1935 ethnography Mules and Men by Zora Neale Hurston. Hurston was one of 
the main literary figures of the Harlem Renaissance, the 1920s artistic movement based 
in New York City, an unprecedented occasion of autonomous representation and 
theorization of black identity by African-American musicians, writers, and performers. 
Apart from her artistic endeavours, Hurston was also trained as an anthropologist at 
Columbia University, working under the guidance of Franz Boas. Through the reading 
of her work, this chapter focuses on the ways in which literature, including folk and oral 
expression, can problematize the issues which have emerged in cultural anthropology at 
the end of the twentieth century in relation to the conventions of ethnographical writing. 
From this perspective, Hurston’s choice to represent herself as an embodied character 
within the narrative frame of her ethnography will be questioned and analysed.
351
  
Embodiment will be considered as an element that destabilizes the paradigms of 
invisibility and scientific objectivity applied to the anthropological methodology of 
those years. The emergence of the body in the ethnography will focus on the question of 
distance in anthropology through the representation of alterity. Furthermore, the theme 
of the body is connected to the representation of Time
352
 in anthropology, which will be 
explored in the following chapter. Orality and performance constitute the links that 
articulate an analysis of the representative forces at work in Hurston’s ethnographies as 
possibilities of expression for alternative conceptions of Time and corporeality. 
This chapter will propose an analysis of the representation of the body within 
Mules and Men through the observations on the relationship between body and 
knowledge as suggested by the Australian feminist Elizabeth Grosz in her studies 
Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism
353
 and Architecture from Outside: 
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Essays on Virtual and Real Spaces.
354
 The discussion of body and knowledge will be 
connected to the analysis of Hurston’s self-representation in the ethnography in relation 
to the specificity of the racial history of the United States: the representation of the 
embodied subjectivity of a black woman in a segregated society can be read as both 
daring and controversial. These considerations will try to underline how the black body 
has been represented and perceived in the US imaginary and how embodiment is linked 
not only to knowledge production, but also to consciousness and particularly, according 
to W. E. B. Du Bois’ famous definition, to “double consciousness” in relation to the 
experience of African Americans. Thus, the chapter will analyse the role of the body as 
a fundamental site of struggle and resistance and, in the fieldwork, as an important 
position for the anthropologist in order to situate her knowledge within the community 
which she studied. The body will be regarded as a “discursive phenomenon” which is 
able to overcome the dialectic between nature (and the attempt at forcing bodily 
processes into a pre-cultural status) and culture because of the body’s pivotal role in 
both ethnographic knowledge and oral performance. In the end, the different levels of 
embodiment present in Hurston’s representation of her journey through Florida and 
Louisiana will be taken into consideration in order to articulate the theme of presence 
and distance in ethnography. The encounter with difference is represented as apparent 
closeness to and similarity with the “object of study” which is ultimately denied by the 
course of the narrative events represented in the framework of the ethnography. Thus, in 
the second part of Mules and Men, dedicated to hoodoo practices in New Orleans, it is 
possible to detect a final attempt at reconciliation of the different layers of subjectivity 
and the possibility of acquiring knowledge through the embodied practice of hoodoo. 
 
2.1 On body and knowledge in ethnography 
 
Blacks, slaves, immigrants, indigenous people can no longer function as 
the working body for white “citizens”, leaving them free to create values, 
morality, knowledges.
355
 
 
When de nigger opened up his bundle he found a pick and shovel and a 
hoe and a plow and chop-axe and then de white man opened up his 
bundle and found a writing’-pen and ink. So ever since de nigger been 
out in de hot sun, usin’ his tools and de white man been sittin’ up 
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figgerin’, ought’s a ought, figger’s a figger; all for de white man, none 
for de nigger.
356
 
 
The two quotations opening this chapter constitute a complementary view on the 
relationship between body and knowledge and, in particular, on the role of bodies’ 
specificities in relation to the production of knowledge and the division of labour. The 
first sentence, taken from Elizabeth Grosz’s Volatile Bodies presents an interesting 
transposition of the mind/body division from the epistemic to the social and historical 
contexts. The second quotation, taken from the 1935 folklore collection Mules and Men 
by Zora Neale Hurston, represents a theorization of the same concept through narrative. 
The framework of this quote is the tale “De Reason Niggers Is Working so Hard” 
included in the seventy-tale-anthology which constitutes the core of Hurston’s 
ethnographic work based on her fieldwork in Florida and Louisiana between 1927 and 
1932. This tale tries to provide an explanation for black exploitation in the United States 
making it date back to the moment in which God left two bundles on the road and the 
black man, outrunning the white, would have chosen the biggest one to discover, a few 
moments later, that the parcel contained the tools of physical labour the white man has 
historically imposed onto him. Since that moment, the pen and ink lodged inside the 
smallest bundle have been controlled by the white man in the context of a story 
assigning mythical origins to a division of labour linked to oppressive and 
segregationist systems. 
In relation to the first quote by Grosz, the extract provides an adequate 
framework for this chapter’s discussion of the relationship between body and 
knowledge in connection to specific forms of exploitation in the history of the United 
States. It provides a contextualization for Zora Neale Hurston’s role as ethnographer 
and novelist as well because her biography can be seen as an attempt to subvert this 
‘original’ order and conquer the pen and ink, the instruments of knowledge production, 
undermining a division of roles so oppressive to be felt as beginning in a dateless time. 
The historical conditions of Hurston’s research, though, can show that the influence of 
white authorities on the intellectual work by black artists and researchers was still very 
evident in the North American context of the 1930s. 
 Hurston’s ethnographical expedition was, in fact, directed by Franz Boas, the 
founder of American cultural anthropology, and funded by Mrs. Charlotte Osgood 
Mason, a white patron deeply interested in the African-American cultural heritage and 
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arts.
357
 Apart from Hurston’s literary and anthropological endeavours, Mason financed 
black educational programmes and several other artists who – like Hurston – were part 
of the Harlem Renaissance, such as Langston Hughes. According to him, Mrs. Mason 
was interested in black artists not because she wanted to help them, but because she 
considered them as “America’s great link with the primitive.”358 
Starting from the assumed connection to the primitive which has been explored 
in Chapter One in relation to both American cultural anthropology and the Harlem 
Renaissance, the present chapter explores the representations of body in Hurston’s 
work: the anthropologist’s choice to represent herself as one among the many characters 
of her study, the introduction of oral language in the first part of the ethnography, and 
the revelation of hoodoo practices in the second section of her ethnography. 
 
2.2 ‘Primitive’ bodies: the emergence of the ethnographer’s body in Mules and 
Men 
 
O my body, always make me a man who questions!
359
 
 
The body has thus far remained colonized through the discursive 
practices of the natural sciences, particularly the discourses of biology 
and medicine. It has generally remained mired in presumptions regarding 
its naturalness, its fundamentally biological and precultural status, its 
immunity to cultural, social and historical factors, its brute status as 
given, unchangeable, inert, and passive, manipulable under scientifically 
regulated conditions.
360
 
 
‘Colonized’, ‘natural’, ‘precultural’, ‘unchangeable’, ‘inert’, ‘passive’: all these 
adjectives, which Grosz refers to the treatment of the body in natural sciences, can be 
connected to other adjectives such as ‘primitive’, ‘savage’, ‘tribal’, ‘ancestral’ which 
are widely spread throughout the anthropological canon in relation to the ‘object’ of its 
analysis. Johannes Fabian remarks that these kinds of terms permeate anthropological 
discourse in order to prevent the ‘other’ of ethnographical inquiry from entering 
“coevalness” (an inclusive term referring to both synchronicity and contemporariness): 
that is, to deny this other the possibility of being a contemporary in relation to the 
anthropologist.
361
 In this regard, Fabian observes that 
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[a] discourse employing terms such as primitive, savage (but also tribal, 
traditional, Third World, or whatever euphemism is current) does not 
think, or observe, or critically study, the “primitive;” it thinks, observes, 
studies in terms of the primitive. Primitive being essentially a temporal 
concept, is a category, not an object, of Western thought.
362
 
 
The denial of coevalness to the anthropological Other becomes a double denial if 
considered in relation to the possibilities of representing the body in scientific texts: 
alterity is confined in another time, while the body is displaced from knowledge 
production because of its supposed association with natural and biological processes. In 
fact, as suggested by Grosz, to take into consideration the bond between the “sexual 
specificity of bodies” and their relation to the kind of theories and knowledges that have 
been constructed helps us to understand that the objectivity and impersonality of 
knowledge rests on “one type of corporeality, one type of subject (white, male, 
European, middle-class).”363 Grosz is convinced that philosophy, like any other 
knowledge, is a consequence of the body seen as “the intimate and internal condition of 
all knowledges.”364 Hence the authority of knowledge rests on the denial of the 
particular bodies participating in its creation in order to see itself as “objective, true, 
valid for all, independent of formulation and context, outside of history, and 
immutable;”365 such an authority rests on a transcendental and remote voice which can 
be universalised. The idea is that the objectivity and impersonal style of theory hides a 
subject assuming that his experience and view can be universal and authentic while 
denying his involvement in embodiment and historical dynamics circumscribing his 
view and perspective.
366
 The definition of the body has been mainly left to natural and 
medical sciences, which confine it in narrow descriptions while distancing it even more 
markedly from other disciplines and theories. 
The awareness created by the acknowledgement of the body’s incidence on 
knowledge production can be particularly valuable in the creation of spaces for other 
corporeal representations in which new “positions, perspectives, interests, productions” 
can be developed.
367
 If the concept of the specificity of bodies is enlarged in order to 
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question other kinds of specificities, such as ethnic and cultural components of identity, 
the previous observations become pivotal in the analysis of the treatment of the 
ethnographer’s body in Mules and Men.  
Grosz’s reflection on philosophy and the body is here employed for the analysis 
of Hurston’s choice to represent the ethnographer’s body – characterized as a black 
woman’s body – in a discipline like anthropology that entails a great investment in the 
body and its agency through the practice of fieldwork; the necessary interactions with 
the ‘objects’ of anthropological inquiry in order to collect the material on which the 
written ethnographies will be constructed, the dialogic and quantitative methods 
involved in ethnographical research, the travel activities strictly linked to these 
practices, and the subsequent writing activity as physical engagement with professional 
tools (pen, paper, typewriter, computer, keyboard) point to the role of the body as an 
essential producer of anthropological knowledge. In this perspective, its representational 
absence in most ethnographical works can reveal a certain degree of awkwardness in 
dealing with the bodily presence of the researcher though it is possible to bring back the 
reasons for such disappearance to the dictates of objectivity and distance informing a 
great part of the history of anthropology both in its American and European traditions. 
Commenting on the actual problems anthropologists can experience in fieldwork, Kirin 
Narayan rightly observes that “the very nature of researching what to others is taken-
for-granted reality creates an uneasy distance.”368 This understandable difficulty in 
experiencing closeness to the anthropological Other
369
, nonetheless, does not account 
for the rendition of another distance, produced through writing, that is a conscious 
detachment and avoidance of the attempt at proximity lived in fieldwork. 
Indeed, the ethnographer’s body almost disappears through the workings of the 
anthropologist as a demiurge who puts order in the collected data, organizes and 
‘objectively’ compares them according to patterns, structures, models, while 
establishing distance.
 370
 The disinvestment of the body hides the centrality of the 
ethnographer’s experience: a pragmatic, empirical kind of experience to be transcended 
in order to distinguish the material from other genres linked to travel and other 
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pragmatic activities such as the travelogue and autobiography and, in so doing, achieve 
scientific authority.  
The body’s resurfacing in Mules and Men is far more significant if considered as 
a commentary on the hidden agency involved both in the collection of data and the 
construction of anthropological works. The body, as observed by Grosz, is as capable of 
knowledge as the mind, but it raises “the question of sexual difference in a way that 
mind does not.”371 In Hurston’s case, sexual, racial, and ethnic differences are all 
involved in the representation of her embodied identity within the ethnography. In 
particular, the emergence of the body as characterized by Hurston’s depiction of her 
role in fieldwork contributes to the attempt to reduce the distance between the 
researcher and the ‘object’ of her study.  
The present chapter will try to underline this attempt towards ‘distance zero’ in 
Hurston’s ethnography proceeding from the first part in which the collection of folk 
tales lets the body emerge through oral language and the physical activities she is 
involved in (driving, dancing, talking, storytelling, fishing, accompanying men to work 
in the swamp) to the second part in which, after the unsuccessful effort at reconciliation, 
the distance between observer and observed is reduced through the hoodoo initiations. 
This apparent fusion with the object of her study, however, could suggest that the 
shared identity supposed to be the basis of her fieldwork cannot be recuperated through 
the interpretive methods of anthropological inquiry.  
Hurston’s choice to represent the body, nonetheless, is both daring and 
controversial. The courageous element would be linked to the desire to complicate the 
question of distance, difference, and identity between the ethnographer and the ‘object’ 
of her study through the introduction of the body in the ethnography, while the 
controversial component would be linked to the risk of being associated with discourses 
ascribing both the womanly and the black experience to restrictive representations of 
bodily processes. As observed by Carla Peterson, the African-American woman’s body 
could be easily identified as “unruly, grotesque, carnivalesque.”372 The choice of 
introducing it into the ethnography can represent a strategy of survival and resistance, 
but also includes the risk “that [her] presence merely reified existing structures.”373 In 
this perspective, the body can no longer be considered as an “inertive, passive, 
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noncultural, and ahistorical term”, but becomes a “site of contestation, in a series of 
economic, politic, sexual and intellectual struggles.”374 
The hypothesis of the present analysis is that the body as characterised in Mules 
and Men can be considered a place of intersection among conflicting motives informing 
the context of data collection and their elaboration. In this perspective, the researcher’s 
body constitutes a sort of threshold allowing other bodies to enter her ethnography. If at 
the basis of ethnographic knowledge production resides a white, male, European 
subject, the act of introducing a body characterized as female and black denotes the 
effort to allow other bodies and subjectivities to enter the dynamics of knowledge 
production from which they have been excluded by the ‘impersonal’ subject permeating 
scientific objectivity. As Grosz observes, bodies contain in themselves the capacity “to 
always extend the frameworks which attempt to contain them.”375 This extended 
framework can be detected from Hurston’s introduction to the collection in the 
vacillating handling of the personal pronouns: 
 
[f]olklore is not as easy to collect as it sounds. The best source is where 
there are the least outside influences and these people, being usually 
under-privileged, are the shyest. They are the most reluctant at times to 
reveal that which the soul lives by. And the Negro, in spite of his open-
faced laughter, his seeming acquiescence, is particularly evasive. You see 
we are a polite people and we do not say to our questioner. “Get out of 
here!” We smile and tell him or her something that satisfies the white 
person because, knowing so little about us, he doesn’t know what he’s 
missing.
376
 
 
From this quotation, it is possible to detect a substantial movement from “they” to “we” 
passing through “the Negro”: the distance established through the third person pronoun 
is nullified and, through the connection to the generalized term, the author accomplishes 
an important shift from personal stance to communal affirmation. In this sense, other 
bodies and other voices are allowed to cross the threshold of knowledge disrupting the 
logic confining them within boundaries of irrationality and primitiveness. 
The body, defined by Grosz as “the very ‘stuff’ of subjectivity”377, can be a way 
of problematizing such “universalist and universalizing assumptions of humanism, 
through which women’s – and all other groups’ – specificities, positions, and histories 
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are rendered irrelevant or redundant.”378 The apparent absence of a speaking subject, the 
impression of a comprehensive and objective description, and the subsequent illusion of 
a 360-degree-perspective are consequences of the humanistic premises linking the 
natural and social sciences. As a black woman anthropologist, Hurston suffered from a 
multiple condition of redundancy (gendered and racial), which shaped the 
representation of corporeality within her folklore collection. As observed by Du Bois, 
from the inside the external social condition of ‘double redundancy’ is, in fact, a 
condition of ‘double awareness’: 
 
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always 
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul 
by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One 
ever feels his twoness, - an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, 
two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose 
dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
379
 
 
Here we are confronted with a dichotomy further complicated in relation to Hurston by 
other terms such as gender and a higher level of instruction perceived by her informants 
as a form of belonging to a different class. Focusing on Du Bois’ duality, however, it is 
possible to understand that the difficulty inherent in this envisioning of the race problem 
is that the refused element of the pair contains the component trying to expel him. 
Because of this, the lacerating experience reported by Du Bois is intimately linked to a 
system that makes every effort to absorb without acceptance. As remarked by Grosz, 
 
[t]he problem of dichotomous thought is not the dominance of the pair 
(some sort of inherent problem with the number two); rather, it is the one 
which makes it problematic, the fact that the one can allow itself no 
independent, autonomous other. All otherness is cast in the mold of 
sameness, with the primary term acting as the only autonomous or 
pseudo-autonomous term. The one allows no twos, threes, fours. It 
cannot tolerate any other. The one, in order to be a one, must draw a 
barrier around itself, in which case it is necessarily implicated in the 
establishment of a binary – inside/outside, presence/absence.380 
 
These thoughts on the construction of difference between the genders seems to 
comment on Du Bois’ considerations about the African-American experience; in his 
perspective, the dichotomy migrates from the social to the personal dimension, the first 
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term being internalized by the blackness it has created in order to emerge as the one 
which longs for those others to whom it is not allowed to be present as equals. The 
condition of being “American” and “Other” at the same time, in the same body, can be 
devastating if not supported by that double perspective which enables the subject to 
create a conscious reading of the society in which s/he is involved in order to change it. 
Although Hurston and Du Bois had very different views on the ways this change could 
take place, they had a common belief in the strength and possibility of empowerment 
inherent in the African-American theorization of distinctive modes of expression and 
representation.  
 
2.3 Double consciousness, mimicry, and alienation 
 
The tradition of racist imagery in the United States is long… and Brinton 
wove together science and imagery found in widely circulated 
magazines, minstrel shows, and the Uncle Tom Cabin’s shows that were 
crisscrossing the country. Old stereotypes became scientific fact.
381
 
 
Commenting on the emergence of American anthropology at the end of the nineteenth 
century, Lee D. Baker focuses on the evolutionist ideas applied to races expounded by 
John Wesley Powell, Frederic Ward Putnam, and Daniel G. Brinton, the founders of the 
discipline in the United States. As introduced in Chapter One, the ‘scientific’ 
explanations Brinton provided in his Races and Peoples (1890) justified the “lynch law” 
and racial inferiority.
382
 During the eighteenth century, the idea of the polygenesis of 
races had been advanced several times to be substituted during the nineteenth by an 
evolutionist perspective in which black people came to represent “the savages” in “the 
Great Chain of Being.”383  
If we read this cultural project according to Edward Said’s analysis of the 
distinction between civil and political society in Antonio Gramsci
384
, it is possible to 
understand how these beliefs, although promoted by and through political and academic 
institutions, survived through imagery and representation creating that consent 
throughout society which was necessary to perpetrate them and make them operative in 
both the legal and social contexts. The idea of consent is at the basis of Du Bois’ 
concept of double consciousness: words and beliefs seep into the conscious minds of 
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black people by way of cultural, linguistic, and political means. On the other hand, the 
dimension of consent was not straightforward and unproblematic; in fact, in the 
internalization of racial representation, it is necessary to take into account the 
psychoanalytic element related to the unconscious throughout the historical experience 
of black people in the United States. As observed by Sandra Adell, the treatment of the 
racial problem in the essays by Sander L. Gilman, Julia Kristeva, and Frantz Fanon all 
locate “[…] the source of pathology… in the image of blackness or Jewishness as it is 
represented in what Kristeva calls ‘an other-directed being.’”385 In particular, Adell 
refers to Fanon’s essay “The Fact of Blackness” in order to analyse African and Jewish 
identities in the United States in relation to their representation in American culture 
according to Kristeva’s definition of  the “abject” as “something rejected from which 
one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as from an object
386… For 
Fanon, that ‘something’ is ‘an impurity, a flaw’ in the Weltanschauung of colonized 
black people that ‘outlaws any ontological explanation.’”387 
In particular, the work of the unconscious in the internalization of the racial 
image would be connected to the black person’s lack of ontological status in the 
encounter with the whites. This ‘lack of ontological resistance’ is what makes possible 
the unconscious, interiorized image of blackness to emerge as “a presumed inferiority… 
coming ‘into being through the other.’”388 In this confrontation, the black person’s 
“bodily schema” is reduced to a “racial epidermal schema” where the outside is finally 
turned inside.
389
  
 
The Negro cannot be for himself. Unlike the Jew who can assume the 
guise and attributes of a white man and “be unknown in his Jewishness” 
[…], the Negro’s blackness marks him with the triple responsibility for 
body, race, and ancestry. As Fanon’s anecdotal “Negro” learns after his 
(black) presence frightens a child on a train, to assume that 
responsibility, to subject oneself to an objective examination of one’s 
blackness is to discover an “other” that must be excised: “I discovered 
my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by 
tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, festishism, racial defects, 
slave-ships, and above all else, above all: ‘sho’ good eatin’ […].”390 
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The unconscious internalization of the racial identity and its meaning in the surrounding 
society becomes a main trope for representation both in Hurston’s own biography Dust 
Tracks on a Road and in her best known novel Their Eyes Were Watching God. Writing 
about her moving to Jacksonville as a teenager, Hurston observes: 
 
Jacksonville made me know that I was a little colored girl. Things were 
all about the town to point this out to me. Streetcars and stores and then 
talk I heard around the school. […] These white people had funny ways. 
I could tell that even from a distance. I didn’t get a piece of candy or a 
bag of crackers just for going into a store in Jacksonville as I did when I 
went into Galloway’s or Hill’s at Maitland, or Joe Clarke’s in 
Eatonville.
391
 
 
This passage finds an echo in Janie’s discovery of her own blackness in Their Eyes: 
 
“Ah was wid dem white chillun so much till Ah didn’t know Ah wuzn’t 
white till Ah was round six years old. Wouldn’t have found it out then, 
but a man come long takin’ pictures and without askin’ anybody, Shelby, 
dat was de oldest boy, he told him to take us. Round a week later de man 
brought de picture for Mis’ Washburn to see and pay him which she did, 
then give us all a good lickin’. 
“So when we looked at de picture and everybody got point there wasn’t 
nobody left except a real dark little girl with long hair standing by 
Eleanor. Dat’s where Ah wuz s’posed to be, but Ah couldn’t recognize 
dat dark chile as me. So Ah ast, ‘where is me? Ah don’t see me.’ 
“Everybody laughed, even Mr. Washburn. Miss Nellie, de Mama of de 
chillun who come back home after her husband dead, she pointed to de 
dark one and said, ‘Dat’s you, Alphabet, don’t you know yo’ ownself?’ 
“Dey all useter call me Afphabet ’cause so many people had done named 
me different names. Ah looked at de picture a long time and seen it was 
mah dress and mah hair so Ah said: 
“ ‘Aw, aw! Ah’m colored! 
“Den dey all laughed real hard. But before Ah seen de picture Ah thought 
Ah wuz just like de rest.
392
 
 
As Fanon suggests, the black person is not ontologically black, but becomes black in the 
encounter and confrontation with whiteness. Assuming as bodily identity her/his racial 
epidermal identity, s/he internalizes both the unconscious and consensual meanings of 
her/his blackness as triple responsibility for body, race, and ancestry. After the 
experience of estrangement and separation from the imposed image of blackness (“it 
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was mah dress and mah hair”) and its internalization, Du Bois’ stress on a conscious 
embodiment of blackness emphasizes the possibility of awareness towards acquired 
meanings of blackness and their rewriting into constructive, affirmative terms.   
In fact, the embodied identity of the black American citizen could be liberated 
from the actual conditions of slavery, but had to strive in order to achieve independence 
from a complex system of representation aimed at defining the black person and 
nullifying her presence in and contribution to historical and cultural processes. Double 
consciousness as theorized by Du Bois articulates itself as a focal point of encounter of 
conflicting motives and influences, of internalized notions about race relations and 
social hierarchies, and reactions to them. More importantly, it expresses the 
ambivalence springing from the ideals supported by political institutions (such as 
equality, liberty, pursuit of happiness, and justice)
393
 and the subsequent awareness of 
being discursively excluded by them, of being finally expelled by the geographical 
context representing the landscape of one’s personal memories and from the historical 
circumstances in which the individual’s life unwinds and acquires meaning. 
 The shift from imagery to scientific fact can be explained through what Homi 
K. Bhabha defines as “a strategic confusion of the metaphoric and metonymic axes of 
the cultural production of meaning.”394 A metonymy based on prejudice like, for 
instance, the sadly famous association between apes and black people
395
, becomes a 
metaphor for their identity, a representation mistaken for reality and, from there, apt to 
be probed by science. “The figures of farce”396, like those represented in the minstrel 
shows, become the means through which authority constantly re-establishes itself
397
 
through the repetition of difference, which, in this way, acquires a supposedly 
ontological status influencing both political choices and scientific assumptions. The idea 
that Bhabha identifies at the basis of colonial mimicry is, in fact, 
 
the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference, 
that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say that the discourse 
of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be 
effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its 
difference.
398
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The transposition of this desire from the (at least partially) assimilationist project of the 
colonial empire to the American segregationist system produces a further slippage, a 
movement towards the definition of a more irreducible kind of difference at the point of 
divergence between Du Bois’ double consciousness and the white gaze as demonstrated 
by the repeated attempts at finding a scientific basis for polygenetic theories.
399
  
Bhabha contributes several definitions of mimicry as compromise 
(“representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal”400), as a strategy of 
appropriation of alterity, as a sign of the inappropriate.
401
 These definitions seem to 
merge around a basically bidirectional effect of mimicry which is absorbed and 
performed both by the hegemonic culture and the subjects repeatedly admitted just to be 
subsequently expelled from it.
402
 Interestingly, Hurston herself has theorized on 
mimicry in relation to originality in the literary and artistic contexts. “Characteristics of 
Negro Expression” (1934), the essay in which she develops her vision on the subject is, 
as observed by Karen Jacobs, Hurston’s “only… entirely interpretive ethnographic 
piece”403 and in it “Hurston makes use of primitivist discourse herself”404 making this 
text a very interesting example of ambivalence towards evolutionist ideas in 
anthropological theories. In particular, this essay “attempts simultaneously to deploy 
and to rehabilitate the category of the primitive and its corollary, the imitative, as 
artistic resources.”405 In her analysis of the concept of originality, Hurston writes: 
 
[i]t has been said so often that the Negro is lacking in originality that it 
has almost become a gospel. Outward signs seem to bear this out. But if 
one looks closely its falsity is immediately evident… What we really 
mean by originality is the modification of ideas. The most ardent admirer 
of the great Shakespeare cannot claim first source even for him. It is his 
treatment of the borrowed material… the Negro is a very original being. 
While he lives and moves in the midst of a white civilisation, everything 
that he touches is re-interpreted for his own use.
406
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This perspective is associated with her view on mimicry, as attested by her decision to 
treat the two in relation to one another: 
 
The Negro, the world over, is famous as a mimic. But this in no way 
damages his standing as an original. Mimicry is an art in itself… the 
contention that the Negro imitates from a feeling of inferiority is 
incorrect. He mimics for the love of it. The group of Negroes who 
slavishly imitate is small. The average Negro glories in his ways. The 
highly educated Negro the same. The self-despisement lies in a middle 
class who scorns to do or be anything Negro… But, this group aside, let 
us say that the art of mimicry is better developed in the Negro than in 
other racial groups. He does it as the mocking-bird does it, for the love of 
it, and not because he wishes to be like the one imitated… The dances 
are full of imitations of various animals.
407
 
 
Through the comparison with the mocking-bird, Hurston is suggesting that mimicry 
has, in fact, a performative element in its closeness to mockery conceived as resistance 
to the forms of oppression activated by systems of racialized power. This form of 
unconscious resistance inherent in mimicry constitutes one of the main links between 
Hurston’s and Bhabha’s theorizations on mimicry and mockery; from the dimension of 
resistance the ambivalent status of mimicry emerges in its full potential.
408
 In fact, 
mimicry still works towards the illusion of a presence of ‘authenticity’ which can be 
imitated and reproduced. In the chain of reproductions, the myth of presence reveals 
itself as a lack of origin and centre; at this point, mockery emerges as “l’affirmation 
d’un monde de signes sans faute, sans vérité, sans origine”, as “interprétation active.”409 
The revisionary process works as a house of mirrors with no possibility of reflecting an 
authentic presence or essence: the acknowledgement of any essential lack is what 
encourages the conflation of mimicry with mockery; the nostalgia towards the absence 
of a presence which can be expressed through mimicry becomes exultation towards the 
possibilities for interpretation of this same lack offered by mockery. From this context, 
the tension between mimicry and mockery becomes play in Derrida’s sense of “jeu” as 
“disruption of presence” and something prior to the alternative presence/absence, a 
possibility allowing the thought of being as presence or absence, not viceversa: 
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[…] Le jeu est la disruption de la présence… Le jeu est toujours jeu 
d’absence et de présence, mais si l’on veut le penser radicalement, il faut 
le penser avant l’alternative de la présence et de l’absence; il faut penser 
l’être comme présence ou absence à partir de la possibilité du jeu et non 
l’inverse.410 
 
Hurston’s discussion of mimicry and originality follows an analysis of language in 
which she compares the linguistic system to the monetary market. In this part of her 
analysis, it is possible to detect another influence of primitivism when she contrasts the 
element of action associated with ‘primitive’ languages with the degree of abstraction of 
“highly developed languages.” The idea of ‘primitive’ languages as characterized by 
action associates Hurston’s view with Bronisław Malinowski’s idea that “among 
‘primitive’ (oral) peoples generally language is a mode of action and not a countersign 
of thought, though he had trouble understanding what he was getting at… since 
understanding of the pyschodynamics of orality was virtually nonexistent in 1923.”411 
Commenting on this point, Walter J. Ong adds that the degree of action of oral 
languages could derive from the fact that “… all sound, and especially oral utterance, 
which comes from inside living organisms, is ‘dynamic.’”412 Considering Hurston’s 
decision to use African-American English as the linguistic vehicle for her ethnographic 
data it is possible to make a further observation; from the stylistic choices she actuated 
in her novels and ethnographies, it can be inferred that she is taking mimicry as the 
subject of her discourse and mockery as a strategy of analysis when she confirms 
widespread anthropological beliefs about languages while disavowing them in her own 
production: 
 
Let us make a parallel. Language is like money. In primitive 
communities, actual goods, however bulky, are bartered for what one 
wants. This finally evolves into coin, the coin being not real wealth but a 
symbol of wealth. Still later, even coin is abandoned for legal tender, and 
still later cheques for certain usages… Now the people with highly 
developed languages have words for detached ideas. That is legal 
tender… Some individuals even conceive of the equivalent of cheque 
words, like “ideation” and “pleonastic.” Perhaps we might say that 
Paradise Lost and Sartor Resartus are written in cheque words. 
                                                 
410
 Ibid., 426. My attempt at translation: “Play is the disruption of presence… Play is always play of 
absence and presence, but if we want to think of it radically, we must conceive it as antecedent to the 
alternative between presence and absence; we must think of it as being presence or absence moving from 
the possibility of play and not the other way round.” 
411
 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (New York: Routledge, 2002: 
1982), 32. 
412
 Ibid. 
  
 
 
89 
The primitive man exchanges descriptive words. His terms are still close 
fitting. Frequently the Negro, even with detached words in his 
vocabulary – not evolved in him but transplanted on his tongue by 
contact – must add action to it to make it do. So we have “chop-axe,” 
“sitting-chair,” “cook-pot” and the like because the speaker has in his 
mind the picture of the object in use. Action. Everything illustrated. So 
we can say the white man thinks in a written language and the Negro 
thinks in hieroglyphics.
413
 
 
 Commenting on this passage, Cheryl A. Wall observes that Hurston relies on a binary 
opposition primitive/civilized that undermines the assumptions of her analysis. On the 
other hand, Wall agrees with Lynda Hill when she states that Hurston “displays 
essentialist ideas of her time while illustrating the contradictions implicit in racialist 
conceptions of culture."
414
 In this regard, Kurt Eisen rightly notices that 
 
[i]n “Characteristics”, Hurston’s primitivism features some of the usual 
essentializing terms of the era, such as “the Negro”, the “upper-class 
Negro”, “Negro life”, and even “primitive man”, but in a way that clearly 
puts such essences into play as creative performance through her concept 
of mimicry, an imitative act of reinvention that, for Hurston, 
distinguishes and sustains African-American art… Unlike O’Neill and 
Eurocentric modernists generally, Hurston’s primitivism was concerned 
not with revealing hidden universals but with enacting the inherently 
performative potential of her ethnographic material, revealing how so-
called primitive cultures are continually made and remade in story and 
ritual.
415
 
 
Eisen proceeds in his analysis by associating Hurston’s dramatic mimicry to 
Bhabha’s concept of “metonymy of presence” or “the transformative dynamic of 
colonial mimicry”416 anticipating Derek Walcott’s idea of mimicry as an “‘act of 
imagination’ which transforms imitation into invention.”417 In fact, her analysis of 
African-American language is opened by another observation on mimicry seen as a 
“universal” ability of the black person and “an evidence of something that permeates his 
entire self. And that thing is drama.”418 Between celebration of the black modalities of 
expression and rejection of a debased form of mimicry, Hurston articulates her analysis, 
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which seems to strive for independence from evolutionist theory, but is finally confined 
within the discursive boundaries framed by it. This is possible because, though she 
“means to ‘like her own things best’… Hurston lacks an agreed upon, sanctioned 
aesthetic standard through which to validate her preferences.”419 Nonetheless, it is 
important to underline that Hurston, as other representatives of the Harlem Renaissance, 
was in fact in the process of creating that framework which could provide black writers 
and artists with an aesthetics independent from traditional hierarchies.
420
  
Furthermore, another important aspect of Hurston’s discussion is linked to the 
element of class and the desire of differentiating within itself the otherwise monolithic 
category of  ‘African American.’ This seems particularly important if, quoting Fanon 
 
the true disalienation of the black man implies a brutal awareness of the 
social and economic realities. The inferiority complex can be ascribed to 
a double process: 
First, economic. 
Then, internalization or rather epidermalization of this inferiority.
421
 
 
Although Fanon is here commenting on the condition of the black person in the Antilles 
and her/his relationship to the colonial empire, nonetheless this quotation seems an 
appropriate observation on one of the possible ways to mitigate the effects of 
ambivalence within the American context as well. In fact, in her depiction of rural 
communities, Hurston revealed the presence of different realities (independent 
communities like Eatonville, turpentine camps, swamps) and represented these contexts 
as essential in the articulation of different black identities. Ambivalence, in fact, can 
become an inside track if conceived as a possibility of diversification in the ways of 
representing black identity through the awareness that factors like economic conditions, 
class distinctions, and levels of instruction are indeed determining in the internalization 
of a sense of inferiority. In the case of a writer like Hurston, ambivalence as a hybrid 
position from which it is possible to acquire and produce knowledge is “a form of 
engaged intellectual and political address – a space of identity…”422 allowing the 
articulation of a “hybrid discourse as a dynamic dialogue between ethnicity and 
citizenship”423, that is a discourse of double consciousness in Du Bois’ sense.424 As 
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remarked by David Huddart, this can be related to Salman Rushdie’s observations on 
the migrant condition in “Imaginary Homelands” when he states that “[o]ur identity is at 
once plural and partial… it is not an infertile territory for a writer to occupy”425, 
although, Huddart adds, “[s]uch a privilege quite often, and suddenly, reverses itself and 
becomes a burden.”426 In fact, 
 
[i]t is possible to convert the absence of definitive identity into a 
privilege, which is certainly one way to understand Bhabha’s mimicry. 
At the same time, it is important to avoid romanticizing this lack of final 
grounded identity, which is experienced by different people in very 
different ways. Mimicry is itself a markedly ambivalent phenomenon.
427
 
 
On the other hand, Bhabha observes that: 
 
[h]ybridity… is no jejune post-Modern lark, nor is it simply my 
invention. It comes from Baldwin’s profound meditation on the unique 
power and pathos of the American color line. Race in the United States is 
not a separate (or separatist) historical domain; it is ubiquitous everyday 
experience lived in the recognition of cultural and psychic hybridity.
428
 
 
From this perspective, double consciousness becomes both a result of the interaction of 
different influences and a starting point for a more diversified, comprehensive 
perspective in which elements like class, gender, and possibilities of advancement in 
professional and intellectual contexts are as important as the sense of belonging to a 
specific ethnic group, its position in the racial hierarchy, and the ambiguities released 
from the split between attempts at fixing identities at a representational level and their 
actual indefiniteness as revealed by the awareness that “[c]ommunities negotiate 
‘difference’ through a borderline process that reveals the hybridity of cultural identity: 
they create a sense of themselves to and through an other.”429 
Such a consciousness is at the core of new possibilities of expression envisioned 
by artistic movements like the Harlem Renaissance and Aimé Césaire’s Négritude, 
currents that – although maybe still relying on the dictionary of evolutionism – were 
striving for independence from its discursive modalities in the desire to provide 
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definitions of the black embodied and artistic experience finally freed from stereotypical 
notions of race and creativity. As seen in Chapter One in relation to the Harlem 
Renaissance, both movements represented an occasion to transpose the partly 
unconscious elements of resistance in mimicry to the conscious level of artistic 
production and criticism that, according to Hurston’s contribution, could achieve its 
fuller potential only through the acknowledgment of its cultural legacy and peculiarities. 
 
2.4 Double consciousnesses and triple bodies 
 
The presence of the black body within Mules and Men is fundamental in giving 
corporeal form to double/multiple consciousness and to the way in which the material 
has been collected and presented, as these activities cannot be detached from the 
meaning that the bodily presence of the ethnographer had within the community in 
which she conducted her research. In anthropological writings, apart from quite recent 
experimentations encouraged by the success of Writing Culture (1986)
430
, it is possible 
to trace what Grosz defines as “a fantasy of disembodiment… linked to the fantasy of 
mastery at a distance… the illusion of being able to leave the body at will and reappear 
elsewhere, to be present while not really present.”431 This definition matches quite well 
the ideal of participant observation that was so popular in the years of Hurston’s 
anthropological activity. Although the anthropologist’s presence in fieldwork was 
essential to the authority of the text s/he was going to write, nonetheless the final form 
of the monograph bore the signs of this fantasy of disembodiment and mastery in the 
erasure of the anthropologist’s corporeality and fieldwork interactions through the 
objectifying gaze and canonical style of anthropological writing.  
As observed by Margaret Lock, despite the body’s centrality to the 
anthropological project, “a perusal of the canon of social and cultural anthropology 
indicates that the body’s explicit appearance has been sporadic throughout the history of 
the discipline.”432  Lock directly connects this tendency to “the concept of a reflexive 
‘I’, a mindful self independent of the body and nature at large”433 which is the basic 
condition of “the ‘view from nowhere’ characteristic of a post-Enlightenment approach 
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to knowledge.”434 In relation to this, Linda Martín Alcoff has underlined the prevalence 
of sight in the project of all Western epistemology “as the basis for mastery through a 
detached, objectifying gaze.”435 Using Merleau-Ponty’s theory on embodiment, Alcoff 
underlines the “ontological interdependence between being seen and seeing”436 
constituting a position opposed to mastery.  In Mules and Men the objectifying stance is 
partially destabilized by the treatment of corporeality, as the ethnographer’s body 
emerges through the text either reinstating difference or reducing it through the 
ethnographer’s double positioning as a site for the anthropological gaze and a visible 
identity in relation to other people in the field.  
Starting from its title, Mules and Men focuses on erasure: not the voluntary, 
epistemological erasure of the researcher from her/his own work, but the cultural 
removal of a part of the society from discourse. The ambiguity of the title accounts for a 
world in which ‘men’ can be represented by the white élite and ‘mules’ can be the 
subjugated Other, the black workers striving for their survival. As suggested by Robert 
Hemenway, both terms could also refer to the double identity of black people in the 
United States, human though treated as animals.
437
  Another reading could refer to a 
series of internal dynamics driven by issues of gender in which the ‘men’ are black, but 
the ‘mules’ are black women.438 The common element in at least two of these 
possibilities of reading is the negation of human status to black women and the 
discursive expurgation of their presence within the linguistic realm. It is important to 
consider, though, that these differences between men and women could have been 
amplified rather than attenuated by the new industrial system, which proliferated 
throughout the United States. In fact, as observed by Angela Davis, “the ideology of 
femininity” is “a by-product of industrialization.”439 
The awareness of African-American social invisibility poses several questions to 
the black woman ethnographic researcher, and in particular it could account for the 
scarce appeal scientific invisibility can have on a person lacking visibility in the social 
structure in which she was inserted. Although in a quite different position from her 
female informants because of her background, it cannot be overlooked that Hurston was 
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living in a segregated society in which the colour of her skin and her gender weighted 
on the possibilities of expression accorded to her both in anthropology and literature. 
Ralph Ellison, in his major work Invisible Man (1952), consciously revisits the paradox 
inherent in invisibility as a sort of social status for African Americans in the United 
States when connected with the actual visibility of their skin colour. In this context, 
invisibility reveals its duplicity: while for the (white, male) philosopher being invisible 
can represent the opportunity to impose his vision of the world as objective truth, for the 
African-American scholar and writer invisibility poses the question of her/his own lack 
of visibility conceived as lack of humanity within the society in which s/he lives. In this 
context, being invisible is equivalent to not being seen because of the stereotypes 
imposed on black people’s actual existence. As observed by Bhabha, 
 
[t]he stereotype is not a simplification because it is a false representation 
of a given reality. It is a simplification because it is an arrested, fixated 
form of representation that, in denying the play of difference (which the 
negation through the Other permits), constitutes a problem for the 
representation of the subject in significations of psychic and social 
relations… the stereotype impedes the circulation and articulation of the 
signifier of “race” as anything other than its fixity as racism.440 
 
This definition of stereotype resonates in the prologue of Invisible Man: 
 
I am an invisible man.  No, I am not a spook like those who haunted 
Edgar Allan Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms.  I 
am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fibre and liquids - and I might 
even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply 
because people refuse to see me.
441
 
 
Nonetheless, invisibility undergoes a transformation during the development of Ralph 
Ellison’s narrative; in fact, from stereotype conceived as a racial strategy for fixing the 
Other it becomes a reversed strategy consciously actuated by the black person in order 
to survive and prepare covertly to a better understanding of oneself and one’s own 
possibilities for expression beyond social restrictions and in spite of them.  
Going back to Davis’ reading of the slavery period as the historical source of 
invisibility for African Americans in subsequent stages of US history, her analysis of 
this violent and unjust structure connects it with an essentially genderless perception of 
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the slaves, considered as chattel
442
, and has as unforeseen consequence a more equal 
distribution of roles within the slave household as wife and husband worked side by 
side in the fields and both provided for their family. According to her examination, it 
seems more likely that the term ‘mules’ can be referred to both men and women 
subjugated by the hard working conditions of slavery and segregation. Actually, 
although Hurston never commented openly on the unfair condition of life and work in 
the South, nonetheless she decided to insert in her collection a great number of tales 
which present a keen elaboration and a reversal of the African-American experience of 
exploitation in the New World as attested by the saga of the ‘folklore hero’ Jack or 
John: 
 
Jack or John (not John Henry) is the great human culture hero in Negro 
folklore. He is like Daniel in Jewish folklore, the wishfulfillment hero of 
the race. The one who, nevertheless, or in spite of laughter, usually 
defeats Ole Massa, God and the Devil. Even when Massa seems to have 
him in a hopeless dilemma he wins out by a trick. Brer Rabbit, Jack (or 
John) and the Devil are continuations of the same thing.
443
 
 
If that ‘thing’ could be defined, it would probably be marked by the sign of rewriting 
and resistance; furthermore, the connection to the slavery period and its reductionist use 
of the black body makes Hurston’s choice controversial and captivating especially if 
compared with the following comment by Davis on the essential genderless status of 
enslaved workforce: 
 
The slave system defined Black people as chattel. Since women, no less 
than men, were viewed as profitable labor-units, they might as well have 
been genderless as far as the slaveholders were concerned. In the words 
of one scholar, “the slave woman was first a full-time worker for her 
owner, and only incidentally a wife, mother and homemaker”. Judged by 
the evolving nineteenth-century ideology of femininity, which 
emphasized women’s roles as nurturing mothers and gentle companions 
and housekeepers for their husbands, Black women were practically 
anomalies.
444
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Nonetheless, as evident both in Margaret Garner’s biography445 and its fictional 
rendition in Toni Morrison’s Beloved, during slavery racial and gendered violence 
merged into a system of bodily exploitation and objectification. Camp has provided an 
analysis of the slavery system as a structure functioning through the captivity of black 
bodies.
446
 In her study on body politics as a strategy of resistance during slavery, 
quoting the French historian Dorinda Outram, Camp identifies the body as “a basic 
political resource”447, an essential site of resistance in the struggle for power between 
classes. Even more interestingly, she identifies a stratification of the enslaved body that 
could combine Davis’s reading of slavery to Morrison’s historical memory and 
representation of it. In fact, Camp states that “[e]nslaved people… possessed at least 
three bodies”448: the first body, or body as “the site of domination”, the second body, or 
body as experienced by the black person involved in their daily confrontation with 
white people
449
, and the third body, the body she takes into consideration in her study 
on runaway parties, as “a site of pleasure and resistance” especially for women.450 
From this perspective, the representation of black womanhood as anomalous 
would be just one of the available readings of black women’s bodies in a racist society, 
rendering the emergence of the body a very remarkable feature of Hurston’s 
ethnographical writing. The significance of Hurston’s choice to provide a representation 
of the black body could be connected to her adhesion to an ideal of blackness propelled 
by the Harlem Renaissance with its emphasis on the beauty of the black body and its 
physical potentialities: on the one hand, this could favour stereotypes of blackness 
among the white patrons who financed black artists at the time;
451
 on the other, though, 
if it is true that  “inherent in the dynamic of the master-servant… relationship… is the 
constant striving to annihilate the consciousness of the servant”452, the reaffirmation of 
the body could represent a statement of vitality in front of the violence and attempts at 
erasure enacted by the systems which validated slavery and segregation. This body 
would represent the re-emergence of Camp’s third body as a possible identity for the 
African-American subjectivity theorized within the Harlem Renaissance. The body of 
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the ‘New Negro’ would be a site of cultural production, an active force of resistance to 
physical and psychological domination and attempts at annihilation. These potentialities 
of the black body came from the experience of slavery exactly as the wounds produced 
by recognizing that in the South of the United States “the slave body, most intensely the 
female body, served as the ‘bio-text’ on which slaveholders inscribed their authority.”453 
Davis’ and Morrison’s readings are both possible in relation to the stratification of the 
black embodied experience and the consequences of it both in terms of suffering and 
possibilities for reaffirmation. 
 
2.5 “Feather-bed tactics” and embodied authorship 
 
The theory behind our tactics: “The white man is always trying to know 
into somebody else’s business. All right, I’ll set something outside the 
door of my mind for him to play with and handle. He can read my 
writing but he sho’ can’t read my mind. I’ll put this play toy in his hand, 
and he will seize it and go away. Then I’ll say my say and sing my 
song.
454
 
 
The present analysis sees Hurston’s choice of bodily representation in her text as the 
narrativized attempt to perform a “feather-bed tactic”455 as defined in her introduction to 
Mules and Men. Her comment on this particular modality of resistance to external 
intrusions could be a clue to the reading of several controversial choices in the 
elaboration of her ethnography. In fact, as a representative of the African-American 
community, she could have decided to “put a play toy” (in this case, an image of 
blackness which could be understood by people believing in an African-American 
primordial essence) in the hands of her white patrons in order to allow the black 
experience to enter the process of meaning creation and knowledge production. It is 
exactly double consciousness as theorized by Du Bois that makes these strategies 
effective, though – in the process – she perhaps confused African Americans as well.456  
From this perspective, the ‘mule’ of the title can have a third meaning: putting 
aside the question of gender for a moment and reflecting on the status of the mule – a 
hybrid without possibility for reproduction – it is clear that (either referred to the black 
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community in general or just to women in particular) this image denotes a dehumanized 
entity who is deprived of the possibility to procreate. In a wider sense, ‘mules’ are 
denied a voice and the possibility to produce cultural meaning. This is possible because 
the reductionist gesture to associate them with nature links them to a realm lacking the 
philosophical premises to enter knowledge production. In fact, 
 
[w]hat Descartes accomplished was not really the separation of mind 
from body (a separation which had already been long anticipated in 
Greek philosophy since the time of Plato) but the separation of soul from 
nature. Descartes distinguished two kinds of substances: a thinking 
substance (res cogitans, mind) from an extended substance (res extensa, 
body); only the latter, he believed, could be considered part of nature… 
The mind, the thinking substance, the soul, or consciousness, has no 
place in the natural world. This exclusion of the soul from nature, this 
evacuation of consciousness from the world, is the prerequisite for 
founding a knowledge, or better, a science, of the governing principles of 
nature, a science which excludes and is indifferent to considerations of 
the subject.
457
 
 
 In a context of racial segregation, this epistemic choice has been translated into the 
essential association of slaves to nature and the body, those working bodies whom white 
‘citizens’ needed in order “to create values, morality, knowledges.”458 In this 
perspective, the dichotomy self/other is strictly connected to the dyad mind/body where 
the mind is the site of rationality. The Other is, therefore, defined as irrational and pre-
logical so that the first term of the dyad can justify its power and existence through the 
exclusion and subjugation of a demeaned otherness. Therefore, the affirmation of a 
black subjectivity active in the production of meaning through the theorization of the 
body is pivotal in constituting the image of a culture refusing to be subjugated by 
systemic oppression. As suggested by Grosz in her analysis of the different 
theorizations of the body throughout twentieth century
459, the body becomes “the site of 
the subject’s social production”, no longer an exclusive “site of rationality”, but a 
location of consciousness
460
 and, it should be added, of empowerment. 
The representation of the body is, however, not exempt from contradictions. In 
fact, as observed by Sánchez-Eppler in her analysis of the role of the body during the 
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rise of the abolitionist and feminist movements in the United States, “[f]eminists and 
abolitionists were acutely aware of the dependence of personhood on the condition of 
the human body, since the political and legal subordination of both women and slaves 
were predicated upon biology;”461 this statement shows the incongruities inherent in a 
representation of the citizen on the basis of an incorporeal conception of personhood 
while large parts of the society were being denied the basic rights of citizenship 
precisely because of the biological characteristics of their bodies and the supposed 
meaning of these bodily facts on their personal abilities and attitudes. In her comment 
on Harriet Jacobs’ work, Sánchez-Eppler connects the political representation of the 
body within the abolitionist and feminist movements to the concept of authorship in the 
literature of slavery. For the sake of the present analysis, as shown in the previous 
comment on Grosz’s theory, this idea will be extended to the mechanism of knowledge 
production. Thus, a possible link between the concepts of political representation, 
literary authorship, and scientific authority can be delineated. 
Speaking about the figure of the mulatto in fiction, Sánchez-Eppler states that “the 
recognition of ownership of one’s own body as essential to claiming personhood is 
matched by the fear of being imprisoned, silenced, deprived of personhood by that same 
body.”462 The menace of confinement inherent in every representation of the body is 
possible as “it uncovers the physical attributes of whiteness and maleness implicit in 
such [political] power.”463 From this perspective, political power, authorship, and 
scientific authority would be linked to a more general attitude in the construction of a 
speaking subject whose bodily presence is downsized and finally denied in favour of a 
presumably universal conception of personhood. The Cartesian division between res 
cogitans and res extensa which Grosz positions at the basis of knowledge production 
migrates from the scientific and philosophical contexts and permeates the political and 
literary representations of the subject. The result is the avoidance of subjectivity in 
order to hide the historical, physical constituted subject and allow his words to reach the 
status of universal truth, authentic authorship, and right-based citizenship. 
The power of this rhetorical person resides precisely in its disembodiment which 
is able to both absorb and hide the different bodies who try to have access to both 
knowledge and political/literary representation(s). 
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As employed in the service of patriarchal authority, the distinction 
between body and soul traditionally functioned to increase, not decrease, 
social control over the body… The writers of antislavery fiction seem 
well aware of the oppressive consequences of locating personhood in the 
soul.
464
 
 
Paralleling this political attitude, the concept of authorship in literature rests on the 
occlusion of the physical data inherent in the author’s body.465 Thus, the emergence of 
the body in the literature of slavery is particularly significant. In fact, 
     
[i]nverting this pattern, slave narratives, and perhaps all confessional and 
testimonial genres, rhetorically create an authorial body. Rather than 
attempt to assert the incorporeality of authorship, testimonial writing 
inscribes the author’s bodily existence and experience.466 
 
Hurston’s decision to insert the anthropologist’s body into the frame of her 
ethnographic collection could therefore be read within the tradition of confessional, 
testimonial writing that Sánchez-Eppler connects to Jacobs’ autobiographical work, 
“[t]he goal of the narrative itself is… to succeed in attaching a dark-skinned and female 
body to the recognition and respect – the personhood – awarded to authorship.”467 This 
move acquires a particular meaning in connection to the authorial voice as the material 
on which Hurston bases her ethnography, and is related to a shared conception of 
authorship common in societies where orality is still the predominant mode of 
communication. As authorship is collective, the emergence of bodily specificities 
accounts for the several authorial voices and for the diversity of their contributions in 
the continuation and reprocessing of the material. Ong observes that in oral societies, 
authorship is conceived as embodiment because 
 
[t]he oral word… never exists in a simply verbal context, as a written 
word does. Spoken words are always modifications of a total, existential 
situation, which always engages the body. Bodily activity beyond mere 
vocalization is not adventitious or contrived in oral communication, but 
is natural and even inevitable. In oral verbalization, particularly public 
verbalization, absolute motionlessness is itself a powerful gesture.
468
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From this perspective, the introduction of the anthropologist’s body in relation to the 
bodies of her informants establishes a dialogue constituted by words, but also by 
gestures, sounds, and body language. The words in their oral character constitute a 
performance of the time shared during the experience of fieldwork and identify 
knowledge production as a collective enterprise based on sharing and exchange. 
 
2.6 Framing the body in Mules and Men 
 
Through a narrativization of her embodied reality, Hurston represents herself as one 
among the many characters of her work, and situates her location in the specific setting 
she has chosen (Florida and Louisiana) through a series of interrelations that are 
determined both by her ambiguous status as a researcher and by the implications of her 
womanly status within the studied communities. In order to understand the significance 
of Hurston’s self-representation, it is necessary to introduce the frame device, which 
connects the folktales of her collection and explain its role in the structure of the 
ethnography. The narrative frame constitutes a commentary both on the tales and on the 
role of the ethnographer in the fieldwork. Added at a later stage, after the rejection of 
the original seventy-tale-manuscript by several publishers,   
 
this background information reveals a great deal about the tales – how 
they were told, how they were integrated into the ongoing verbal 
interaction and the practice of everyday life, for example – and about the 
tellers. It likewise locates Hurston in the process of collecting and 
transforming the tales and other folkways.
469
 
 
Such a narrative device, though appealing both for the publishers and the general public, 
has been one of the most analysed elements of the ethnography, as explained by 
Nicholls.
470
 In his article, he traces the main approaches to the analysis of the narrative 
frame as a combination of autobiography and ethnography in Hemenway’s study and 
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his followers;
471
 as an element compromising the scientificity of the work in early 
readings of the collection; as a brilliant break with scientism according to the 
postmodern critique; and as an example of subversion according to feminist criticism.
472
 
In Nicholls’ view, all these readings, although remarkable, would constitute an 
oversimplification that “has led readers to miss the book’s presentation of everyday 
forms of resistance in the Jim Crow South.”473 For the present analysis, Nicholls poses a 
very interesting question linked to the possibility of recording the “‘hidden transcript’ of 
everyday resistance”474 while being an outsider. Although he highlights the 
disappearance of Hurston’s narrative persona when following the men in their daily 
working activities
475
, the theme of resistance in folklore seems clearly linked to 
Hurston’s way of representing herself as an embodied character of her ethnography and 
problematizing – through her presence – the question of identity within the fieldwork, 
of the ways in which being a ‘native’ interjects and overlaps with being an ‘outsider’ 
and, ultimately, a ‘stranger.’ 
Therefore, in her positioning within this narrative frame, it is possible to detect a 
series of movements towards a progressive textual embodiment denoting an alternate 
distancing from and approach towards the object of her anthropological observation: the 
arrival in Eatonville and the toe-party in Wood Bridge, the humorous courting ritual and 
dance in Polk County, the attempted stabbing caused by jealousy and fleeing from 
Florida, and the several Hoodoo initiations in New Orleans. The connection between 
these episodes can be found in the written representation of the oral language of Florida. 
Through this means and the use of the Hoodoo practice in the second part of her 
ethnography, the anthropologist makes an attempt at reducing distance through 
representation.  
Orality and Hoodoo, in fact, are here introduced not only as ethnographic data, 
but also as an integral part of the form and style in which Hurston wrote her work and 
as modalities of resistance towards external attempts at definition and interpretation. 
Hurston’s stylistic choices and the effects derived from them, as attempts at reducing 
distance while reinstating it, depend on the double meaning of the term ‘representation’ 
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provided by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, as Darstellung (“placing there”)476 and 
Vertretung (“stepping in someone else’s place”).477 In her rendering both of her 
experience of fieldwork and the data collected, Hurston indeed shifted between these 
two definitions of ‘representation’ linked both to scientific/anthropological canons and 
fiction, which had the potentiality of undertaking a second level of re-presence related 
to her status as both an ethnographer and an informant. Fictional representation of oral 
rituals and Hoodoo practices, in fact, are aesthetic choices which could reveal the 
political possibilities of Vertretung in its connotation not only of speaking for, but 
speaking through the subjects she represented in the sense of Darstellung. Therefore, 
her embodied presence in the ethnographic frame accounts for an articulation of this 
double connotation of the term ‘representation’ and its amplification through the 
fictional devices she activated in her ethnographical narrative. 
In terms of the representation of the black female body, its first appearance is in 
the ‘Introduction’ when Hurston, as observed by Jacobs, uses the metaphor of the “tight 
chemise” as a representation of a cultural heritage from which she had to take distance 
in order to achieve a different degree of awareness. According to Hurston herself, this 
new understanding has been attained through the “spyglass of anthropology.”478 Jacobs 
analyses the trope of the chemise as an article of clothing able to reveal the form while 
concealing the surface of the black female body. Thanks to the “detachment through the 
machinery of science”, Hurston would actuate a distancing strategy towards her 
embodied reality as bearer of cultural significations over which she cannot have 
complete control.
479
 Although in the text Hurston’s movement oscillates between 
distance and reconciliation, it is indeed possible to retrace the emergence of the 
ethnographer’s body throughout the book according to the definition of body as 
proposed by Braidotti, that is “[t]he body, or the embodiment, of the subject is to be 
understood neither as a biological nor a sociological category but rather as a point of 
overlapping between the physical, the symbolic, and the sociological.”480 
This position focuses on “the embodied nature of the subject, in its link with 
desire, power, and knowledge.”481 Rosi Braidotti’s definition of the body can be 
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connected to a Foucauldian notion of embodiment where, as remarked by Ladelle 
McWhorter
482
, it is used to challenge the dichotomy nature/culture. In fact, 
McWhorter’s analysis shows how the conception of the body in Foucault is not directed 
towards a liberation of a supposed ‘natural’ body from the constraints of culture, but – 
as evident in the history of representation of the black body and the imagery linked to it 
– “the natural body is itself a discursive phenomenon.”483 In this sense, the 
representation of the body in Hurston’s ethnography wouldn’t be a mere condescending 
gesture towards primitivist ideas circulating both in anthropology and in the arts during 
the 1920s but, as a site of social interaction and ethnographic knowledge, it articulates a 
discourse in the interstices between nature and culture. Camp’s triple stratification of 
the enslaved body
484
 – which could be defined as dominated, experienced, and 
celebrated – shows again its aptness in the analysis of Hurston’s ethnography in relation 
to the definitions of body provided by Braidotti and Foucault. “The tight chemise” 
could represent the societal constraints inherent in the first body and the psychological 
limitations inherent in the second. Thus, both anthropological knowledge and artistic 
endeavours would contribute to the attainment of the third body, a body that is not 
natural or cultural, but is a site of political action and knowledge production inserted 
within this dichotomy and connected to the “mind in a new flux of self.”485 This shift in 
representation is even more impressive because of its link to a history in which the body 
had been such a contested site of political representation and a visual sign of social 
disadvantage and racial violence. 
The second movement, represented by the anthropologist’s arrival, constitutes a 
convention of the ethnographical genre. The peculiarity of Hurston’s arrival rests on her 
underlining the fact that this arrival is actually a return to her native village Eatonville. 
Although Hurston claimed the town was her birthplace, her birth certificate attests that 
she was born in Notasulga, Alabama, but moved to Eatonville with her family in the 
very first years of her life. As such, Eatonville can be considered her second birthplace 
as it was certainly there that her literary imagination started to flourish. From this 
perspective, the fictional arrival becomes an occasion of mutual recognition between the 
researcher and her informants, as attested in the following lines: “They looked up from 
the game and for a moment it looked as if they had forgotten me. Then B. Moseley said, 
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‘Well, if it ain’t Zora Hurston!’ Then everybody crowded around the car to help greet 
me.”486 
This picture is particularly meaningful if compared to the scene of the 
ethnographer entering the community as transmitted through the anthropological canon. 
As observed by Mary Louise Pratt in relation to Firth’s and Malinowski’s 
ethnographies
487
, the influence and fascination of travel literature is often present 
especially at the opening of the ethnographical texts in which the anthropologist’s 
arrival becomes a metaphorical rite of passage, a place of transition between familiar 
ground and the field and its mysteries. In particular, analysing the opening of Argonauts 
of the Western Pacific, Pratt identifies “the image of an old-fashioned castaway”488 as 
“an evocative and utopian self-image for the ethnographer”489 in Malinowski’s 
description of his own arrival into the Trobriand community. According to Pratt, the 
image of the castaway or the captive would represent both an idealization and a 
mystification of the anthropologist’s role in fieldwork, embodying the ideal of 
participant observation while, at the same time, hiding the difference in economic and 
political status between a captive and an ethnographer.
490
 In this context, Hurston’s 
reaffirmation of her status as a member of the community is charged with an attempt at 
authority similar to the attempt at the core of the castaway’s image: she represents 
herself as perfectly integrated within the community although her personal account of 
her fieldwork experience
491, like Malinowski’s diaries, shows the discrepancy between 
the actual conditions of research and their final rendition in the written form. More than 
a captive, she states her knowledge and understanding of the matter from the beginning, 
in an act of “ethnographic self-fashioning”492 through which she becomes Zora, 
Eatonville’s daughter. 
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Just after this scene and a first session of storytelling, Zora (Hurston’s narrative 
persona) is invited to a toe-party and drives her informants to Wood Bridge. The 
distance between her and the studied community, although always denied, is perceptible 
in her supposed ignorance of the conventions of such an event, as clearly stated in the 
following exchange: “‘Say, what is this toe-party business?’ I asked one of the girls. 
‘Good gracious, Zora! Ain’t you never been to a toe-party before?’” 493 The occasion 
reveals its gendered connotation soon after: a toe-party consists in hiding all the girls 
present behind a curtain and buying their toes for a dime to dance with them and offer 
them some food and drinks during the evening. Zora, the researcher, is not exempted 
from participating in this social ritual; her gender determines the way in which she can 
take part in it ascribing the bodily fact to her possibility of intervention and 
interpretation of the event. In fact, despite the claim of objectivity, the anthropologist’s 
presence as an observer in the context of research requires her/him to participate 
according to coordinates linked to gender, age, and social status (or her/his status as 
perceived by the community in which the research is conducted). She has to take on a 
social role suitable to her appearance in order for her presence to acquire meaning 
within the community and therefore become a possible sharer of their cultural 
production. 
Inherent to the fieldwork dynamics as described both in the passage above and 
in the folkloric collection at large, John Dorst has located the presence of “two closely 
integrated codes”: folkloric and erotic494 emerging plainly in Hurston’s most famous 
novel, Their Eyes Were Watching God (1937), but present as well in the development of 
Mules and Men. In his analysis of the Eatonville section, Dorst focuses on the 
interconnectedness between storytelling and gender clash and how the fights taking 
place among the storytellers comment and inspire new tales and oral performances.
495
 In 
the second section, dedicated to Polk County, he observes an even more marked stress 
on the two codes in the passage from folklore to embodiment of one Ella Wall, 
represented in the jook songs, and later appearing “in flesh”496 among the characters of 
the ethnography. Furthermore, leaving the more familiar space of Eatonville, Hurston 
had to adapt herself to being part of contexts – like the jooks and the swamps – which 
she had not had the possibility to know before as she left Florida as an adolescent and 
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was involved in very different milieus in her journeys towards the north of the country. 
In her fieldwork, she had to take into account that her body, appearance, and gender had 
a meaning in those places and could influence the success of her work because, as 
remarked by Ugo Fabietti commenting on Lila Abu-Lughod’s research, the 
ethnographer’s gender is pivotal for her positioning in fieldwork.497  
What Fabietti’s remark does not take into account, however, is that the 
anthropologist’s gender is important in the positioning within the fieldwork also 
because the presence of a woman researcher makes evident the lack of an attempt to 
“problematize” sexuality in ethnographies written by men. In fact, as observed by 
Esther Newton, “by not ‘problematizing’… his own sexuality in his texts, the 
anthropologist makes male gender and heterosexuality the cultural givens, the unmarked 
categories.”498 In relation to Hurston’s representation of her presence in fieldwork, 
Dorst writes about disruption of the ethnographer’s identity499 revealing “the paradox of 
authenticity at the heart of social science fieldwork.”500 Connecting this observation to 
the body theme, Dorst’s disruption could be considered as well in relation to the 
difficulty of transposing the embodied experience of fieldwork within a text that, as 
made clear by Newton’s observation, excludes it from its very premises. 
  
2.7 Zora’s journey and levels of embodiment 
 
In Zora’s movement from Eatonville to the nearby area of Polk County, it is possible to 
see a correspondence between her journey and a further level of embodiment. While in 
Eatonville she could claim an ‘insider’ status, in Polk County the colour of the skin is 
not enough to determine a sense of belonging to the community. In fact, several factors 
linked to class and social status contribute to the complication of the encounters she has 
there. The anthropologist’s outward appearance is considered with suspicion because 
the reasons for her presence in the community are not clear. Her apparel and belongings 
(in particular, her car) mark her out as different. She has to take up a role to make her 
presence comprehensible in a community characterized by harder working conditions as 
she perceives their perplexity and detects the activation of those “old feather-bed 
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tactics” they use towards strangers.501 Her awareness of these strategies of self-defence, 
nonetheless, indicates that she is not a complete stranger, articulating once again an 
alternate movement between proximity and distance in representation. Her solution to 
overcome this stalemate is “to impress the job with the fact that I was also a fugitive 
from justice, ‘bootlegging.’”502 In this way she can justify her car and participate in the 
dance, as an observer. Her will to shorten the distance is felt in her desire to dance with 
the others, as stated in the quote: “[…] nobody asked me to dance. I was just crazy to 
get into the dance, too… it looked as if I was doomed to be a wallflower and that was a 
new role for me.”503 
Since she has no luck among the dancers, she decides to go out where some 
people are talking. It is there, through the dialogue, that she understands the further 
reasons for suspicion which are surrounding her presence: 
 
“Miss, you know uh heap uh dese hard heads wants to woof at you but 
dey skeered.” 
“How come, Mr. Pitts? Do I look like a bear or panther?” 
“Naw, but dey say youse rich and dey ain’t got de nerve to open dey 
mouf.” 
I mentally cursed the $ 12.74 dress from Macy’s that I had on among all 
the $ 1.98 mail-order dresses. I looked about and noted the number of 
bungalow aprons and even the rolled down paper bags on the heads of 
several women. I did look different and resolved to fix all that no later 
than the next morning.
504
 
 
These episodes connecting the several stories of the collection are a reflection on the 
role of the ethnographer within the studied community, as suggested by Graciela 
Hernández.
505
 From this perspective, the sense of estrangement is fictionalized through 
the representation of bodily factors that are perceived as clear signs of different class 
and status. Zora’s reaction is to give a narrative form to her presence in the fieldwork, 
providing her appearance with a new meaning that can be felt as less disturbing in the 
economy of the community. This strategy appears a very focused critique on the role of 
the researcher and on the possibility of conducting ‘participant observation’: while the 
anthropologist is conducting her research, she herself is being observed and analysed 
and the conclusions reached concerning her person actually affect the results of her 
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observations. The bodily presence of the researcher can activate a different awareness in 
the self-perception of the community that enacts its own reading on elements of class 
and gender. This reversal of the gaze is a way of questioning and destabilizing 
ethnographic authority similar to the literary strategies actuated by the anthropologist 
and novelist Amitav Ghosh in the rewriting of his doctoral thesis and fieldwork in 
Egypt into the hybrid text of the novel In An Antique Land (1992). As observed by 
Neelam Srivastava,  
 
[t]he more Ghosh tries to find out about customs and lifeways in the 
village, the more his questions are turned against himself, in a sort of 
counter ethnography, a reversal of Ghosh’s Western “participant 
observation” method for accumulating anthropological data… The 
ethnographer’s culture has been “studied”, in a parody of the way the 
careful anthropologist approaches his object of study.
506
 
 
This situation finds an echo in Hurston’s own report of her first experience of fieldwork 
in her autobiography: 
 
I did not have the right approach. The glamour of Barnard College was 
still upon me… I knew where the material was all right. But I went about 
asking, in carefully accented Barnardese, “Pardon me, but do you know 
any folk-tales or folk-songs?” The men and women who had whole 
treasuries of material just seeping through their pores looked at me and 
shook their heads… 507 
 
The representation of the ethnographer’s body and presence in fieldwork accounts for 
the question of visibility and the vulnerability connected with it when the gaze is 
directed towards the anthropologist and the distance created by ethnographical 
methodology is finally reversed onto her/him. Concerning Ghosh’s questioning of 
ethnographic authority, Anshuman Mondal points out that “in a reversal of the 
procedure by which the ethnographer takes it upon him/herself to translate difference 
into distance, it is they who distance Ghosh by translating his religious difference from 
them into an inexplicable and absolute Otherness.”508 As shown in the passages above, 
something similar happens to Hurston in relation to her representation of embodiment 
and presence in fieldwork as evident also in the following scene of humorous courtship 
where, once again, the bodily data cannot be ignored. While in the scene analysed above 
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the element of class seems to prevail, here it is the ethnographer’s gender that is 
exposed in its interweaving with the erotic element: 
 
“Say, Miss, you know nearly all dese niggers is after you… Some of ’em 
talkin’ ’bout marryin’ you… Dese mens don’t even know how to talk to 
nobody lak you. If you wuz tuh ast dese niggers somethin’ dey’d answer 
you ‘yeah’ and ‘naw.’ Now, if you wuz some ole gator-back ’oman dey’d 
be tellin’ you jus’ right. But dat ain’t de way tuh talk tuh nobody lak you. 
Now you ast me somethin’ and see how Ah’ll answer yuh.” 
“Mr. Pitts, are you havin’ a good time?” 
(In a prim falsetto) “Yes, Ma’am. See, dat’s de way tuh talk tuh you.” 
I laughed and the crow laughed and Pitts laughed. Very successful 
woofing.
 509
 
 
Although the goal of the conversation is clarified from the beginning as being ‘woofing’ 
(namely, joking) still what is at stake here is a double difference: the ethnographer is 
involved in this conversation because of her womanly status, and her being woman is 
perceived as different from the other women present in the commune. As observed by 
Dorst, “an erotic undercurrent previously confined to the tales and to the sanctioned 
space of performance begins to spark out in the social reality of the fieldwork 
situation:”510 in fact, what passages like this one show is that “erotic and social 
power[s]”511 are at work in the field shaping the collection of data and the ways of 
rendering them while underlining that “sexual attraction… [though] not a research tool 
openly acknowledged in realist anthropology”512 is indeed a shaping force of its 
methodology and practice. This is possible because, as Vincent Crapanzano has 
observed in relation to his own ethnographic research, “passion and science are in fact 
not so easily separable.”513  
In fact, at the basis of knowledge production resides what Braidotti defines as 
“‘the desire for philosophy’ as an epistemophilic drive, i.e., a will to know that is 
fundamentally affective.”514 When this philosophical stance is transposed to 
anthropology, it becomes possible to trace a map of affectivities that involve the Other 
of anthropological enquiry in a play of rejections and attractions taking place at 
different levels of subjectivity. This desire is “not just libidinal… but rather 
ontological… the desire to be, the tendency of the subject to be, the predisposition of 
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the subject toward being.”515 When this disposition to knowledge becomes 
ethnographical practice, however, it can encounter other kinds of will and desire. 
Misunderstandings and the ways of overcoming or avoiding them become an integral 
part of the ethnography, even if often an unrepresented, unwritten one. In particular, the 
different way of inhabiting femininity provided by Hurston activates a series of 
dynamics that will eventually lead to the attempt to stab her; furthermore, this is also a 
sign of an enduring difficulty in the effort of reducing distance through representation 
because, in writing, “there is no such thing as a delivered presence but a re-presence, or 
a representation… On the contrary, the written statement is a presence to the reader by 
virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made supererogatory any such real thing.”516   
In this sense, a further critique that seems to persist in the subtext of the 
ethnography is the will to represent the essentially active status of the ‘observed’ and 
their possibility of influencing the material gathered while interfering with the 
conditions of its collection. In relation to Hurston’s research, in particular, what 
emerges is the subversive potentiality of the canonical choice of having men among her 
informants. As observed by Newton, “[t]he straight male anthropologist’s best 
informants are likely to be, or at least to be represented as, male, presumably 
minimizing the danger of these key relationships becoming eroticized.”517 From her 
particular point of view, Hurston had to face and represent the difficulties and 
implications of conducting research in contexts in which women were marginal and the 
consequences of her choices and her presence in those social encounters. 
The necessity to collect songs and stories that could account for the cultural 
production in the turpentine camps or the chain gang placed her in an adversarial 
position towards both the women and the men involved as informants in the fieldwork. 
Passing through the working and fishing sessions to which she is admitted even though 
just a few women usually take part in such events
518, Hurston’s comment on the gender 
relations within the community is represented by the choice to insert the sermon 
“Behold de Rib”519 in which the woman’s bodily status is made still more visible thanks 
to the synecdoche of the rib. The speech by the travelling preacher, as observed by 
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Meisenhelder, “represents the ideal against which relationships between men and 
women are measured in Mules and Men.”520  
 
Brothers, if God 
Had taken dat bone out of man’s head 
He would have meant for woman to rule, hah 
If he had taken a bone out of his foot, 
He would have meant for us to dominize and rule. 
He could have made her out of back-bone 
And then she would have been behind us. 
But no, God Amighty, he took de bone out of his side 
So dat places de woman beside us; 
Hah! God knowed his own mind. 
Behold de rib!
521
 
 
The story from Genesis 2:21 is employed as a commentary on gender equality and, as 
suggested by Wall, it allows Hurston “to celebrate a verbal art she greatly admired and 
to register a protest against the tradition that shaped it.”522 Furthermore, this constitutes 
an amplified dimension of rewriting: the story of the Genesis has been transformed 
through the verbal tradition and it is here proposed again on the written page as an 
observation in contrast to the actual conditions of women within the community. The 
lack of feedback after the sermon (“The sparse contribution taken, the trio drifted back 
into the darkness of the railroad…”523) is significant of the tensions between genders 
and of the unresolved conflicts framing the sessions of storytelling when both men and 
women are present. 
The pressure palpable within the commune involves the anthropologist as well 
and reaches its climax at the end of the Polk County section. Zora’s exit from the 
community, in fact, becomes the moment when the tensions caused by the researcher’s 
presence are extrapolated and the violence inherent in the appropriation of the ‘objects’ 
of anthropological research by the ethnographer are reversed on her character.
524
 The 
pretext for this violent act can be traced to a jealousy motive that once again addresses 
the issue of the anthropologist’s presence as a woman. Her special status among men 
who finally accepted her within their circle in order to let her hear their stories and 
songs, places her in a difficult position towards the other women of the commune. The 
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tension is relieved through the literal fleeing of the anthropologist who moves to New 
Orleans in order to undertake her research on Hoodoo.
525
 
In this episode, we can trace the presence of a question concerning the 
ethnographer’s subjectivity as delineated by Braidotti in relation to Foucault’s definition 
of the subject. The subject formation does not depend on a supposed ‘internalization’ of 
cultural codes, but rather on “a negotiation between layers, sedimentations, registers of 
speech, frameworks of enunciation.”526 In this perspective, the ‘native’ anthropologist 
seems to have actuated a defective subjectivity in which the negotiation among the 
several layers of her presence as a black woman, an anthropologist, a participant, an 
observer, a member of the community yet an outsider, has been unsuccessful and 
recognized as such by the object of her research. 
The second section of the ethnography
527
, therefore, is triggered by the attempt 
to reconcile these different layers of subjectivity through the embodied practice of 
Hoodoo. In “Part 2: Hoodoo”, 
 
Hurston seems to be very consciously inscribing herself as some type of 
occult figure, further establishing herself as the focal point of 
subjectively experienced folkloric culture. Instead of providing objective, 
distanced reportage of voodoo and conjure rituals in New Orleans, she 
focuses her writing on her reaction to the events she is participating in.
528
  
  
In this section, the role accorded to oral language in the first part shifts onto Hoodoo as 
both of them are presented as valid alternatives to mainstream interpretations of 
meaning.
529
 The primitiveness that social sciences have associated with both oral 
language and Hoodoo practice could identify the first as a degraded version of the 
English language and the second as a by-product of religion. On the contrary, their 
pivotal roles within the collection point to their stylistic validity in the reprocessing of 
African-American material and their theoretical originality in comparison to other 
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modalities of knowledge production.
530
 As observed by Wall, “the Afro-centric belief 
system of hoodoo” constituted a source of empowerment for both women and black 
people in general.
531
 
 
Psychologically, hoodoo empowered all of its adherents; it allowed them 
to perceive themselves as actors in the world, not the passive reactors the 
dominant society held them to be. Conversely, hoodoo put the masters’ 
power in a new perspective… Indeed, hoodoo could be used to exact 
justice from the master as well as revenge against fellow slaves… Finally 
and most pertinently, power in hoodoo was decentered; the absence of 
clerical authority militated against male dominance within the slave 
community. Consequently, hoodoo was particularly empowering for 
women.
532
  
 
This notion of empowerment is based on the body and its possibility to interact with the 
forces of nature and master them: in fact, in this section “Hurston’s concerns with 
spirituality, the body, and gender forcefully emerge from the subtext and assume 
primary importance.”533 In order to underline the importance of the bodily facts in this 
part of Mules and Men, a brief description of the beautiful etching by Miguel 
Covarrubias opening it
534
 will be provided here for further analysis; the picture 
represents the naked body of a woman lying on a bed, face downwards, the drawing of a 
thunder stretching from her left shoulder down to her right hip; beside the bed is a chair 
with a water pitcher and a glass. This illustration, depicting one of the several Hoodoo 
initiations presented in the ethnography, represents graphically the textual presence of 
Hurston’s body. As observed by Boxwell, commenting on this image, “[h]er naked 
body itself becomes a kind of runic ethnographic text in this same rite.”535 Providing as 
an explanation the necessity to experience Hoodoo personally as the only way of 
knowing its essence, Hurston tries to reset the distance between ‘observer’ and 
‘observed’ once again. It is precisely the introduction of her body and its vulnerability 
into the text that makes this shift possible.
536
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In the three initiations she goes through as a Hoodoo novice, what is at stake is 
the possibility of acquiring the right to belong to the studied community through a 
process of apprenticeship. As shown in the context of the previous section of Mules and 
Men, neither ethnic factors nor made-up lies can account for the anthropologist’s 
presence and activities. In the detailed descriptions of the hoodoo initiations
537
 and 
rituals, the body is present in its physical possibility of performing the tasks prescribed 
by faith. The references to the body are numerous throughout the initiations: “leg”, 
“head”, “arms”, “loins”, “navel”, “eyes”, “feet”, “cheeks”, “forehead”, “face”, “little 
finger”, “hand”, “blood”538, “head” (again), “chest”, “flesh”539, “throat”540 are all 
actively involved in the activity of research. The woman ethnographer is physically and 
wholly present in her nakedness at the mercy of the supposed ‘object’ of her study. The 
kind of knowledge resulting from this process is, par force, an embodied, situated, and 
positional form of knowledge. As observed by Wall, the knowledge acquired through 
Hoodoo requires “physical strength and mental stamina that are many times greater than 
those any of the Eatonville homefolk would have attributed to Lucy Hurston’s 
daughter.”541 The difficulties experienced in entering the world of Hoodoo and in 
making herself a trustworthy novice are narrated as part of the initiation process itself. 
This process, as underlined by Wall’s analysis, is characterised by the verb ask that “not 
only structures the paragraph… [but] becomes a metonym for the rite of initiation which 
is the climax to which the chapter builds.”542 
The practice of Hoodoo could represent a means of reconciliation of the 
different layers of subjectivity proposed above; in fact, as suggested by Wall, this 
alternative interpretation of spirituality can denote “a location of female empowerment” 
through word where the decentring of authority results in a possibility of active 
representation for women.
543
 Through the Hoodoo practice in which the body has the 
possibility to emerge in less problematic ways than in the embodied experience of 
fieldwork, it is possible to see a space of retreat from the phallologocentrism of both 
folklore and science as “there is no such thing as a mother tongue, … all tongues carry 
the name of the father and are stamped by its register.”544 As noticed by Houston A. 
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Baker in relation to Marie Laveau, one of the most important Voodoo priestesses in the 
history of New Orleans, “[v]oodoo… is indisputably a woman’s domain.”545 On the 
other hand, though, there is also the danger for black people to be ascribed, once again, 
to irrational practices and confined by an external perception of their existence. In this 
regard, Baker observes that 
 
[p]erhaps that is something terribly right about this strong propensity for 
the supernatural in Afro-American life. After all, the “Grand Narrative” 
of the Western Enlightenment assumed that the mere fact of melanin 
confined all people of color to bestial irrationality. In that grand 
narrative, whiteness was written as the only hue that was both natural 
and rational. The marginal spaces left for color were the non-rational and 
the perversely supernatural. It is understandable, therefore, that, in the 
New World, African captives who had been stolen by enlightened 
Europeans would transform these spaces of color into the vivid, spiritual 
common sense called Voodoo.
546
 
 
The potentiality for resistance inherent in Hoodoo as in other forms of expression 
considered peculiar to the African-American experience constitute also their menace 
because, while opening spaces for agency, they also risk being invalidated by the same 
discursive practices of power that the strategies of survival were trying to subvert in the 
very first place. This is possible because, as Stuart Hall observes, “black is marked”547 
in opposition to an idea of whiteness as a synonym of “what the world is.”548 What Hall 
defines as the ‘markedness’ of ethnicity as black, associated with the apparent 
unmarked status of both whiteness and knowledge as seen in Grosz’s analysis, favours a 
lack of balance which easily denotes the (black) ethnic sign with a surplus of meaning. 
As Bhabha notices: 
 
[s]uch contradictory articulations of reality and desire – seen in racist 
stereotypes, statements, jokes, myths are… the effects of a disavowal that 
denies the differences of the other but produces in its stead forms of 
authority and multiple belief that alienate the assumptions of “civil” 
discourse… the repetition of guilt, justification, pseudoscientific theories, 
superstition, spurious authorities, and classifications can be seen as the 
desperate effort to “normalize” formally the disturbance of a discourse of 
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splitting that violates the rational, enlightened claims of its enunciatory 
modality. The ambivalence of colonial authority repeatedly turns from 
mimicry – a difference that is almost nothing but not quite – to menace – 
a difference that is almost total but not quite.
549
 
 
Because of the menace inherent in stereotypical images of blackness, Hurston decided 
to work on the borders of representation, in the interstices which offered, at the same 
time, possibilities for expression and erasure while stressing the importance of 
conscious rewriting of (at least, partially) unconscious modalities of resistance in order 
to let them emerge as vital elements of African-American identity and art. In her works 
the reader’s attention can be directed towards representational choices performed by the 
anthropologists in their texts that are invariably linked to the body (and its absence), as 
seen in the present chapter, and to Time (and its avoidance), as will be explored in the 
next one. 
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Chapter 3: Time and Orality in Zora Neale Hurston’s Mules and Men 
 
“Our lives are summed up in sounds and made significant… That’s why 
we must do so much to invent meanings…”550  
 
To question the significance of Time in ethnography in relation to Hurston’s work is to 
question the meaning of conducting anthropological research in a segregated society as 
a way of taking into consideration alterity within the national borders of the US, 
because the divisions along lines of colour, ethnicity, class, and economic status present 
in 1930s American society were marked according to different temporal coordinates on 
the basis of their adherence to or distance from modernity and the increase of speed in 
social and working rhythms. The approaches to the temporal question in Hurston’s 
ethnographies are, therefore, manifold: from the point of view of a decolonizing project, 
Time can be taken as a coordinate for problematizing concepts like ‘modernity and 
‘backwardness’ in the context of an evolutionist hierarchy;551 from the point of view of 
the researcher, Time is an element that can destabilize the binarisms ‘insider/outsider’ 
and ‘participant/observer;’ from a third perspective, the representation of Time in 
ethnography through orality can alter the visualism of traditional ethnographic 
depictions questioning the immobility and ‘Time denial’ of cultural descriptions as 
expressed in the convention of the ‘ethnographic present.’ Kirsten Hastrup refers to this 
feature of ethnography as “a literary device”552 and a “construction of time”553 in the 
passage from description to interpretation, from fieldwork to writing. In the relationship 
between the actual flowing of time in fieldwork and its representation in ethnographic 
writing it is possible to find a pattern which has been often reproduced in the history of 
anthropology thanks to the activation of particular literary strategies of omission and 
translation such as, for instance, the representation of Time and body in ethnography. 
The main link between these two elements is their erasure from the text as a 
result of the interpretation of data collected in fieldwork; that is, elision of the 
anthropologist’s body and of the researcher’s and the Other’s Time: in fact, if temporal 
immobility is inherent in ethnographic descriptions, labels such as ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’ can be an indication of the reversal of such immobility towards the 
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ethnographer inasmuch as they do not take into consideration the complex intermingling 
and stratification of academic knowledge, anthropological methodology and their 
contradictions in the pragmatic context of fieldwork, personal memories, and associated 
vicissitudes. Such labels seem to have the final aim to ‘freeze’ the anthropologist within 
a period of her/his life (for instance, when s/he was considered a member of a defined 
community) and do not take into account the actual temporal flowing in the 
anthropologist’s own life, her/his detachment from the group of origin, and the reactions 
to her/his return among them. As observed by Linda Tuhiwai Smith, in fact, 
“[i]ndigenous research approaches problematize the insider model in different ways 
because there are multiple ways of both being an insider and an outsider in indigenous 
contexts.”554 
In Hurston’s case, actually, although the community probably had an ambivalent 
attitude towards the researcher, and she probably experienced a significant shift from 
the perspective she had before leaving the community in her teenage years, considering 
her as either an ‘insider’ or an ‘outsider’ means congealing her presence in Time and 
nullifying the effects not only of institutionalized education and ethnographic fieldwork, 
but also the influence of the anthropologist’s personal growth and elaboration of life in 
its variety before and after leaving the community. The works of so-called insider 
anthropologists, in fact, carry with them a different degree of reflexivity or “a constant 
need”555 for it due to the fact that “insiders often have to live with the consequences of 
their processes on a day-to-day basis.”556 Hurston returned to live in Eatonville only at a 
later stage in her life, but taking into consideration her belonging to several 
communities at once (the anthropological community, the artistic community linked to 
the Harlem Renaissance, the black community at large, to name just a few), it is 
possible to see how degrees of ‘insiderness’ intersected in her research in important 
ways producing real consequences on her life and career. An example of this can be 
found in what Lynda Marion Hill has defined as Hurston’s difficulty in “classifying 
stories she collected into ‘tale types’, as a folklorist is expected to do”557, and how this 
became “for her… a challenge to figure out how tales she remembered from a time past 
have taken new forms.”558 These observations on her problematic approach to the 
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categorization of African-American tales relate to the question of performance as an 
articulation of Time in anthropology and in the lives of the ethnographer and her 
community; Hill comments that: 
 
[a]ccording to Richard Schechner, a performance can be distinguished 
from daily behavior because it repeats or “restores” previous behavior. 
This is the meaning of enactment – a ritualization of behavior… Some 
definitions of performance emphasizing ritualistic – repetitive – behavior 
offer insights into Hurston as a person who understood how cultural 
traditions change.
559
 
 
If this notion of cultural performance is applied to anthropological practice, “[i]nasmuch 
as ‘one learns through performing, then performs the understanding so gained’, 
Hurston’s work opens a learning process.”560 The representation of the performative 
features of both cultural material and ethnographic praxis as a learning process can be 
considered an attempt to overcome both the dichotomy between ‘lived’ and ‘structured’ 
Time and a way to avoid the essentializing potential of anthropological descriptions 
while underlining creativeness and variation within traditions through linguistic and 
paralinguistic expression. 
 
3.1 ‘Lived’ and ‘structured’ Time in fieldwork and theory 
 
One main point of the current analysis of Time in Mules and Men is to be found 
in language as a methodological and stylistic choice guiding the development of the 
text. In fact, by introducing the dialogic dimension and the oral features of spoken 
language into a written text, Hurston is choosing a different representation of Time in 
the context of her monograph. Language in its aural and oral characteristics
561
 can 
represent a connection between Time and the body, and is a way of introducing a shared 
temporality into the text while attempting to reduce distance. Through the reading of her 
work, the focus will be directed on the ways in which folk and oral expression can 
problematize the issues which have emerged in cultural anthropology at the end of the 
twentieth century in relation to the conventions of ethnographical writing, as 
demonstrated by works such as Fabian’s Time and the Other and the debate originated 
by the publication of James Clifford and George Marcus’ Writing Culture in the 1980s.  
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In fact, although as observed by Bunzl, “[a]t the turn of the century, the intersubjective 
coevalness of anthropological Self and ethnographic Other is no longer in question”562, 
it seems quite revealing that Hurston’s ethnographies have not found the place they 
deserve in the anthropological canon; the decision to insert her autobiographical voice 
in the ethnography or the ways in which she decided to problematize her presence in 
fieldwork as an African-American woman while attaining ethnographic authority were 
important experimental achievements in the context of the 1930s.  Therefore, I will use 
Fabian’s analysis of Time in ethnography to study Hurston’s representational choices in 
her writing. At the time in question, anthropology had established its written records by 
removing its referent from the present of the writing subject. In this way, it constructed 
an allochronic discourse denying coevalness, namely the sharing of the same Time with 
its object of study. Basically, alterity had been defined through distance in Time more 
than geographical, spatial remoteness.
563
 
This is significant for the anthropological discourse as it was constructed in the 
US; in fact, alterity was not necessarily to be found in faraway lands through the 
colonial encounter, but it was mainly studied within the national boundaries or at the 
very borders of the nation, and from this perspective, the Caribbean represented what I 
would define as ‘a close, faraway place.’564 The discourse so constructed, as noted by 
Fabian, derived its language from prehistory and archaeology, disciplines that do not 
involve any kind of interaction with living people. In the North American context of the 
1930s, anthropologists could provide an explanation for alterity in the existence of 
different temporal realities within the same territory. The system that made this possible 
was a segregationist organization of society in which rhythms were different because 
the possibilities for political representation and public affirmation of black people were 
different (read: disadvantaged or non-existent). As noted by Leigh Anne Duck
565
, the 
mainstream depiction of African Americans suffered from an anachronistic bias that 
resulted from their exclusion from institutions and politics and, in turn, reinforced such 
exclusions. 
The representation of Time in Mules and Men has been seen as partly 
reinforcing both anachronistic and segregationist discourses in the attempt to portray the 
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authentic aspects of folkloric experience as profoundly different from the principles and 
rhythms of modernization. Nonetheless, Duck observes that Hurston’s temporal 
coordinates are “flexible and vital”, her representation of the ‘folk’ is far from being 
backward and tales are inserted in “a context of conflict, interchange, and alteration.”566 
It is evident from the context in which the tales are inserted that they represent a 
reflection on interracial and intra-racial conflicts and tensions; even the Time of 
mythical accounts seems to function as a space in which to find an origin for present 
problems or current situations rather than being an essentialization of the Time of 
alterity.
567
 
Duck suggests that the issue of Time in Mules and Men can be framed within the 
different layers of temporality as experienced by Hurston in her fieldwork. In reference 
to this, it can be useful to consider the distinction proposed by the Italian anthropologist 
Antonino I. Buttitta between ‘lived’ and ‘structured’ Time in relation to the different 
times intersecting any anthropologist’s life and fieldwork.568 In order to explain this 
temporal divide, Buttitta makes reference to the ways in which time has been treated in 
historiography; he indicates the historical flux as the “macrosystemprocess of 
history”569 that has been structured by historiography in represented time. It is in this 
passage that the shifts from the life continuum and representation, history and 
historiography, take place.
570
 In similar ways, lived experience in the anthropologist’s 
life and in her/his research and representation in fieldwork notes and ethnographic 
writing coexist and overlap.
571
  
In relation to the divide between experience and theory expressed in Michelle 
Rosaldo’s claim that “what we now need is not more data (read: fieldwork), but more 
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questions (read: theory)”572, Kamala Visweswaran observes that “this separation… 
loses sight of the fundamentally restitutive value of feminism, and the potential of a 
feminist ethnography that has yet to be expressed: locating the self in the experience of 
oppression in order to liberate it.”573 The tension between the phases of ‘lived’ and 
‘structured’ experience – that in anthropological practice corresponds to the dimensions 
of fieldwork and writing – finds its final expression in objective/subjective ethnographic 
accounts and in “the development of what might be termed ‘woman-centered’ and 
‘decentered’ approaches in feminist anthropology.”574 Thus, Time can be theorized as 
another point of negotiation in the subjective, embodied experience in which to practise 
such a defined separation between life and research, lived (fieldwork) experience and 
theoretical (written) interpretation, is indeed difficult, if not impossible. 
 
3.2 Visualism and temporal traditions 
 
In relation to Hurston’s approach to the temporal issue, it is possible to notice an 
attempt at placing the object of her study in a distant Time, if not denying Time to it 
altogether in the account of Zora’s return to Eatonville at the very beginning of Mules 
and Men: 
 
“… Who you reckon want to read all them old-time tales about Brer 
Rabbit and Brer Bear?” 
“Plenty of people, George. They are a lot more valuable that you might 
think. We want to set them down before it’s too late.” 
“Too late for what?” 
“Before everybody forgets all of ‘em.” 
“No danger for that. That’s all some people is good for – set ‘round and 
lie and murder groceries.”575 
 
This passage could give the impression that, because of her ethnographer’s status, Zora, 
Hurston’s narrative persona, has knowledge of processes of which the average 
Eatonville inhabitant is unaware. This preoccupation was typical of salvage 
anthropology and can be traced back to the Boasian conception of anthropology in its 
cultural relativist consideration of cultures as “separate gardens” to be observed in 
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isolation in order to avoid the interference of external elements.
576
 This anthropological 
mode rested on the assumption of authenticity and potential corruption: while 
reinstating the originality and uniqueness of cultural heritage, it could end up 
reinforcing claims of difference based on evolutionist notions of Time and divisions 
such as, for example, ‘folk’/ ‘primitive’ opposed to ‘modern’/ ‘civilized.’ 
In Mules and Men, this disciplinary discourse is destabilized, nonetheless, by the 
introduction of the dialogic dimension in which storytelling takes place. In the 
intersection between corporeality and Time, aural and oral characteristics of 
enunciation, the shared dimension of Time is recovered through the notion of 
ethnography as encounter, life, bodily investment, sound, speech, dialogue, successive 
moments of sharing embedded in power relations regulated through Time. From this 
perspective, knowledge is not something to be ‘preserved”, but rather becomes the 
result of the interactions taking place in fieldwork. Thanks to the introduction of the 
category of Time through orality, Hurston proposes the representation of it as 
performance so that its erasure in anthropological writing reveals its own performativity 
as epistemological practice.
577
 This becomes evident in the account of a day of work in 
the swamp, as attested by the following quotation: “Men are not supposed to over-sleep 
and Dick Willie gets paid to see to it that they don’t. Listen to him singing as he goes 
down the line.”578 The register is here closer to the chronicle than to the ethnographic 
account in its use of the imperative form of the verb listen in relation to a referent 
identified as an implicit second person subject (‘you’).  
While the present tense is typical of the ethnographic monograph, the implicit 
‘you’ to which this sentence refers is very uncommon as the referent of the ethnography 
was usually erased from its context.
579
 The reference to sound also destabilizes the 
notion of ‘visualism’ which was inherent to anthropological writings and rested on the 
idea of sight as “the noblest, most comprehensive, and most reliable of the senses;”580 
Fabian, however, questions this privilege: “what makes a (reported) sight more 
objective than a (reported) sound, smell, or taste?”581 Although the whole scene widely 
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relies on visual images
582
, it is indeed significant that one of its first references is to 
sound as the basis of the ethnographic encounters represented throughout the text. The 
auditory category allows the entering of the temporal element into ethnographic writing, 
a movement which had been often denied by the stillness of visualistic descriptions.  
In fact, Hurston’s ethnography renounced objective depictions in order to 
provide alternative descriptions through the theoretical possibilities of folklore. With 
regard to the legacy of visualism in ethnography, it can be useful to explore the notion 
of ‘picturesque’ as an aesthetic category introduced in 18th century theory. As defined 
by William Gilpin in his Essay on Prints (1768), the term would refer to “that peculiar 
kind of beauty, which is agreeable in a picture.”583 The concept of picturesque is 
historically related not only to composition and choice of subject in painting, but also to 
travels, travelogues, and ways of observing. In this sense, as noted by Robert 
Smithson
584, the picturesque would be strictly linked to “a more physical sense of the 
temporal landscape.”585 In its suspension “between the beautiful and the sublime”, 
according to Uvedale Price’s definition of the term586, the category of picturesque 
rendered a whole set of subjects, such as decadent buildings and underprivileged 
people, eligible for representation. Furthermore, in Gilpin’s text it is possible to deduce 
the relation between depiction and Time in the tradition of visual art. In his explanation 
of “the judicious choice of circumstances”587 within the design of a composition in its 
“historical relation to a fact”, he includes “[…] a proper time, proper characters, the 
most affecting manner of introducing those characters, and proper appendages.”588 In 
the painter’s treatment of Time suggested by Gilpin, what is striking is the reliance on a 
temporal conception more properly linked to literature and, in particular, theatre: 
 
[w]ith regard to a proper time, the painter is assisted by good old 
dramatic rules; which inform him, that one point of time only should be 
taken – the most affecting in the action; and that no other part of the story 
should interfere with it… With regard to characters, the painter must suit 
them to his piece, by attending to historical truth, if his subject be 
history; or to heathen mythology, if it be fabulous.
589
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The reference to two distinct conceptions of Time, historical and mythological, in 
pictorial representation is of utter importance in the transposition of the idea into 
writing, especially ethnographical writing. In fact, what emerges in visualistic 
ethnographical descriptions is an ambiguous relationship to the category of Time in its 
elision of the historical conditions in which the anthropological encounter takes place, 
and in its difficult relationship to the actual living conditions of its ‘objects’ who often 
relied on narrative accounts based on oral means of transmission in which the category 
of myth was not always distinctly separable from that of history, as in the narrative 
modalities of folklore.  
In Hurston’s case, the insertion of folklore and of elements associated with the 
genre of the novel raise questions about the traditions informing her writing and the 
different temporal modes inherent to them. As observed by Houston Baker, referring to 
T.S. Eliot’s essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1920), there is a tradition “in a 
historical sense” which is constituted by “the monuments of black American 
literature”590 and another meaning of tradition that is “broader, less literary”591: this 
second connotation “refers to customs, practices, and beliefs that have been handed 
down from generation to generation by ‘the folk’ or ‘the group.’”592 In the present 
study, a third factor enters this double tradition here, that is, the ‘interstitial’ position of 
multiple traditions: Western and American literary traditions in general, black American 
literature, and folklore all had a role in shaping Hurston’s writing. As attested by her 
own account of her literary education in her autobiography Dust Tracks on a Road 
(1942): 
 
[…] the books gave me more pleasure than the clothes… In that box 
were Gulliver’s Travels, Grimm Fairy Tales, Dick Whittington, Greek 
and Roman Myths, and best of all, Norse Tales. Why did the Norse tales 
strike so deeply into my soul? I do not know, but they did… Of the 
Greeks, Hercules moved me most… I resolved to be like him… I also 
met Hans Andersen and Robert Louis Stevenson. They seemed to know 
what I wanted to hear and said it in a way that tingled me. Just a little 
below these friends was Rudyard Kipling in his Jungle Books. I loved his 
talking snakes as much as I did the hero. I came to start reading the Bible 
through my mother… Except for the beautiful language of Luke and 
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Paul, the New Testament still plays a poor second to the Old Testament 
for me.
593
 
 
I turned in written work and answered questions like everybody else, but 
he [Dwight O.W. Holmes, her English teacher] took no notice of me 
particularly until one night in the study of English poets he read Kubla 
Khan. Listening to Coleridge’s poem for the first time, I saw all that the 
writer had meant for me to see with him, and infinite cosmic things 
besides… This was my world, I said to myself, and I shall be in it, and 
surrounded by it…594 
 
[…] I had hundreds of books under my skin already. Not selected 
reading, all of it. Some of it could be called trashy. I had been through 
Nick Carter, Horatio Alger, Bertha M. Clay and the whole slew of dime 
novelists in addition to some really constructive reading. I do not regret 
the trash. It has harmed me in no way.
595
 
 
Swift, Grimm, Stevenson, Andersen, Roman, Greek, and Norse myths, the Bible, 
English poetry and ‘trashy’ literature are all recognized as part of her literary 
background shaping her writing together with the oral tradition of storytelling heard on 
the store-porch of Eatonville
596
, and implicit references to African-American literature 
as will be demonstrated in the development of this chapter in relation to the construction 
of authorship and authority in writing. What is at stake here is the intermingling of 
different literary traditions influencing both her novels and her ethnographies; in 
particular, in relation to her ethnographic writing, it is possible that it was exactly the 
tradition linked to novel and poetry (either oral or written) together with the features of 
black folklore that enables her to open the text to new possibilities of representation of 
body and Time. In this context, the term ‘novel’ is here used in a Bakhtinian sense to 
refer to 
 
[…] whatever force is at work within a given literary system to reveal the 
limits, the artificial constraints of that system. Literary systems are 
comprised of canons, and “novelization” is fundamentally anticanonical. 
Always it will insist on the dialogue between what a given system will 
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admit as literature and those texts that are otherwise excluded from such 
a definition of literature.
597
 
 
In this sense, the introduction into ethnography of elements referring to other literary 
traditions (mainly the ones linked to the novel and storytelling) call into question the 
literary elements inherent in the construction of ethnographical writing as, in fact, “the 
novel can include, ingest, devour other genres and still retain its status as a novel, but 
other genres cannot include novelistic elements without impairing their own 
identity.”598 Because of the “novel’s awareness of the inadequacies of its own 
language”599, questions of Time and embodiment can emerge in ethnography opening 
the genre to new possibilities, but also bringing into question the status of the text and 
the authorship framing it. In fact, “since the novel is aware of the impossibility of full 
meaning, presence, it is free to exploit such a lack to its own hybridizing purposes.”600 
Through the introduction of elements traditionally ascribed to the novel (among which 
it is possible to find questions on the representation of temporality and identity, either 
embodied or not), the ethnographic genre acquires richness and stratification, opens up 
to a self-reflection on its own modalities of construction and representation, but it is also 
destabilized, hybridized, and subsequently, shaken in its foundation from its very core. 
Taking into consideration Hurston’s account of a working day in the swamp, it is 
possible to detect the presence of visual elements in her description of the community 
waking up: this can be considered as a sign of the presence of different forces linked to 
manifold traditions with which she deals in her text in order to shape it and shape the 
narrative voice(s) sustaining it. The passage under consideration relies once again on the 
second person pronoun identifying a witness summoned to first observe and then, take 
part into the scene: in the description of the whole day in the swamp, it is possible to 
trace the interest in portraying a day of work through theatrical devices, one of 
Hurston’s interests as a playwright.601 The representation of Time in Mules and Men, 
therefore, is important not only in order to understand how anthropological Time (or the 
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denial of it) finds expression in this ethnographic work, but also to trace the 
interrelations between ethnographic and literary writing within the text.  
As suggested by Kristeva, “we live within a fragmented chronology that has yet 
to discover a founding concept of its own.”602 The problem is in determining to whom 
the pronoun ‘we’ refers and according to which chronological principles the 
construction and representation of Time is subject to processes of fragmentation and 
distancing. In fact, as stated by Fabian, cultural relativism “circumvents the problem of 
common Time by postulating a multiplicity of times and spatial coexistence… the very 
notion of containing walls and boundaries creates order and sense based on 
discontinuity and distance.”603  As observed by Duck, Hurston’s treatment of Time in 
Mules and Men suggests the interweaving of multiple temporalities in her experience: 
the Time of the “folk” meets the “time of the highway” just like “clock time” meets “the 
transcendent timelessness of hoodoo.”604 Hurston would represent herself at the 
“intersection of different temporalities”605 showing that the mediation of different times 
inherent in the different rhythms of the North and South of the United States was indeed 
possible. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the attribution of a different time 
to the South of the United States and the perceived backwardness of a system of 
production which was felt as surpassed by the industrial development in northern areas 
of the country is a strategy of distancing by the North deflecting from its own racism. In 
so doing, the South became “the abjected regional Other.”606 
 
3.3 Time, orality, and writing 
 
In its presentation of Time in ethnography, Mules and Men reveals itself to be a hybrid 
text in which general assumptions on the ways of conducting ethnography and the 
denial of coevalness inherent in them can be destabilized and coexist with the 
representation of “intersubjective time”607, the Time of exchange taking place in 
fieldwork. The introduction of oral speech into writing is particularly significant in 
order to understand the temporal implications of Hurston’s text; apart from the different 
temporalities intersecting in Hurston’s representation of herself in fieldwork, this 
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chapter will consider how Time enters her ethnography according to three main 
features: through the presentation of different versions of the same tale; through the 
representation of the dialogic context of fieldwork giving the temporal and spatial 
coordinates in which the storytelling took place; and as already observed, through the 
representation of the oral features of language. As observed by Ong, “writing… is not a 
mere appendage to speech. Because it moves speech from the oralaural to a new sensory 
world, that of vision, it transforms speech and thought as well.”608 This perspective on 
writing and orality can be productive in connection to the question of the representation 
of Time in anthropology because it provides a direct link to the visualism inherent in the 
ethnographies which deny coevalness to the studied Other and shows us the potential of 
the introduction of orality into the text in order to allow other senses to enter 
anthropological knowledge. 
In this context, both body and Time cross the threshold of ethnography in the 
form of, respectively, voice and rhythm: in fact, it is possible to crystallize an image, 
but it is not the same with sound which – in order to be reproduced in the present 
moment – requires the same duration it originally had in fieldwork. According to Ong’s 
analysis, 
 
[t]here is no way to stop sound and have sound… If I stop the movement 
of sound, I have nothing – only silence, no sound at all. All sensation 
takes place in time, but no other sensory field totally resists a holding 
action, stabilization, in quite this way. Vision can register motion, but it 
can also register immobility. Indeed it favors immobility, for to examine 
something closely by vision, we prefer to have it quiet… There is no 
equivalent of a still shot for sound.
609
 
 
Representation, in this resonant description, really acquires the meaning of re-
presence because it is very difficult to reproduce a sound without allowing it to be 
inserted in the present moment. This is a very different ‘present’ from the one promoted 
by ethnographic writing as analyzed by Fabian. In fact, he observes that the 
ethnographic convention of present tense “at the very best ‘freezes’ a society at the time 
of observation; at worse, it contains assumptions about the repetitiveness, predictability, 
and conservatism of primitives.”610 On the contrary, Hurston’s present is not constituted 
through an atemporal description, but through the time of orality: in this sense, 
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representation becomes re-presence. In fact, in order to be appreciated, her ethnography 
would require to be staged as a theatrical play so that the characters involved in it can 
regain the power of the oral word and, through it, its rhythms and time; the ethnographic 
form is, therefore, challenged by the content which attempts to resist ideological 
concepts inherent in that form. 
In orality, the body and its time are the main resources of communication; the 
transposition of these facts on the written page, with their impact on sound and gesture, 
is commented on in some of the tales of the collection, as for instance in “How to Write 
a Letter.” When a father asks his daughter who has been “off to school for seben years” 
to write a letter to his brother, he is mostly disappointed when the girl cannot write a 
clucking sound he makes with his tongue to call the attention of his new mule. 
 
[…] “Now tell him some mo’. ‘Our mule is dead but Ah got another 
mule and when Ah say (clucking sound of tongue and teeth) he moved 
from de word.’” 
“Is you got dat?” he ast de girl. 
“Naw suh,” she tole ‘im. 
He waited a while and he ast her again, “You got dat down yet?” 
“Naw suh, Ah ain’t got it yet.” 
“How come you ain’t got it?” 
“Cause Ah can’t spell (clucking sound).” 
“You mean to tell me you been off to school seben years and can’t spell 
(clucking sound)? Why Ah could spell dat myself and Ah ain’t been to 
school a day in my life. Well jes’ say (clucking sound) he’ll know what 
yo’ mean and go on wid de letter.”611 
 
The story provides a powerful statement on the relationship between oral and written 
expression commenting of the idea whether writing can always substitute for orality 
while representing a more complete form of communication. On the contrary, it gives 
an account of the oral word as able to transmit an alternative series of sounds and 
meanings. To offer an alternative to official accounts and interpretations is another 
resource inherent in orality: the impossibility of reproducing the clucking sound in 
writing, in fact, accounts for the limits of (ethnographical) written texts which – 
although giving the impression of a comprehensive, 360-degree-description – ignore 
human experience in terms of temporal and bodily facts in order to create an immutable, 
unquestioned description of a community frozen in time. 
In relation to this tale, Barbara Johnson has pointed out that 
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[t]he daughter in the tale is in a situation analogous to that of Hurston: 
the educated student returns home to transcribe what her forebears utter 
orally. She has learned a notation system that considers itself complete 
but that turns out to lack a sign for (clucking sound). The “inside” is here 
commenting on the “outside”, the tale commenting on the book as a 
whole… But lest one fall into a simple opposition between the tale’s 
orality and the transcriber’s literacy, it is well to note that the 
orality/literacy relation is the very subject of the tale, which cannot be 
appreciated by those who, like the father in the tale, cannot write. Its 
irony is directed both ways.
612
 
 
These observations seem to find an echo in Ong’s ideas on the passage from orality to 
literacy. He notices that: 
 
[o]ral cultures indeed produce powerful and beautiful verbal 
performances of high artistic and human worth, which are no longer even 
possible once writing has taken possession of the psyche. Nevertheless, 
without writing, human consciousness cannot achieve its fuller 
potentials, cannot produce other beautiful and powerful creations… This 
awareness is agony for persons rooted in primary orality, who want 
literacy passionately but who also know very well that moving into the 
exciting world of literacy means leaving behind much that is exciting and 
deeply loved in the earlier oral world.
613
 
 
In Ong’s vision, it is possible to perceive an evolutionist bias in the 
essentialization of orality that, although defined as ‘beautiful’ and ‘powerful’, would be 
relegated in a psychological frame anterior to writing, activity that allows people to 
achieve a further degree of development (‘fuller potential’). Hurston’s work on orality, 
on the contrary, shows the ways in which oral and written expression can affect one 
another in a mutual exchange which does not presuppose a ‘before’ and an ‘after;’ in 
Mules and Men writing can indeed be a means to revive oral language thanks to the 
connection between fieldwork, folklore, and theatre. Gates has based his theory of 
Signifyin(g) on the capacity for self-reflectiveness inherent in trickster figures of the 
oral tradition such as Esu in Yoruba cultures and the Signifying Monkey in African-
American folklore. The two characters, in fact, would share “the curious tendency to 
reflect on the uses of formal language.”614 In the trope of Signifyin(g) it is possible to 
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trace the feature which shapes the connection between orality and writing, African-
American musical forms and literary expression: through the movements of repetition 
and revision
615
, the black artistic forms would acquire their peculiarity; throughout these 
movements the passage between oral and written forms of expression become just one – 
although maybe the most marked one – among passages of reinscription, renaming, and 
rewriting. 
In ways akin to the critical theory proposed by Gates, with its focus on the 
connection between black vernacular and African-American literary tradition, the 
Bengali historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has explored the relation between the oral custom 
of adda and the role of this dialogic practice in literary circles and Bengali literature. 
Chakrabarty uses the term adda according to the definition by the linguist Sunitikumar 
Chattopadhyay who describes adda as “[…] ‘a place’ for ‘careless talk with boon 
companions’ or ‘the chats of intimate friends.’”616 Differently conceived as “useless 
talk”617 and as “a site of self-presentation, of cultivating a certain style of being in the 
eyes of others”618, adda in its oral features was connected with and influenced by 
written literature in several ways. Chakrabarty marks the passage of this ancient ritual to 
modernity explaining the importance of adda as a cultural model of reference for 
‘modern’ clubs and literary circles, because in adda encounters what was at stake was 
the creation of a cultural and psychological space enabling one to enjoy language and 
style as markers of identity. Adda helped the diffusion of literature, cinema, and the arts 
in important ways;
619
 acquired a new status thanks to its connection with writing, and 
adapted itself to ‘modernity’ in such ways that render Ong’s idea of a definitive, ‘no 
return’ passage from orality to literacy, and from oral to written modalities of thought, 
quite limited in the contexts of the rich exchange taking place between adda and 
Bengali writing, as well as between black vernacular and African-American literature. 
In Chakrabarty’s view, learning self-expression in oral adda meant to be involved in a 
framework opening new possibilities for the appreciation and the creation of written 
literature. Finally, adda represented a communal way of thinking about language and 
maintaining an independent organization of time and space, which was antithetical to 
the one proposed by “modern civil society.”620 This self-determination, finding 
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expression in orality, is maintained and amplified in literature as observed by Gates 
when he states that “[t]he language of blackness encodes and names its sense of 
independence through a rhetorical process that we might think of as the Signifyin(g) 
black difference.”621 
From this perspective, writing would be already present in orality
622
 so that 
Hurston’s tale on the relationship between orality and writing can constitute a comment 
on the actual conditions of literacy in the African-American communities where 
younger generations were acquiring reading and writing skills while forgetting the 
connection of written forms with oral modalities of expression. This could be revealing 
of Hurston’s conviction that African-American writers were unaware of the oral and 
folkloric legacy lying at the core of black urban speech and literary expression. The 
political possibilities inherent in the conquest of literacy could be neutralized by this 
lack of awareness and lose its empowering potential in the process. In fact, Hurston’s 
work seems to echo Fanon’s idea that “[a]ny idiom is a way of thinking”623, so that her 
involvement in linguistic and anthropological research supports her stylistic and literary 
achievements. Language and theory, speech and folkloric legacy, are closely 
interrelated. The aim to be achieved is not some kind of racial betterment, but a form of 
collective self-awareness of the artistic and political potentialities inherent in folkloric 
forms of expression and their actual influence on mainstream American English 
language and culture.  
In his essay “Harlem is Nowhere” (1948), Ralph Ellison gives an interesting 
account of the displacement of the African-American identity in the northern urban 
regions of the United States. He describes the chaotic reality of the ghetto in which 
forms of musical expression like jazz and bebop coexisted with the most extreme 
violence. The resulting contrast between these positive and negative aspects was due to 
the “abruptness of change and the resulting clash of cultural factors.” 624 In Harlem, he 
continues, time has sped up at such a fast pace that  “it is possible for talented youths to 
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leap through the development of decades in a brief twenty years, while beside them 
white haired-adults crawl in the feudal darkness of their childhood.”625 And he adds, 
 
[s]ignificantly, in Harlem the reply to the greeting, “How are you?” is 
very often, “Oh, man, I’m nowhere” – a phrase revealing an attitude so 
common that it has been reduced to a gesture, a seemingly trivial word. 
Indeed, Negroes are not unaware that the conditions of their lives 
demand new definitions of terms like primitive and modern, ethical and 
unethical, moral and immoral, patriotism and treason, tragedy and 
comedy, sanity and insanity.
626
 
 
In Ellison’s words, it is possible to perceive the potentialities of such a ‘nowhere status’, 
but also its implications in relation to chaos and identity issues. ‘Being nowhere’ is a 
way of escaping definitions, especially at a time when those definitions were being 
discussed and redefined, but it also bears the risk of losing one’s own identity in the 
very process of redefinition. In fact, in the passage from South to North, Ellison 
acknowledges the yielding without replacement of structures supporting the African-
American personality. In his vision, “the cultural history of Negroes in the North reads 
like the legend of some tragic people out of mythology.”627 In particular, African 
Americans had abandoned a more stable social order that, although repressive, 
constituted the environment in which they had acquired “those techniques of survival to 
which Faulkner refers as ‘endurance.’”628 Other ways of thinking that Ellison ascribes to 
African Americans would have been compromised in the passage from southern to 
northern regions, such as the “peasant cynicism” and the “sense of being ‘at home in the 
world;’”629 although, even more importantly, the African-American citizen had 
renounced to “an authoritative religion which gives his life a semblance of a 
metaphysical wholeness; a family structure which is relatively stable; and a body of 
folklore – tested in life-and-death terms against his daily experience with nature and the 
Southern white man – that serves him as a guide to action.”630 The view of folklore as ‘a 
guide to action’ seems quite close to the use of folklore made by Hurston in her own 
fictional and ethnographic works. More precisely, it is the value of folklore as a guide to 
linguistic and artistic actions that Hurston is promoting as a political stance against the 
idea of folk as too primitive and naïve for the modern age.  
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Another point to be underlined in Ellison’s passage is the description of the 
southern social structure in which African Americans had acquired some stability, but 
not humanity. In fact, if Harlem is nowhere, the southern experience of slavery is 
somewhere, but somewhere where African Americans could not be someone. These 
spatial coordinates could be seen as circumscribing the history of black people in the 
United States; if, as noticed by Bhabha, “mimicry emerges as one of the most elusive 
and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge”631 producing, by way of its 
ambivalence, a ‘slippage’ or ‘excess’ summarized in the formula “almost the same, but 
not quite”632, in the US context marked by slavery and segregation, the particular issue 
of a ‘partial’ (in the sense of “both ‘incomplete’ and ‘virtual’” 633) presence becomes the 
dominant element in the reading of the same African-American presence: ‘almost here, 
but not quite’ could be an appropriate formula to describe the attempt at erasure of the 
African-American agency and location in the context of American history.
634
 The 
experience in Harlem, therefore, summarizes the chaotic and exciting situation of 
having the possibility to define oneself for the first time while escaping previous 
definitions orchestrated by the external (white) gaze, but with the constant risk of 
invisibility and identity annihilation. In Toni Morrison’s Beloved, the real meaning of 
slavery – even in its ‘soft’ and apparently more endurable forms – accounts for the 
theory under the system. Sweet Home is, indeed, a protected universe for the slaves 
working there where Mrs. and Mr. Garner treat them as ‘men.’ After Mr. Garner’s 
death, Mrs. Garner’s brother-in-law and his two nephews come to help her in the 
administration of the plantation. The arrival of schoolteacher – as the ex-slaves 
remember him – show the theoretical assumptions sustaining a system that could be 
wrongly idealized in Mrs. and Mr. Garner’s version of it. Paul D, one of the ex-slaves, 
still questions their attitude after many years of freedom: 
 
[f]or years Paul D believed schoolteacher broke into children what 
Garner had raised into men. And it was that that made them run off. 
Now… he wondered how much difference there really was between 
before schoolteacher and after. Garner called and announced them men – 
but only on Sweet Home, and by his leave. Was he naming what he saw 
or creating what he did not? That was the wonder of Sixo, and even 
Halle; it was always clear to Paul D that those two were men whether 
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Garner said so or not. It troubled him that, concerning his own manhood, 
he could not satisfy himself on that point. Oh, he did manly things, but 
was that Garner’s gift or his own will? What would he have been anyway 
– before Sweet Home – without Garner? In Sixo’s country, or his 
mother’s? Or, God help him, on the boat? Did a whiteman saying it make 
it so? Suppose Garner woke up one morning and changed his mind? 
Took the word away. Would they have run then?... they had been isolated 
in a wonderful lie… Protected and convinced they were special. 635 
 
“Did a whiteman saying it make it so?” summarizes the theoretical issue inherent in 
slavery; Mrs. and Mr. Garner’s generous attitude towards their slaves shows, by 
contrast, what was inherent in the system: the impossibility to define one’s identity in 
independent terms. Their magnanimity within the boundaries of their protected universe 
juxtaposes, but does not challenge, what is outside: a man is either a man all the time, in 
all places, or is not; and a man is a man when the society in which he is inserted gives 
him the possibility to define himself as such. The character of schoolteacher is the 
embodiment of the definitional power inherent in slavery and segregation, and of the 
philosophical assumptions that make freedom not just an issue of iron collars and 
broken chains. 
 
Everything rested on Garner being alive. Without his life each of theirs 
fell to pieces. Now ain’t that slavery or what is it? At the peak of his 
strength, taller than tall men, and stronger than most, they clipped him, 
Paul D. First his shotgun, then his thoughts, for schoolteacher didn’t take 
advice from Negroes. The information they offered he called backtalk 
and developed a variety of corrections (which he recorded in his 
notebook) to reeducate them.
636
 
 
Schoolteacher’s and his pupils’ notebooks are almost characters in themselves 
as, in their pages, the lives of the slaves working at Sweet Home are summarized and 
defined by the external gaze which tries to discern between what it sees as ‘human’ and 
‘animal’ characteristics.637 In the episode of Sethe’s stolen milk the sheer violence 
inherent in such classification becomes painfully evident in its practical consequences: 
 
Schoolteacher was teaching us things we couldn’t learn. I didn’t care 
nothing about the measuring string. We all laughed about that – except 
Sixo. He didn’t laugh at nothing. But I didn’t care. Schoolteacher’d wrap 
that string all over my head, ’cross my nose, around my behind. Number 
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my teeth. I thought he was a fool. And the questions he asked was the 
biggest foolishness of all.
638
 
 
Schoolteacher’s ‘foolish’ questions and anthropometric measurements constitute an 
important link between slavery and anthropology, especially in its first stages: at its 
outset, in fact, anthropological theory both supported and challenged different theories 
of race; what it shared with oppressive systems of power was exactly the sole rights to 
define what it considered the objects of its studies.
639
 From this perspective, Sixo’s 
character can be analysed as an embodiment of the witty spirit of folklore at self-
definition and awareness. Sixo is the protagonist of an episode in the novel that closely 
reminds one of John’s tales in folklore when schoolteacher questions him on what he 
judges as a theft. 
 
“You stole that shoat, didn’t you?” 
“No. Sir,” said Sixo, but he had the decency to keep his eyes on the meat. 
“You telling me you didn’t steal it, and I’m looking right at you?” 
“No, sir. I didn’t steal it.” 
Schoolteacher smiled. “Did you kill it?” 
“Yes, sir. I killed it.” 
“Did you butcher it?” 
“Yes, sir.” 
“Well, then. Did you eat it?” 
“Yes, sir. I sure did.” 
“And you telling me that’s not stealing?” 
“No, sir. It ain’t.” 
“What is it then?” 
“Improving your property, sir.” 
“What?” 
“Sixo plant rye to give the high piece a better chance. Sixo take and feed 
the soil, give you more crop. Sixo take and feed Sixo give you more 
work.” 
Clever, but schoolteacher beat him anyway to show him that definitions 
belonged to the definers – not the defined.640 
 
In the end, Sixo cannot escape slavery like John, the folklore’s character, does in 
most African-American folktales; and he is physically eliminated by it. Nonetheless, his 
presence in the novel highlights the link between definition and representation inherent 
both in slavery and anthropology as expressed in Karl Marx’s famous words: “[t]hey 
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cannot represent themselves, they must be represented.”641 It is possible to understand 
the ‘nowhere’ of Ellison’s Harlem as the no man’s land of (self)-representation where 
the legacy of folklore is to be remembered as the first artistic and theoretical attempt at 
self-definition. 
 
Even the educated colored: the long-school people, the doctors, the 
teachers, the paper-writers and businessmen had a hard row to hoe. In 
addition to having to use their heads to get ahead, they had the weight of 
the whole race sitting there. You needed two heads for that. Whitepeople 
believed that whatever the manners, under every dark skin was a 
jungle… In a way, he thought, they were right. The more coloredpeople 
spent their strength trying to convince them how gentle they were, how 
clever and loving, how human, the more they used themselves up to 
persuade whites of something Negroes believed could not be questioned, 
the deeper and more tangled the jungle grew inside. But it wasn’t the 
jungle blacks brought with them to this place from the other (livable) 
place. It was the jungle whitefolks planted in them. And it grew. It 
spread. In, through and after life, it spread, until it invaded the whites 
who had made it. Touched them every one. Changed and altered them. 
Made them bloody, silly, worse than even they wanted to be, so scared 
were they of the jungle they had made. The screaming baboon lived 
under their own white skin; the red gums were their own.
642
 
 
The myth of the jungle – now in more positive, but always controversial terms – was 
reemerging in the primitivist assumptions present both in anthropology and modernism 
during the years in which Hurston was giving shape to her works and the theory behind 
them but, as observed by Paul D in Beloved, “Does a whiteman saying it make it so? 
...What if he changed his mind? Took the word away.”643 Thus, one of the main 
attempts present in Hurston’s work both in anthropology and fiction is to be found in 
the possibility that the word would not be taken away again because African Americans 
had the possibility to define themselves in independent terms, a resource that had been 
always present in folklore and could be expressed in both artistic forms and 
anthropological theory. 
The complexity of this cultural legacy is inherent in Hurston’s choice to 
represent variety within the African-American communities she studied; apart from 
being another way to represent the passing of Time and the transformations occurring 
                                                 
641
 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) quoted in Gates (ed.), “Race”, 
Writing, and Difference, 2. 
642
 Morrison, Beloved, 234. 
643
 Ibid., 260.  
  
 
 
140 
through it, it can be seen as part of her attempt to “reveal that which the soul lives by”644 
as stated in her Introduction to the collection. Thus, her decision to provide an 
alternative representation of relations in fieldwork by introducing the themes of Time 
and body in ethnography through orality must be read as an effort to overcome 
assumptions which both governed her research methodology and were instilled in her 
training as an anthropologist and in her lived experience as an African-American 
woman in a segregated society. In fact, relating Mules and Men to her essay 
“Characteristics of Negro Expression”, it is possible to notice how categories such as 
‘primitive’ and an evolutionist vision of culture and language were present in her 
intellectual background. Ideas like “[t]he primitive man exchanges descriptive 
words”645 can coexist with and be shaken by the firm belief that “Negro folklore is not a 
thing of the past. It is still in the making. Its great variety shows the adaptability of the 
black man: nothing is too old or too new, domestic or foreign, high or low, for his 
use.”646 
This idea of folklore in the making is probably that which identifies Hurston’s 
project as ethnography in the making, a project which, through the representation of 
Time and body, allows the anthropological ‘Other’ to enter the written text as a subject 
empowered by the oral features of language and its rhythm. 
 
3.4 Stratifications of body and Time 
 
My analysis of Time in ethnography starts from its relationship to the body and 
connects these two themes through language, voice, and orality. In particular, I would 
like to consider the three-fold stratification of the enslaved body as suggested by Camp 
in relation to the three main representations of Time in ethnography delineated by 
Fabian. In Camp’s analysis, the first body of the enslaved person is the body as a site of 
domination;
647
 it represents what she calls, using a term borrowed from Michel 
Foucault, the “biotext” of slaveholders’ authority.  This first body can be related to what 
Fabian addresses as ‘Physical Time;’ in fact, this ethnographic temporalization is 
                                                 
644
 Hurston, Mules and Men, 2. 
645
 Zora Neale Hurston, “Characteristics of Negro Expression” (1934) in Cheryl A. Wall (ed.), Zora 
Neale Hurston: Folklore, Memoirs and Other Writings (New York: Library of America, 1995), 830. See 
Chapter Two, 86-89 for a discussion of some aspects of this essay. 
646
 Ibid, 836. 
647
 Stephanie M. H. Camp, “The Pleasures of Resistance: Enslaved Women and Body Politics in the 
Plantation South, 1830-1861”, The Journal of Southern History, 68, no. 3 (August 2002), 543. 
  
 
 
141 
strictly connected to “a system of ideas which include space, bodies, and motion”648 
which came into being during colonialism in order to “move or remove the other 
body.”649 Through the use of different devices in order to favour distance, “one assigns 
the conquered populations a different Time.”650 In this context, Time and space become 
coordinates of domination interiorized by enslaved and colonized people leading to the 
second layer of embodiment and temporalization. The second body is, in fact, 
constituted by “the subjective experience of this process… the colonized body that, in 
Fanon’s terms, the person of ‘color’ experienced ‘in the white world.’”651 The 
experience of the body in a colonized/segregated society could be considered in relation 
to ‘Mundane or Typological Time’, the second representation of Time presented by 
Fabian.
652
 In this second temporal framework, categorizations such as ‘neolithic’ or 
‘archaic’ start being used as “distancing devices” and “[a]djectives like mythical, ritual, 
or even tribal, will… connote temporal distancing as a way of creating the objects or 
referents of anthropological discourse.”653 Through the shift from chronology to 
qualitative judgment, the colonized person discovers the role of her/his body within the 
wider society.  
Ethnicity and colour of the skin become markers of a different Time within the 
same society and this temporal distance is organized on an evolutionist model according 
to which economic status and ethnic affiliation can function as signs of different stages 
in progress and development. Frantz Fanon has accounted for the role of black skin as a 
marker of a different (read: primitive) Time in France and its colonial territories like 
Martinique where the role of the colonial ideology and government was so pervasive 
that their inhabitants judged themselves according to coordinates of modernity and 
backwardness acquired from the external, imposing gaze. He observed that “[a]ll 
colonized people – in other words, people in whom an inferiority complex has taken 
root, whose local cultural originality has been committed to the grave – position 
themselves in relation to the civilized language: i. e. the metropolitan culture.”654 More 
importantly, in the passage from native country to colonial France, black people gained 
a different status in the eyes of their fellow citizens as “the métropole is the holy of 
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holies”655 and entering it, they were experiencing a change of status and a shift in Time. 
The status they were leaving in the eyes of their fellow people – but still retained in 
France – is well expressed by Eduardo Galeano’s words: 
 
The nobodies: nobody’s children, owners of nothing. The nobodies: the 
no ones, the nobodied…  
Who are not, but could be. 
Who don’t speak languages, but dialects.  
Who don’t have religions, but superstitions.  
Who don’t create art, but handicrafts.  
Who don’t have culture, but folklore.  
Who are not human beings, but human resources.
656
 
 
Treated as bearers of a different Time in France, black people from Martinique did 
experience a shift in belonging to the modernity and centrality of the métropole in the 
passage from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘centre;’ this often meant being judged as a ‘central 
nobody’ instead of a peripheral one in France, while acquiring the status of a 
“demigod”657 in their native land. 
The perception of the body one can experience in this kind of society is certainly 
very different from the third and final layer of bodily consciousness described by Camp, 
that is the body as a “contested terrain of struggle”, “as a site of pleasure and 
resistance.”658 In this context, the body becomes a source of pride and self-expression, 
which can be celebrated as a way of destabilizing the “geography of containment that 
aimed to control slave mobility in space and time.”659 This last bodily stratification can 
be connected to what Fabian calls “Intersubjective Time”, the framework in which 
communication is most likely to take place in order to create a shared Time.
660
 Although 
this model of communication can still favour distance, Hurston’s choice to celebrate the 
body through oral expression and the representation of voice while including the 
context of performances in dialogue and conflict is an attempt to represent the sharing 
of Time between the anthropologist and the studied community during the experience of 
fieldwork. In so doing, she is trying to avoid what Fabian calls the ‘denial of 
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coevalness’, that is “a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of 
anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological 
discourse.”661 In this context, Deleuze’s perspective on embodiment, according to 
which “[b]odies may be chemical, biological, social, or political” suggests that “the 
distinction between these modes is not… ontological. It becomes, for Deleuze (with 
Félix Guattari), semiological, a function of different regimes, different organizations of 
life”662 can be applied to the different layers of Time representation and the different 
ways of organizing temporal experiences both in social and anthropological relations. 
As Fabian suggests in relation to Time, this movement is not only semiological, but also 
political. 
 
3.5 Layers of embodiment and temporalization in Mules and Men 
 
In order to probe the significance of this approach to body and Time and the parallel 
between segregated/colonized society and representation of Time in anthropology, one 
can apply the correspondences between layers of embodiment and temporalization as 
delineated in the previous section to the specific texts present in Hurston’s ethnographic 
collection. The first level (body as site of domination/physical time) is signalled by the 
marking of Time during the day of work at the mill. 
 
Well, we were at the mill at last, as slow as we had walked. Old Hannah 
[the sun] was climbing the road of the sky, heating up sand beds and 
sweating peoples. No wonder nobody wanted to work. Three fried men 
are not equal to one good cool one… Work was too discouraging to think 
about. Phew! Sun and sawdust, sweat and sand.
663
 
 
By that time somebody saw the straw boss coming so everybody made it 
on into the mill. The mill boss said, “What ate y’all comin’ in here for? 
Ah ain’t got enough work for my own men. Git for home.”664 
 
In the above passages, it is possible to notice the influence and control exerted by the 
white employers on both physical and temporal conditions of the black workers. The 
mill boss can decide either to make the men work in extreme weather conditions or 
dismiss them without any explanation while giving them an unexpected day off. Body 
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and Time become the very sites in which the dominion and authority over black 
people’s everyday life and general living conditions can be unrelentingly wielded and 
reaffirmed. As for the positioning of the anthropologist towards the ‘objects’ of her 
research and distance to them, the first passage is revealing of Hurston’s identification 
with the workers (use of the plural first person pronoun “we”) and her understanding of 
their condition, regardless of their genders and working status. As for the temporal 
distance, the past tense used in the recollection of the fiery-hot day of work acquires 
rhythm and speed through the last sentence made up of the alliteration of four nouns 
which make tangible the actual conditions of work and their effects on the workers (sun, 
sawdust, sweat, sand). 
In relation to the second layer of embodiment and temporality (body as 
subjective experience of domination/typological Time), it is possible to analyze “Kill 
the White Folks”665, one of the tales of the slavery period, which have as their main 
protagonist a slave named Jack or John. According to temporal coordinates, it is 
important to underline that these tales constitute a conscious recollection of the shared 
history of the community, that is they represent the insertion of a mythical element 
(victory over slavery in the form of cultural struggle and resistance) in a historical 
framework (the recent experience of slavery as reflected in the actual conditions of 
segregation). Furthermore, these tales are often told in breaks and spare moments during 
the working day making even more evident the connection between slavery and 
subsequent exploitation of black skilled labour. In this particular tale, the name of the 
protagonist is not specified, but its position between two tales which have John as main 
character
666
 underlines its connection to this figure of folklore. 
 
And dat put me in de mind of a nigger dat useter do a lot of prayin’ up 
under ‘simmon tree, durin’ slavery time. He’d go up dere and pray to 
God and beg Him to kill all de white folks. Ole Massa heard about it and 
so de next day he got hisself a armload of sizeable rocks and went up de 
‘simmon tree, before de nigger got dere, and when he begin to pray and 
beg de Lawd to kill all de white folks, Ole Massa let one of dese rocks 
fall on Ole Nigger’s head. It was a heavy rock and knocked de nigger 
over. So when he got up he looked up and said: “Lawd, I ast you to kill 
all de white folks, can’t you tell a white man from a nigger?”667 
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This tale is particularly interesting because it stages racial difference and its 
interiorization by the enslaved person. The distance between black and white men is 
underlined by the ironic substitution of God by the white who was, in fact, in a 
condition of semi-almightiness within the slavery system. This distance is not nullified 
by an encounter, but by the violence represented by the throwing of the stone: the 
mythical time of the black man’s prayer finds its parallel in the mythical time of God’s 
ironic substitution while the historical time of slavery is paralleled by the historical 
violence represented by the stone which knocks the slave down. This touch without 
actual encounter is a result of pervasive control and violence, of constant marking of 
difference through labels such as ‘nigger’, which contain a temporal distancing in the 
social system and are interiorized in the subjective experience of the body, so that the 
final reaction is the reaffirmation of difference through the question: “Can’t you tell a 
white man from a nigger?” 
As for the third stratification of embodiment and temporality (body as a political 
site/intersubjective Time), a good example – apart from the very style in which Hurston 
decided to convey her fieldwork data – can be found in the interactions taking place 
during the day off when the men are sent home by the mill boss.  
 
When Mrs. Bertha Allen saw us coming from the mill she began to hunt 
up the hoe and the rake. She looked under the porch and behind the 
house until she got them both and placed them handy. As soon as Jim 
Allen hit the steps she said: “Ah’m mighty proud y’all got a day off. 
Maybe Ah kin git dis yard clean today. Jus’ look ad de trash and dirt! 
And it’s so many weeds in dis yard, Ah’m liable to git snake bit at my 
own door.” … “Ah’m standin’ in my tracks and steppin’ back on my 
abstract – Ah ain’t gointer rake up no yard. Ah’m goin’ fishin’”, Cliffert 
Ulmer snapped back. “Grandma, you worries mo’ ‘bout dis place than de 
man dat owns it. You ain’t de Everglades Cypress Lumber Comp’ny sho 
nuff. Youse just shacking in one of their shanties. Leave de weeds go. 
Somebody’ll come chop ‘em some day.” …Big Sweet and Lucy got out 
their poles and joined us. It was almost like a log-rolling or a barbecue. 
The quarters were high. The men didn’t get off from work every day like 
this.
668
 
 
During the day off and the session of fishing and story-telling, the body becomes a site 
of pleasure and resistance both to inter- and intra-group pressures. In fact, the old 
woman’s request of raking the yard is declined by the younger men who see it both as a 
form of internalized subjugation (“You ain’t de Everglades Cypress Lumber Comp’ny 
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sho nuff… Leave de weeds go”) and a denial of the rare possibility to administer their 
time by themselves. The fishing session constitutes an occasion of celebration of the 
Body through motion and freedom from constraints and a possibility for sharing 
meanings and time with other members of the community in the presence of the 
anthropologist. 
 
3.6 Voice and Time: “the human side” of science 
 
What makes a (reported) sight more objective than a (reported) sound, 
smell, or taste?
669
 
 
To explore the role of voice in Mules and Men is to take into account how authority, 
either scientific or literary, can construct itself within a text. As seen in the previous 
chapter, the apparently impersonal style of scientific writing hides a subject who needs 
invisibility in order to establish his analysis as valid. To question scientific authority 
means to take into consideration the construction of authorship in writing. In relation to 
Hurston, authorship deals with both the oral folkloric tradition she researched in her 
ethnographic practice and with the written texts that are part of the African-American 
canon. In particular, it is possible to trace a link between slave written narratives and 
Hurston’s search for authority in her texts.  
In this regard, what has to be underlined once again is that visualism is not 
completely eliminated in Hurston’s ethnographies, but more precisely integrated with 
sound and motion. This approach to sight represents a different approach to authority 
that can be delineated in relation to diverse ideas on authorship in Ralph Waldo 
Emerson and Frederick Douglass, as observed by Jeannine DeLombard. De Lombard 
notices that Emerson’s statement “I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see 
all”670 is a “transcendentalist version of the implicitly white, implicitly male, implicitly 
bourgeois universal subject… recently consolidated in Western culture”671, and she 
adds: 
 
[i]n contrast to the “embodied” subjectivity of women, people of color, 
and the poor, the universal subject’s “predominant mode of 
epistemological engagement with the world is through the agency of 
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reason.” Thus, Smith notes, “[T]he topography of the universal subject 
locates man’s selfhood somewhere between the ears.” In Nature Emerson 
locates the self even more specifically with the image of the “transparent 
eyeball.”672 
 
What is at stake in Emerson’s text is delineating “the project of U.S. authorship in 
visual terms”673 and DeLombard is successful in opposing this “transparent eyeball” to 
the representation of the eye in Douglass’ Narrative. The eye in Douglass cannot be 
separated from the “historical relations between the black body and ‘scopic regimes of 
modernity’ in Western culture.”674 In his Narrative, vision in the embodied image of the 
eye is inextricably linked to violence and witnessing in person the acts of brutality 
perceived through sight. To pass from the act of witnessing to the act of testifying, a 
shift from sight to sound, from eye to voice, is necessary in order to achieve distance 
from the body not acquiring complete transparency, but at least a lower degree of 
vulnerability. 
Douglass’ eye, in his narrative, is injured during an episode in which he passes 
from witnessing to being the target of racial violence. DeLombard observes that “this 
scene produces in Frederick a heightened awareness of the inescapability of the slave’s 
embodied subjectivity.”675 Emerson’s “transparent eyeball” is very far from Douglass’ 
embodied, vulnerable eyeball as expressed in the following sentence in which he gives 
account of a kick he received in his eye using the words “[m]y eyeball seemed to have 
burst.”676 In Douglass’ text, this episode marks the end of his status of enslaved person 
and the passage to the condition of freed man enabled to write his memories of slavery 
as a testimony to its violence and injustice. The shift away from vision is given also to 
the fact that, for the enslaved subject, it was impossible to disconnect vision from the 
body and, in this regard, sight becomes destabilized by its closeness to distorted 
perspective.  
DeLombard underlines that, while narratives of former slaves were acquiring the 
status of testimony, nineteenth-century optical science “was undermining the reliability 
and authority of such [visual] observation on the basis of the body’s unsettling capacity 
to produce its own experiences, its own reality.”677 That is to say that the black 
embodied sight could not acquire the transparency and universality of Emerson’s 
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eyeball and, therefore, had to find another medium of expression for authority. The 
metonym for authorship becomes voice in Douglass’ assertion of his identity “as one 
who speaks rather than one who sees.”678 De Lombard further observes that “[p]erhaps, 
as a voice… Douglass… could at last shed the embodied subjectivity associated with 
his former role as an eyewitness to Southern slaveholding violence and attain “a degree 
of freedom” in a universal subjectivity unencumbered by the body.679 
Nonetheless, Douglass soon finds out that prejudices are present in the North as 
well and that he cannot escape his body.
680
 What emerges is the fundamental bodily 
dimension of both sight and voice in African-American literature; as it is impossible to 
achieve transparency because the (white) subject hidden in it is not invisible at all, but 
rather employs a mimetic strategy within the text, the possibility for black authorship is 
linked to embodiment. From this perspective, voice becomes a medium of action in 
contrast with the limits of observation as passive witnessing of racial violence. In this 
regard, Douglass becomes “a witness and a participant”681, using a definition which 
approximates his position to the role of the Boasian anthropologist in fieldwork. The 
question of authorship and embodiment is linked to the most important slave narratives 
of the nineteenth-century and, considering the gender variable, it is important to 
remember Sánchez-Eppler’s observations on authorship in Harriet Jacobs’ Incidents in 
the Life of a Slave Girl. In fact, she notices: 
 
[r]arely playing on the body of the reader, the slave narrative replaces 
that body with the body of the author. This is a startling move, since 
generally the position of author gains its privilege precisely because the 
text produced occludes the specific physical body of the person who 
produced it. Inverting this pattern, slave narratives, and perhaps all 
confessional or testimonial genres, rhetorically create an authorial body. 
Rather than attempt to assert the incorporeality of authorship, testimonial 
writing inscribes the author’s bodily existence and experience.682 
 
This seems to delineate a tradition of writing in which Hurston could acquire 
significance shifting the focus from autobiographical to (auto)ethnographical 
accounts.
683
 In fact, in contextualizing her work within a canon, it is important to 
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consider her instruction in English literature and cultural anthropology, her oral 
‘weaning’, and her insertion in a tradition of African-American writing. Thinking about 
her theory of imitation and the bias of mimicry against which black authors had to 
confront themselves through writing, her choice of inserting orality in ethnography is 
indicative both of the awareness of the oral legacy informing her writing and of her 
desire not to be considered derivative in the writing tradition of anthropology whose 
authorship was based on an artificially invisible subject which refused her authority 
from the start while marginalizing her contribution as imitation. 
In relation to authorship, the decision to represent orality in ethnography by 
filling the text with names of people who contributed to it (usually dismissed as 
anonymous informants)
684
 seems to honour the shared authorship typical of the oral 
traditions. Finally, ethnography and other texts based on ethnographic data are the ideal 
media to convey the hybrid experience of fieldwork as suspended between oral and 
written expression, a practice of constant movement between sound and vision. In 
Hurston’s writing it is therefore possible to trace the legacy of the construction of 
authority in abolitionist literature with its focus on the “visual power of the injured 
black body”685, an authority which constructed itself on the awareness of being in the 
position of “a witness more than an advocate, an authority that produced not 
Emersonian transcendence but an insistent corporeality structured always through black 
physical vulnerability.”686 
 
3.7 From vision to voice (and back) 
 
“Not only will I stare. I want my look to change reality.”687 
 
How can I say things that are pictures
688
 
 
The others are not any more present in the text the anthropologist offers 
to her readers than their voices are present in (or even behind) the 
phonetic transcription of their utterances. In fact, it is because of this, 
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because of this phonic and existential absence that these others can in the 
end be represented by the anthropologist, for, if they were here, there 
would be no point in representing them, that is, to stand for them and to 
speak for them.
689
 
 
Fabian has argued against the preponderance of metaphors of vision in anthropology 
and their marked inclination towards visualism or synopticism, namely “the urge to 
visualize a great multitude of pieces of information as orderly arrangements, systems, 
and tableaux.”690 Nonetheless, visualism alone – considered as both “the ideological 
current in Western thought” and a “cognitive style”691 – cannot be held responsible for 
the essentialization of the object of observation. In fact, to assume “the political twist 
which we ascribe to anthropological discourse, visualism had to be expounded in spatial 
schemes.”692 Fabian further notices that “in this tradition the object of anthropology 
could not have gained scientific status until and unless it underwent a double visual 
fixation, as perceptual image and as illustration of a kind of knowledge. Both types of 
objectification depend on distance, spatial and temporal.
693
 
Ethnography defines itself as “observing and gathering, i.e. as a visual and 
spatial activity”694 underlining, in this epistemological and ideological attitude, its 
connection to the diffusion of oil painting starting from the sixteenth century. Paintings 
were mainly used to show sights and commissioned by owners in order to show what 
they possessed
695
 underlining the “analogy between possessing and the way of 
seeing.”696 
 
Significantly enough it is an anthropologist who has come closest to 
recognizing it… Lévi-Strauss writes: “It is this avid and ambitious desire 
to take possession of the object for the benefit of the owner or even the 
spectator which seems to me to constitute one of the outstandingly 
original features of the art of Western civilization.”697 
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Lévi-Strauss sees Renaissance paintings as both instruments of knowledge and 
possession
698
 and detects in them “a way of seeing the world, which was ultimately 
determined by new attitudes to property and exchange.”699 
In Hurston’s ethnographic practice, vision as an instrument of knowledge and 
appropriation is not completely dismissed because of the five senses it is ascribed the 
power to observe and define. As seen in relation to Douglass’ narrative, though, for the 
African-American subjectivity sight is not that space of rationality and universality 
granted to the white, male, bourgeois subject of science. For black people, sight is 
historically and inextricably linked to the limits imposed by both slavery and 
segregation and epistemologically connected to the vulnerability of the body and its 
limited perspective. As observed by hooks, 
 
[t]he “gaze” has always been political in my life… There is power in 
looking… The politics of slavery, of racialized power relations, were 
such that the slaves were denied their right to gaze. Connecting this 
strategy of domination to that used by grown folks in southern black rural 
communities where I grew up, I was pained to think that there was no 
absolute difference between whites who had oppressed black people and 
ourselves.
700
 
 
Because of the definitional power of sight, Hurston cannot dismiss it from her text so 
easily, but because of the embodied characteristics of her vision, she decides to integrate 
her scopic perspective with sound and motion, allowing the entrance of a temporal 
dimension into her ethnography. Furthermore, vision is destabilized by embodied 
African-American authorship because, as it has been discussed in the previous chapters, 
the presence of the black body can suggest a primitivist bias linked to irrationality rather 
than reason.
701
 The possibility of being associated with irrational ways of thinking is 
apparent in the matter-of-fact way in which Hurston tries to deal with phenomena 
generally ascribed to the paranormal or the occult, such as her use of the picture of a 
zombie in Tell My Horse: Voodoo and Life in Haiti and Jamaica (1938) or in her 
account of the visions she had throughout her life at the beginning of her autobiography 
Dust Tracks on a Road:  
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I do not know when the visions began. Certainly I was not more than 
seven years old, but I remember the first coming very distinctly… There 
was no continuity as in an average dream. Just disconnected scene after 
scene with blank spaces in between. I knew that they were all true, a 
preview of things to come… These things had to be… So when I left the 
porch, I left a great deal behind me. I was weighed down with a power I 
did not want. I had knowledge before its time… I never told anyone 
around me about these strange things. It was too different. They would 
laugh me off as a story-teller. Besides, I had a feeling of difference from 
my fellow men, and I did not want it to be found out. Oh, how I cried out 
to be just as everybody else! But the voice said No. I must go where I 
was sent… Time was to prove the truth of my visions, for one by one 
they came to pass. As soon as one was fulfilled, it ceased to come.
702
 
 
In the description of Hurston’s visions about her future, it is possible to detect a 
relationship between vision (either physical or spiritual) and a power which is difficult 
to contain (“I was weighed down with a power I did not want” could refer to the power 
of seeing and subsequently defining while refusing the reciprocity of the gaze to the 
object under observation) and voice as an element which prompts to action while 
fostering movement and activity (“But the voice said No. I must go where I was sent.”) 
Vision is here not the basis of rational knowledge, but of cosmic understanding and 
premonition, perhaps implying a connection between visual perspectives associated 
with African Americans and different degrees of ‘irrationality’ and ‘lack of control’ 
which render the mere reliance on vision impossible because of its ultimate 
unattainability. 
Nonetheless, in Hurston’s conception of ethnographic writing, vision as 
appropriating knowledge is present in such metaphors as the “spyglass of 
anthropology”703 and in her definition of research as “formalized curiosity… poking and 
prying with a purpose.”704 What is interesting in her use of the spyglass metaphor is that 
the gaze is autoethnographic or, at least, self-oriented, directed toward the chemise she 
is wearing (an image for her culture) which the instrument of anthropological distancing 
allows her to see more clearly. In Antonio Gramsci’s words, “[t]he starting point of 
critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is ‘knowing thyself’’ 
as a product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of 
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traces, without leaving an inventory. The first thing to do is to make such an 
inventory.”705 
The dyad ‘knowledge/objectivity’ is present also in her consideration of Boas’ 
main merits as “the greatest anthropologist alive.”706 Following his instructions “to go 
out and find what is there”707, the initial results are, however, unsuccessful. As she 
admitted in her reflections on her initial fieldwork in Florida, “[m]y first six months 
were disappointing… I did not have the right approach. The glamour of Barnard 
College was still upon me… I knew where the material was all right. But, I went about 
asking, in carefully accented Barnardese, ‘Pardon me, but do you know any folk-tales or 
folk-songs?’”708 
As suggested by the passage above, in Hurston’s ethnography the acquisition of 
knowledge is strictly connected to the acquisition of a voice as an actual means of 
contact with the anthropological Other(s). Her gaze is able to deal with distance because 
it is also directed towards her own self in order to achieve awareness of the intrinsic 
value inherent in the material she is studying. This seems to be the main role of 
anthropological theory in her research and writing as evident in her statement regarding 
the tales she is going to collect. When questioned by two of her informants about the 
scope of her research, she highlights the central role of folktales, adding that “[t]hey are 
more valuable than you might think. We want to set them down before it’s too late.”709 
Anthropology provides awareness, self-consciousness, and a method which – although 
based on visualistic assumptions – relies also on orality and allows her to shift from 
sight to voice, as in Douglass’ Narrative, whereas observation alone is demonstrably 
unsuccessful as “[f]or an oral culture learning or knowing means achieving close, 
empathetic, communal identification with the known.”710 
 The main difference between sight and voice as epistemological modalities is to 
be found in the different degrees of distance from and involvement with the object of 
ethnographic knowledge: in fact, vision can be performed without reciprocity and in 
perfect stillness while the lack of reciprocity stops sound, therefore voice requires a 
response in order to fulfill its potentialities. By means of these sonic exchanges, Time is 
allowed to enter the epistemology of knowledge. As observed by Fabian, though, “aural 
                                                 
705
 Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds.), Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio 
Gramsci (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1998: 1929-1935), 324. 
706
 Hurston, Dust Tracks, 127. 
707
 Ibid. 
708
 Ibid., 127-128. 
709
 Hurston, Mules and Men, 8. 
710
 Eric A. Havelock quoted in Ong, Orality and Literacy, 45. 
  
 
 
154 
perception and oral expression neither presuppose nor guarantee a more ‘personal’ idea 
or use of knowledge”711 and they may depersonalize knowledge “as much as through 
visual-spatial reduction;”712 nevertheless “[t]he aural and oral must be invoked for 
epistemological reasons because they may provide a better starting point for a 
dialectical concept of communication.”713 At the same time, Yelvington has highlighted 
the usefulness of the metaphor of dialogue in the study of the anthropology of diaspora 
and has focused on the dialogic aspect as one of the most important concepts which 
anthropology borrowed from linguistics; he also carefully evaluates the possibilities of 
the concept of dialogue as applied to anthropological research, noticing that in relation 
to diaspora studies, the dialogic dimension “does not imply an equality among 
participants in the process.”714 Rather, 
 
[i]t entails… multiparty interactions of material, ideational, and 
discursive phenomena, among others, in complex relationships 
characterized more often than not by an unequal distribution of power; a 
dialogue not between fixed objects, but a process of mutual influence and 
conditioning that is itself already part of an ongoing dialogic process 
where ‘rhetorics of self-making’… play a crucial role.715 
 
In Hurston’s ethnography, the representation of Time is both connected to the 
representation of sound and to a different notion of vision, linked to the body (not 
incorporeal) and present in orality. Ong’s observation that “[w]ithout writing, words as 
such have no visual presence, even when the objects they represent are visual. They are 
sounds. You might ‘call’ them back – ‘recall’ them. But there is nowhere to ‘look’ for 
them”716 could be destabilized by Hurston’s definition of African-American oral 
language as “hieroglyphics”, which undermines the opposition between written and oral 
expression, but also underlines the connections between the two: 
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Now the people with highly developed languages have words for 
detached ideas… The primitive man exchanges descriptive words. His 
terms are close fitting. Frequently the Negro, even with detached words 
in his vocabulary – not evolved in him but transplanted on his tongue by 
contact – must add action to it to make it do. So we have “chop-axe,” 
“sitting-chair,” “cook-pot” and the like because the speaker has in his 
mind the picture of the object in use. Action. Everything illustrated. So 
we can say that the white man thinks in a written language and the Negro 
thinks in hieroglyphics.
717
 
 
In spite of its hierarchical presentation of differences between more ‘developed’ and 
‘primitive’ languages, this passage could constitute an appropriate answer to Ong’s 
statement on the lack of visualistic elements in orality; it may also be true that the aural 
is indeed prevalent, but in the particular case of African-American oral tradition as 
analysed by Hurston, words acquire visual presence in orality through action. In fact, 
the category of action is what brings motion into visual perspective and ultimately links 
it to sound and rhythm. From this, it is possible to understand that Time as represented 
in Mules and Men can mimic the actual time of the ethnographic enterprise of 
fieldwork, but more than that it inserts in ethnographical writing theatrical Time, in the 
sense of drama. As Hurston writes: 
 
[t]he Negro’s universal mimicry is not so much a thing in itself as an 
evidence of something that permeates his entire self. And that thing is 
drama. His very words are action words. His interpretation of the English 
language is in terms of pictures. One act described in terms of another. 
Hence the rich metaphor and simile.
718
 
 
Just as the introduction of sound does not automatically guarantee the insertion of Time, 
so it is possible to free the visual perspective from immobility through action drawing it 
close to the modalities of representation of cinema and theatre and distancing it from 
metaphors of still perspectives linked to painting and photography. This conception of 
vision applied to the formula of ‘participant observation’ shifts the focus from 
observation to participation and from a theory of knowledge as a result of interaction 
(and, in this perspective, collectable and recordable) to a practice where knowledge is 
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the result of a dialectical process of exchange in a context where “[t]o do, to dramatize, 
to reproduce… seem to be some of the elementary structures of embodiment.”719 
 
3.8 Ethnography and theatre: performance between primitivism and diaspora 
 
As observed by Judith Butler in relation to gender, identity “requires a conception of a 
constituted social temporality.”720 In this process, according to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
the body becomes both an historical idea and a set of possibilities whose “materiality… 
bears meaning… and the manner of this bearing is fundamentally dramatic. By dramatic 
I mean only that the body is not merely matter but a continual and incessant 
materializing of possibilities.”721 In this historical and processual conception of the 
dramatic body and its potentialities, it is possible to see another means of representing 
Time in Hurston’s ethnographic writing. Time, though, is represented in the text as 
sound and act as well, whereas ‘act’ is defined as  
 
a given temporal duration within the entire performance,… shared 
experience and “collective action”… The act that one does, the act that 
one performs, is, in a sense, an act that has been going on before one 
arrived on the scene… As anthropologist Victor Turner suggests in his 
studies of ritual social drama, social action requires a performance which 
is repeated. This repetition is at once a reenactment and reexperiencing 
of a set of meanings already socially established; it is the mundane and 
ritualized form of their legitimation… the performance renders social 
laws explicit.
722
  
 
In the present analysis of Hurston’s ethnography, the text is considered as 
entwined between two different, complementary kinds of performances: on the one 
hand, the ethnographical performance
723
 whose performativity Hurston represents both 
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in the fictionalized account of the interactions taking place in fieldwork and in her 
frame to the folktale collection and, on the other, the community performances which, 
through storytelling, produce identity awareness in the group. In the staging of the 
dialogues and storytelling sections of fieldwork, the boundaries between writing and 
orality, description and interpretation, become blurred. The process of sedimentation of 
the storytelling tradition, represented in the tensions between speakers and in their 
interactions, apart from casting light on intragroup relations and difficulties, introduces 
“timing and shared time in communicative events.”724 From this, what emerges is the 
idea that “much of cultural knowledge is performative rather than informative and… 
this has consequences for the way we think of ethnography.”725 As observed by Carme 
Manuel in relation to Hurston and Langston Hughes’s theatrical play Mule Bone (1930), 
their main achievement was 
 
[…] to read the culture of nonliterate rural blacks as a text, yet become 
ethnographers using performance as both a mode of investigation and 
representation so as to change the “gaze of the distanced and detached 
observer to the intimate involvement and engagement of ‘co-activity’ or 
co-performance with historically situated, named ‘unique 
individuals.’”726  
 
Here the relation between anthropology and literature, linguistic commitment and 
theatrical device, cultural and fictional performances, unravel in the fabric of the 
ethnography as, just like the play, it can be considered “a drama based on a conception 
of performative language.”727 In this regard, quoting Michael North, Manuel reminds us 
that, in analyzing Hurston “[c]ritics have noted that, regarding the relation of literature 
and anthropology in her work, ‘it is difficult to say whether she fictionalized her 
ethnographic reports or whether the fiction had always been in part the product of 
ethnographic collecting.’”728 It must be added that, apart from questioning the 
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fictionalization of Hurston’s ethnographic reports or the use of fiction within them, it is 
useful to investigate the role of ethnographic material in her fictional works and 
theatrical productions. In fact, taking into account some of her plays such as The Great 
Day (1932) or From Sun to Sun: A Program of Original Negro Folklore (1933)
729
, the 
structural resemblance between the plays and the ethnographic work Mules and Men is 
striking. Of the seven sections which constitute From Sun to Sun, for instance, four are 
present in the ethnography as well: “In the Quarters – Waking the Camp”, “Back in the 
Quarters – Dusk Dark”, “Itinerant Preacher at the Quarters”, “In the Jook – Black Dark” 
are submitted to dramatic unity condensing several years of research into a performance 
deploying itself in the theatrical time of one day. What is also interesting in these 
productions at the beginning of the 1930s is their role of ‘bridge’ between two stages of 
ethnographic research: the research Hurston had conducted in Florida, Louisiana, 
Alabama, and the Bahamas between 1927 and 1932 and her subsequent research in 
Haiti and Jamaica in 1937. Anthea Kraut observes that 
 
Hurston’s stage production… not only resituated African American 
culture in relation to the material conditions of labor in a rural Floridian 
community; it also recast dance practices in a broader, transnational 
framework. After immersing the audience in the ways of Southern black 
Americans, Hurston’s narrative erupted into a display of a distinctly 
Caribbean dance form, thereby shifting the geographical terrain of the 
revue.
730
 
 
As underlined by Fabian, the dialogue between anthropology and theatre is particularly 
productive as “social and cultural relations are better understood when tensions, even 
contradictions, between actions and acting, life and theater, are acknowledged”731 whilst 
“[t]he significance of theater in multicultural situations would seem to depend on the 
theatricality of culture.”732 Kraut justly remarks that the significance of theatre in 
Hurston’s particular situation seems to rely on the introduction of diaspora as an 
alternative to primitivism and a method of investigation of African-American and black 
Caribbean cultural forms. Kraut adds: 
 
[i]n crowning her vision of black folk culture with a number whose 
African origins she frequently underscored, Hurston effectively advanced 
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an embodied theory of Afrocentricity long before the term entered 
popular or academic discourse. Just as crucially, she demonstrated how 
discrete diasporic expressive practices were transported to American 
shores on the bodies of West Indian migrant workers.
733
 
 
In such a context, the anthropologist becomes ethnodramaturg, according to Victor 
Turner’s definition in the sense of a “provider of occasions, a catalyst in the weakest 
sense and a producer (in analogy to a theatrical producer) in the strongest.”734 From this 
perspective, the introduction of Time in the ethnographical narrative with its connection 
to embodiment depends on the characteristics of performance which does not “simply 
enact a preexisting text. Performance is the text in the moment of its actualization (in a 
story told, in a conversation carried on, but also in a book read).” As underlined by 
Kraut, what performance actualizes in Hurston’s plays is the passage from a notion of 
primitiveness to a representation of diaspora which connects her production to the work 
by another African-American anthropologist and performer, Katherine Dunham. 
Although audiences were not always ready to understand the nuances present in their 
works and could finally reduce their performances to within the boundaries of 
primitivism
735
,  
 
the turn to the Caribbean in both women’s anthropological and 
performance work… [was] a key factor in diaspora’s gradual 
replacement of primitivism as the dominant interpretive lens for 
apprehending black dancing bodies. Independently of each another, 
Hurston and Dunham found the West Indies to be a valuable site for 
discerning and documenting African influences in the New World.
736
 
 
To think of language as performative in Hurston’s representation of African-
American English within her ethnography means to consider language and the process 
of storytelling, like the body, as “a continual and incessant materializing of 
possibilities… conditioned and circumscribed by historical convention.”737 The staging 
of social conflicts during the sessions of storytelling in her ethnography and their 
subsequent rendition in theatrical form, thus, would be a textual representation of this 
process as communal awareness building itself through time thanks to the intervention 
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of historical, embodied subjects who created identities and meanings while arranging in 
concert sight as a source of power and voice as a way of destabilizing or giving an 
alternative account to the scopic modalities of knowledge. Hurston’s way of 
approaching African-American folklore reminds us once again of Gates’ definition of 
Signifyin(g) as repetition and revision with a critical difference.
738
 
On the other hand, to think of ethnography as performative means to use 
anthropological practice as an institutionalized and dramatized mirror of processes of 
meaning formation in fieldwork settings. Hurston’s ethnography becomes, in this sense, 
a performative as opposed to ‘informative’ mode of knowledge production, the latter 
being “based on data first gathered and then controlled by the collector” in which 
“performances need to be dismissed because they are threatening to any enterprise, 
project, or institution that depends for its existence on maintaining distance and 
control.”739 As noticed by Crease, performance is a shared event occurring in both arts 
and sciences; in this sense, “[a] performance… is more than the application of a 
praxis… it is a poiesis, a bringing forth of a phenomenon, something with presence in 
the world, something which can be returned to and which can appear in different ways 
in different circumstances.”740 According to Crease’s analysis, what dramatic 
performance and, in this specific case, anthropological performance share is being both 
“forms of inquiry”741 dependent on a hermeneutic circle in which “[e]ach moment… is 
already a movement of interpretation.”742  Significantly, in the passage from 
ethnographic practice to theatrical performance, what emerges is the function of the 
Caribbean as a site where it is possible to cultivate “‘diaspora literacy’ in American 
audiences, to borrow Vèvè Clark’s words for ‘the ability to read and comprehend the 
discourse of Africa, Afro-America, and the Caribbean from an informed indigenous 
perspective.’”743 The ‘turn to the Caribbean’ as an “intermediary terrain between Africa 
and America”744 will be the focus of the following analysis of Hurston’s and Dunham’s 
Haitian ethnographies. The role of the anthropologists within their ethnographic works 
and the significance of their writings for both American cultural anthropology and 
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African-American diaspora
745
 will be explored in the fourth and final chapter of this 
thesis. 
                                                 
745
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Chapter 4: “When the anthropologist arrives, the gods go away”746: 
Zora Neale Hurston and Katherine Dunham in Haiti 
 
“Papa Legba, ouvrier barrière por moi passer” 747 
 
“Work on a frontier, if you can find one.”748 
 
It seems appropriate to start this chapter on the anthropological fieldwork conducted in 
Haiti by Zora Neale Hurston and Katherine Dunham with an invocation they both report 
having heard at the beginning of Vodoun ceremonies. Papa Legba, god of gates and 
crossroads, is the first god to be summoned in any Vodoun rite because Legba is the one 
who can make things possible. Henry Louis Gates describes him as a topos or “divine 
trickster” derived from the Yoruba myths and recurring in the narrative traditions of 
black orality: 
 
[t]his curious figure is called Esu-Elegbara in Nigeria and Legba among 
the Fon in Benin. His New World figurations include Exú in Brazil, 
Echu-Elegua in Cuba, Papa Legba (pronounced La-Bas) in the pantheon 
of the loa of Vaudou of Haiti, and Papa La Bas in the loa of Hoodoo in 
the United States… Each version of Esu is the sole messenger of the 
gods… he who interprets the will of the gods to man; he who carries the 
desires of man to the gods. Esu is the guardian of the crossroads, … 
master of that elusive, mystical barrier that separates the divine world 
from the profane, text with interpretation… The Fon call Legba “the 
divine linguist”, he who speaks all languages… Esu is the text’s 
interpreter… “the one who translates, who explains, or ‘who loosens 
knowledge.’”749 
 
In anthropology as envisioned in the present research, his presence is 
particularly fascinating as it casts light on the existence of a threshold to be crossed in 
order to acquire knowledge and understanding, “a liminal crossroads of culture contact 
and ensuing difference at which Africa meets Afro-America.”750 Thus, the present 
research sees the Caribbean as a possible threshold or frontier for both American 
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anthropology and the African-American creative arts. The summoning of Papa Legba is 
a metaphor for the multiple boundaries and frontiers involved in this project: the 
interdisciplinary distinctions between science and art, the intradisciplinary organization 
of anthropology, the fragile boundary between participation and observation implied in 
its epistemology, the frontiers and boundaries embodied in the very presence and 
subjectivity of the anthropologist involved in the tasks of fieldwork and interpretation; 
in fact, the border can also represent “a metaphor for psychological, sexual, spiritual, 
cultural, class and racialised boundaries”751 as noticed by Avtar Brah in relation to 
Gloria Anzaldúa’s theory of borderlands. Brah also adds that the concept of ‘border’ is 
strictly connected to the notion of diaspora
752
 and these concepts together refer to the 
theme of ‘location.’753  
Within this framework, the movement of anthropology from the United States to 
the Caribbean, together with the converse migratory movement of Caribbean people to 
the United States, can highlight the complex interaction between, on the one hand, the 
search for African roots in the Caribbean, and on the other, the transformation of the 
meaning of blackness in the North American context via migratory routes departing 
from the South of the United States and the Caribbean as well. Cultural anthropology as 
practised by Hurston and Dunham is here considered as one of the “contemporary 
trans/national movements of people, information, cultures, commodities and capital.”754 
The difference between the use of the trope of the border in the present research and the 
use of the metaphor of the frontier in American Studies – and in Ugo Fabietti’s 
definition of anthropology as “a frontier knowledge born on a frontier”755 – is 
characterised by the effort not to romanticize the border as such, but to utilize this 
metaphor as “a means to reflect upon social conditions of life” as in Anzaldúa’s 
theorisation of the border. In this regard, Brah reminds us that  
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“[b]orders are arbitrary constructions. Hence, in a sense they are always 
metaphors. But, far from being mere abstractions of a concrete reality, 
metaphors are part of the discursive materiality of power relations. 
Metaphors can serve as powerful inscriptions of the effects of political 
borders.
756
  
 
The interest in the Caribbean area for American anthropology seems to coincide 
with both the closing of the American frontier and the actual expurgation of the 
“vanishing Americans” and the rise of interest in possible connections between African 
Americans and other black people in the American territories. Zora Neale Hurston, 
Katherine Dunham, Pearl Primus, Ellen Irene Diggs, and Vera Mae Green are all 
African-American women who were trained in either anthropology or sociology and 
had the opportunity to conduct research in the islands of the Caribbean mainly in the 
first half of the twentieth century. The connection between African-American women 
researchers involved in social sciences and the relevance of the Caribbean as a source of 
African continuities in the New World for American anthropology suggest that this 
geopolitical and cultural area can be considered as a frontier for both anthropological 
research and African-American culture. 
 Therefore, the ethnographies by Zora Neale Hurston and Katherine Dunham 
and their creative renditions of their fieldwork materials both in fiction and performance 
can be used as case studies in order to analyse the role of anthropology as a “frontier 
knowledge born on a frontier” and its significance for women and so-called ‘native’ 
anthropologists. In this research, the approach to their contributions in the Caribbean is 
reminiscent of Talal Asad’s analysis of the relationship between colonialism and 
European social anthropology. In particular, his reflections will be transposed to the 
context of the United States in order to consider in which ways anthropological research 
at the beginning of the twentieth century could be involved in power relations within 
and outside the US territory. While Asad’s analysis was articulated on the encounter 
between European social anthropology and the so-called Third World, in reference to 
American anthropology and, in particular, to its Boasian matrix, it is pivotal to 
understand the role of anthropology in the study and analysis of so called minorities 
within the US territory. 
The hypothesis here is that, for these African-American women anthropologists, 
the Caribbean could represent a ‘laboratory’, borrowing this term from Melville J. 
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Herskovits
757
, where it was possible to examine the potential links between Africa and 
Afro-America and delineate African legacies in order to acquire a conscious 
understanding of black diasporic identities and their several representations. The present 
analysis is also mindful of W. E. B. Du Bois’ concept of double consciousness which is 
at work in particular ways when considering the anthropologists’ double status of 
belonging to the United States at a national level while trying to envision a wider 
community linked to the transposition of Africa onto American ground and their 
involvement in both anthropology and the arts. Finally, in the Caribbean area, the role 
of Haiti emerges as both a first example of emancipation and a place rich in myths and 
traditions of African legacy. From this perspective, the Caribbean is here considered as 
both a historical-political context and a trope in the discourses of Hurston, Dunham, and 
US anthropology at large.
758
  
 
4.1 Haiti: an African continent, an American Dream in black skins 
 
HAITI: Good Neighbors (but Queer) 
Calypso-like musings of Edith Efron, U.S.- born wife of a Port au Prince 
businessman, as reported in the Haiti Sun: 
 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
Americans are infinitely queer 
Say the Haitians, with a jeer. 
They think in terms 
Of mechanical devices, 
They dislike spices. 
Their wives 
Run their lives; 
And they consider that being flirty 
Is, somehow, dirty. 
Vice 
Does not entice 
The Cranky 
Yankee, 
Who considers license a good thing 
Only so far 
As it applies to a car. 
 
Haitians are infinitely queer 
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Say the Americans, with a jeer. 
They eat their salad before their meat 
And refuse the salty in favor of the sweet. 
Most irritating is the patience 
Of the Haitians, 
Who are always late 
For a date. 
And who don’t know 
That being philosophically slow 
May be sublime, 
But is a horrid loss of time. 
Haitian habits of driving and joywalking 
Make Americans leery, 
Because Haitians are always trying to disprove 
The “two-bodies-cannot-occupy-the-same-space-at-the-same-time” 
theory. 
And of course the Haitian institution of 
Which Americans beware 
Is the garçonnière. 
 
Personally, I jeer 
At both Haitians and Americans, who 
Are infinitely queer…759 
 
 
 
The anthropologist Sidney W. Mintz observes that “[f]ew countries in modern times 
have received so bad a press from foreign observers as Haiti”760, and adds: 
 
A small, rugged nation, born of an exhausting and destructive revolution, 
its poor people, disease-ridden, illiterate, and erratically led, independent 
Haiti gives the impression of having drifted aimlessly (and painfully) for 
more than a century. Observers from “more developed” lands have had a 
field day – and still have – bemoaning the evil consequences of a mass of 
African slaves having turned upon their masters to destroy them and their 
works.
761
 
 
In this context, Haiti finds its location among several possible representations: a 
dangerous example for other black people in the New World, the first black Republic in 
the world, the second free Republic in the Americas, a Caribbean land suspended 
between United States imperialism, European colonialism, and internal rivalries; “the 
magic island” of William Seabrook’s well-known 1929 travelogue or not an island at all 
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according to Maya Deren’s definition of Haiti as “a nation of continentals”762 
characterised, as observed by J. Michael Dash, by “the ruggedness of its mountainous 
landscape.”763 In her 1950 article for Flair magazine, Deren was writing for the average 
US tourist to whom she reminded that there is a basic paradox in contemporary Haiti 
“[w]hich is this: you have come to an island, and as you accept the hospitality of 
Haitians, visit them, awaken to the meaning of their ancient culture and craft, you 
presently find yourself among a people who are no islanders…”764 The continent 
embedded within the island – if it is still possible, at this point, to refer to Haiti as one – 
is Africa.
765
 Deren’s observations on Haiti are also useful in order to contain the 
kaleidoscope effect which, though fascinating, risks to refracting and diffracting this 
land, and its people with it, until the point of making them disappear into a blurred 
image of exotic Otherness. In the midst of contrasts, with the subsequent difficulty in 
‘telling the truth’, Deren finds an attempt at unity based on the historical consciousness 
sprung from the revolt of the slaves against their French colonizers: 
 
[i]t is difficult to tell the truth about Haiti. There are so many truths, and 
they do not seem to be part of the same truth, and one is embarrassed, 
suddenly, to remark that the cliché “land of many contrasts” is smugly 
entrenched in one’s mind… And yet there is, over and above all these 
contrasts, that certain homogeneity which is national character, that special 
integrity which distinguishes a people as an individual, independent nation 
in spirit as well as in fact. The contrasts are between the ways of life; the 
unity is that they all developed out of a single, basic reason – the spectacular 
revolt of the Negro slaves against the French which made Haiti the second 
independent republic of the Western Hemisphere (the United States was of 
course the first).
766
 
 
It is possible, then, that exactly because of the historical consciousness at the basis of 
the nation and its unity, Haiti does not contain simply one continent, but two at the same 
time. In fact, Hispaniola – the Caribbean island housing the nations of Haiti and Santo 
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Domingo – bears the first historical mark of the European venture in the Americas. The 
1492 discovery of America started from this geographical location, but in the particular 
case of Haiti, the American element also highlights the presence of a mythical 
dimension not connected for once to its African legacies and Voudoun rituals, but to its 
standing as either an (alternative) ‘American Dream’ for black people in the Americas 
or an ‘American Nightmare’ for the slaveholders who still profited from slave labour in 
1804
767
, the year in which Jean-Jacques Dessalines declared Haiti independent. As 
observed by Mintz in an article he wrote after the magnitude 7.0 MW earthquake which 
stroke Haiti in 2010,  
 
[b]y using the sword against their oppressors, the Haitian people turned 
themselves into Thomas Jefferson’s universal human beings. Yet they 
were feared and reviled for having done so. International political, 
economic, and religious ostracism, imposed by their slaveholding 
neighbors, followed and lasted for close to a century. Not until 1862 did 
the United States recognize Haiti. What country that profited from 
slavery could dare to be a good neighbor? The Vatican did not sign a 
concordat with the new nation until 1860.
768
 
 
Mintz’s words today echo the preface of C. L. R. James’s 1938 The Black Jacobins, his 
historical account of the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804): 
 
In August 1791, after two years of the French Revolution and its 
repercussions in San Domingo, the slaves revolted. The struggle lasted 
for 12 years. The slaves defeated in turn the local whites and the soldiers 
of the French monarchy, a Spanish invasion, a British expedition of some 
60,000 men, and a French expedition of similar size under Bonaparte’s 
brother-in-law. The defeat of Bonaparte’s expedition in 1803 resulted in 
the establishment of the Negro state of Haiti which has lasted to this day. 
The revolt is the only successful slave revolt in history, and the odds it 
had to overcome is evidence of the magnitude of the interests that were 
involved. The transformation of slaves, trembling in hundreds before a 
single white man, into a people able to organise themselves and defeat 
the most powerful European nations of their day, is one of the great epics 
of revolutionary struggle and achievement.
769
 
                                                 
767
 See J. Michael Dash, Haiti and the United States: National Stereotypes and the Literary Imagination 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: The Macmillan Press, 1988), 11: “If the Haitian 
revolution was white America’s nightmare, it fulfilled the most passionate dream of black Americans. 
The black American, himself stereotyped as the ‘Other’ in the United States, was unlikely to identify with 
the reductionist myths of Haiti’s strangeness. He was more likely to see a war, successfully waged by 
black slaves against a European power, in admiring and idealistic terms.” 
768
 Sidney W. Mintz, “Whitewashing Haiti’s History”, Boston Review, 22 January 2010. Available at: 
http://www.bostonreview.net/world/whitewashing-haiti%E2%80%99s-history. Last accessed 3
 
July 2013. 
769
 C. L. R. James, “Preface to the First Edition” in C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint 
L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York: Vintage House, 1989: 1938), ix. 
  
 
 
169 
 
According to Mintz, these historical facts are still at the basis of recent rhetoric 
misrepresenting Haiti in the medias: “[t]he inescapable truth is that ‘the world’ never 
forgave Haiti for its revolution because the slaves freed themselves.”770 
 
4.2 African-American culture and the Caribbean 
 
Herskovits dedicated a main section of The Myth of the Negro Past (1941) to the aspect 
of revolt in the experience of black people in the Americas in order to debunk the notion 
of a supposed passive adherence of the slaves to the slavery system; in fact, although 
most historians in the United States “took it for granted that the slaves were merely 
passive elements in the historical scene”771, he quoted several studies, among which the 
1934 Economic History of United States by Fred A. Shannon, in which detailed 
accounts of slave rebellions such as “the New York uprisings of 1712, the South 
Carolina rebellions of 1720 and 1739, and of three nineteenth century revolts”772 had 
been provided. Another study cited by Herskovits, “an even more recent textbook of 
American history”773, took into account “the numerous insurrections that bear witness to 
maladjustments among the slaves”774: “[s]ix uprisings in continental United States… 
[were] listed… for the period between 1663 and 1700, fifty during the eighteenth 
century, and fifty-three between 1800 and 1864.”775  
The stereotype of the acquiescent African was often opposed to the myth of the 
untamed Indian and Herskovits referred precisely to Haitian history to debunk this 
notion, noticing that “[i]n Haiti… the Negroes were imported because the work in the 
mines had almost exterminated the Indians, as it likewise did the Negroes who were 
imported for this purpose”776 while, at the same time, he observed that “[i]n the United 
States… it would seem that Indians had a lower resistance to bacterial diseases borne by 
Europeans than did Negroes.”777 These myths, although apparently opposed, had 
complementary functions: on the one hand, the narrative of the unyielding Indian 
justified the actual extermination of Native Americans; on the other, the focus on the 
passivity of the slaves brought from Africa served a reassuring function which ill-
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concealed the fear for insurrections. In this regard, Sybille Fischer notices that 
“[f]antasy, paranoia, identificatory desires, and disavowal”778 had always been an 
essential part of the economies of slave trade and plantations. Herskovits, apart from 
giving examples of alternative ways of resisting slavery such as running away, slowing 
down work, suicides, infanticides, and poisoning
779
, had also recorded the ways in 
which the South of the United States reacted to the possibility of a slave rebellion in the 
1830s and 1840s. Quoting again from 1930s studies of the historical period in question, 
he cast light on “[t]he constant fear of slave rebellion [which] made life in the South a 
nightmare” and delineated the contours of this fear by using Carl R. Fish’s words in The 
Rise of the Common Man, 1830-1850 (1935): 
 
Nor was the fear of property loss the only or the greatest of Southern 
apprehensions. One of the strongest points in Southern culture was in 
acquaintance with the elements of classical literature. To them the history 
of the servile wars in Rome was a familiar topic. Nor was it ancient 
history alone which alarmed them. Fresh in their memory were the 
horrors of the Negro revolution in Haiti. Toussaint L’Ouverture, who to 
Wendell Phillips was an apostle of liberty, was to them a demon of 
cruelty. How far the Negroes who surrounded them, who cooked their 
food and nursed their children, had been affected by civilization, and 
how far they retained the primitive savagery they were presumed to have 
brought from Africa, they did not learn until the Civil War.
780
 
 
The menace to civilization was a priority to place even before the fear of actual 
property loss; furthermore, the above passage suggests that the question of African-
American ‘cultural retentions’, as anthropology would later call them, had already been 
sketched: was there a ‘heart of darkness’ which kept beating, unheard yet unstoppable, 
under the surface of Western civilization? As seen in Chapter One, folkloric traditions 
in the United States came to occupy a contentious position in the anthropological debate 
on the origins of African-American difference: was there a cultural heritage to preserve, 
as sustained by Herskovits after 1925 or, as suggested by the African-American 
sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, black people in the United States had been irreparably 
deprived of their cultures and were, therefore, to be considered as disadvantaged 
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Americans?
781
 Yelvington reminds us that this debate, which has later influenced the 
approaches of anthropologists to the African diaspora in the Americas, was less 
polarised than it can seem at a first glance. In fact, 
 
Frazier adhered to a Herskovitsian view of acculturation… Citing 
Herskovits, he was willing to admit that African survivals existed in the 
Caribbean and Latin America, especially in religion… and he attributed 
the uniqueness of the United States in this regard… to the contrasting 
effects of the differing slave regimes. On the other hand, Herskovits 
never diminished the power of the enslavement process in “stripping 
from the aboriginal African culture” their “larger institutions, leaving the 
more intimate elements in their organization of living.”782 
 
Yelvington is certainly right in highlighting the undeniable similarities between the two 
positions; nonetheless, the contours of this debate provide the proper framework for the 
inclusion of the Caribbean, South America, and West Africa into the horizon of U.S. 
cultural anthropology. In fact, the doubts cast by the experiences of slavery, 
segregation, and institutional racism on the actual worth of African-American folklore 
and its supposed ‘authenticity’ represented a real push towards a comparative study of 
African cultures in the Americas in relation to their West African origins. In this regard, 
Greenberg notices that: 
 
[i]n Herskovits’ view the variations the New World cultures exhibited in 
relation to the different situations into which the Negro was brought as a 
slave constituted a vast comparative laboratory from which might emerge 
results of general value to the understanding of the interrelationship 
between culture and physical form as well as the processes of cultural 
change. Moreover, such studies would shed light on the basic nature of 
Negro culture.
783
 
 
The image which was looming large over the interpretation of African legacies in the 
Americas was, once again, the myth of the vanishing American: in fact, although 
Boasian anthropology underlined the importance of environment and cultural change, 
the notion of ‘authentic’ Native American cultures was directly connected with 
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references to a period prior to the contact with the European colonizers. This 
anthropological approach to Native American cultures implied a strategy of temporal 
denial
784
 consigning Native Americans to a past “which failed to interrogate the 
tumultuous history of contact.”785 Lee D. Baker adds that 
 
[o]ften times anthropologists perpetuated the idea that American Indians 
were trapped in time because they were trapped on reservations. The 
sardonic upside, however, was that Indians transmitted a pure, authentic, 
and healthy culture to their children; the tragic downside for Negroes was 
that they inherited a dangerous, counterfeit, and pathological culture 
from their parents.
786
 
 
Baker also notices that the difference between Native American and African-American 
cultures was recorded by Hurston in a letter to Boas written in 1927. Although her 
comments must be read in the context of a first unsuccessful expedition to collect 
African-American folklore in Florida, she claimed that: “the negro is not living his lore 
to the extent of the Indian. He is not on a reservation, being kept pure. His negroness is 
being rubbed off by close contact with white culture.”787 What Hurston was here 
deliberately ignoring was the fact that, although it was possible to trace a moment prior 
to contact with Europeans for Native Americans, the same could not be done for the 
cultures of Africans in the Americas: the fact of being banished from modernity through 
temporal or spatial coordinates (pre-colonial history/reservations) meant that 
‘conservative’ Native Americans could aspire to an ideal of cultural ‘purity’ which was 
denied to “so-called progressive Indians, east European immigrants, Negroes, and 
people within the orbit of the modern urban environs”788 who were “in the process of 
freeing themselves from the shackles of tradition through acculturation.”789 Hurston 
later recognised that the acculturative process did not mean a cultural loss, on the 
contrary, it could be a signal of cultural vitality as she wrote to Boas on her return to 
Miami after a short trip to the Bahamas in 1929: “Now I find that there is a new birth of 
creative singing among Negroes. The old songs are not sung so much. New ones are 
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flooding everywhere.”790 Hurston was starting to become aware of the influence of the 
Caribbean on African-American folklore.
791
 As recorded by Hemenway, 
 
Hurston… found much material around Miami during September [1929]. 
She also began to see links between Afro-American and Afro-Caribbean 
folklore. She had met so many West Indians in the Miami area that she 
was sure “their folklore definitely influences ours in South Florida.” In 
October she travelled to Nassau in the Bahamas to collect material that 
would both reinforce and contrast with her previous collections.
792
 
 
It was exactly the West Indian element which further complicated the position of 
African-American culture in the United States as, on the one hand, its presence was read 
as an element of innovation able to modify the meaning of blackness within the US 
borders; on the other, it represented an ideal of cultural authenticity and ‘Africanness’ 
against which African-American folklore risked falling short. Hurston wrote Boas that 
he “might be interested in the Bahamas. The Negroes there are more African, actually 
know the tribes from which their ancestors came. Some still speak the dialects. I know 
that you were interested in finding out as near as possible the tribes and localities of the 
slaves.”793 It is important to remember that, as Walter Jackson has pointed out, Boas 
“believed that African culture had been lost by blacks in America”794 although he 
“stressed the importance of educating black Americans about African culture as a way 
of increasing race pride and countering the ‘strong feeling of dependency among the 
best classes of Negro.’”795 At the same time, Boas did not exclude the idea that “African 
‘mannerisms’ were retained by African Americans.”796 The influence of Boasian theory, 
together with close contacts with both the Harlem Renaissance and Caribbean 
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anthropologists such as Fernando Ortíz in Cuba and Jean Price-Mars in Haiti
797
, 
modified Herskovits’s initial position of full assimilation of African Americans into US 
society.
798
 Yelvington and Jackson have stressed the role of Hurston – here in the 
position of subject under observation - in Herskovits’s change of understanding of 
African elements’ significance in the Americas: 
 
Herskovits had written to Austrian ethnomusicologist Erich Moritz von 
Hornbostel about Hurston, his research assistant in his physical 
anthropological project on “race mixing” and the American Negro. 
Although she was “more White than Negro in her ancestry”, Herskovits 
said, her “manner of speech, her expressions, - in short, her motor 
behavior” were “what would be termed typically Negro” and he 
suggested that these movements, observed by Herskovits when Hurston 
was singing spirituals, had been “carried over as a behavior pattern 
handed down thru [sic] imitation and example from the original African 
slaves who were brought here.”799 
 
It was 1927 and Herskovits, together with Hurston, had been involved in a physical 
anthropology study “which concluded that American Negroes were, in fact, not even a 
race.”800 The epistolary debate between Herskovits and von Hornbostel was focused on 
the meaning of motor behaviour as either a product of race (von Hornbostel’s racial 
argument) or culture (the Herskovitsian hypothesis of ‘cultural patterns’).801 According 
to Herskovits, similarities in behaviour among African Americans “could not be racially 
determined but must be due to cultural influences.”802 The difficulty in disentangling the 
threads of these cultural influences led Herskovits, Hurston, and another of his 
assistants, the dancer Katherine Dunham, to consider the Caribbean as a necessary stop 
over between US black culture and other black cultures in the Americas and West 
Africa.  
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4.3 Being possessed by modernity: American anthropological imagination and the 
Caribbean 
 
In 1955, the French anthropologist and filmmaker Jean Rouch directed Les maîtres fous 
(The Mad Masters), a short ethnographic movie on a religious sect operating in the city 
of Accra, Ghana, from the late 1920s: young men who had recently moved to the city 
from the British colony of the Gold Coast, confronted with the new urban environment, 
started to celebrate and be possessed by a new set of divinities, called Houka, gods of 
the city and technology who also represented colonial authority and domination. At the 
beginning of the movie, Rouch explains that the violence during the Houka ceremony 
he had filmed, which expressed itself through a series of turbulent possessions and the 
sacrifice of a dog, was “the reflection of Western civilization.”803 The possessions he 
witnessed were, in fact, mimicked performances of European colonial administrators 
and occupiers: some of the Houka he observed were ‘Houka Sarikaki’, the driver of 
locomotives; ‘Captain Malia’, a British captain who travelled the Red Sea; ‘Madame 
Lokotoro’, the doctor’s wife; and ‘the governor’. 
Although comparisons between two very distant places such as Ghana and Haiti 
cannot be easily drawn, Rouch’s controversial ethnographic movie works here as a 
metaphor for 1930s American anthropology in the Caribbean and in Haiti as the 
particular focus of the ethnographies by Katherine Dunham and Zora Neale Hurston. As 
explained previously, the Caribbean constituted a sort of laboratory in which to look for 
Herskovitsian ideas of African retentions and survivals in order to envision potential 
continuities with African-American cultures in the United States. On the one hand, 
therefore, the Caribbean was studied as a source for ‘roots.’ On the other hand, as 
observed by Mintz, the Caribbean region had experienced modernity “even before 
Europe itself”804 because modernization in the region had had a definite impact on 
people, the organisation of their lives and work, and their cultures as “[it] took place in 
the constant presence of multicultural Others.”805 These cultures were characterised by 
‘creolization’ which, Mintz explains, did not entail “the fragmentation of culture and the 
destruction of the very concept, but the creation and construction of culture out of 
fragmented, violent, and disjunct pasts.”806 Mintz considers the plantation lifestyle, in 
its entanglement with colonial rule, as the main trigger for a modernization before the 
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time, “a modernity that predated the modern”807, which went unnoticed exactly because 
it was experienced in a century when it had not been realised elsewhere. In this sense,  
“the modernity of the sixteenth-century Caribbean was unique”808 and its uniqueness 
derived from being a place where “the anonymity, depersonalization, and 
individualization of modern life”809 were realised before the times. Thus, the perception 
of the Caribbean as ‘archaic’ resulted from the decline of the area in world economy810 
and, in the specific case of Haiti, from the one-hundred-year isolation the country 
experienced after its independence.
811
 Although Boasian anthropology had acquired a 
certain awareness of the stratified character of cultures in their historical contexts, the 
search for cultural ‘authenticity’ was still very strong as was the idea that “cultures vary 
in intactness and coherence”812 (seen as inherently positive qualities of a culture).813 
Caribbean cultures did not meet these standards and had distanced themselves from 
them for many centuries; Mintz ascribes to this the limited interest anthropology could 
have in the 1930s Antilles. In fact, “[a]s they must have been perceived at the time, 
Caribbean cultures represented a fourth category, alongside the genuinely ‘primitive’, 
the Western and the archaic civilizations: these were the people without culture.”814 As 
seen at the beginning of this chapter
815
, this same perspective questioned the existence 
of specific African-American cultures within the United States; the Caribbean with its 
gods and Voudoun rites, the drums and the dances of possession, thus became a 
‘reversed’ mirror for African-American anthropologists who were, in their turn, 
‘possessed’ by an idea of anthropology as modern science and of progress as defined by 
the growing interests of the United States’ international politics. How Dunham and 
Hurston decided to deal with these concerns is connected with the ways in which they 
represented and located themselves in their Haitian ethnographies. In fact, both 
anthropologists found their presence complicated by racial, cultural, national, and 
                                                 
807
 Ibid., 305. 
808
 Ibid., 303. 
809
 Mintz, Caribbean Transformations, 257. 
810
 See Mintz, “Enduring Substances, Trying Theories”, 296. 
811
 See Karen McCarthy Brown, Mama Lola: A Vodou Priestess in Brooklyn (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
California and Oxford, England: University of California Press, 1991), 5. In relation to Vodou, for 
instance, Brown observes that: “Vodou’s closer ties to its African origins are primarily a result of Haiti’s 
virtual isolation from the rest of the world for nearly a century following its successful slave revolution.” 
See also Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 94. Buck-Morss focuses here on the intensification of racism in the aftermath of 
Haitian Revolution “as a means of segregating Europe from the impact of global events.” 
812
 Mintz, “Enduring Substances, Trying Theories”, 304. 
813
 See ibid. 
814
 Ibid., 305. 
815
 See also Chapter One in this thesis, 56-57. 
  
 
 
177 
gender affiliations. Their difficult positions as African-American anthropologists and 
artists in 1930s Haiti will be the main focus of the sections following in this chapter 
which provide an analysis of some aspects in Dunham’s Island Possessed (1969) and 
Hurston’s Tell My Horse: Voodoo Life in Haiti and Jamaica (1938), the accounts of the 
fieldwork they both conducted in the Caribbean in the mid-1930s.
816
 
 
4.4 Dance and embodied knowledge in Katherine Dunham’s Island Possessed 
 
But could a civilized person have been expected to concern himself with 
the savage beliefs of people who worshipped a snake?
817
 
 
This section analyses the role of body, or embodied representation
818
, and 
performance in Island Possessed, Katherine Dunham’s 1969 account of the fieldwork 
she conducted in Haiti between 1935 and 1936 and of her subsequent visits to the island 
until the 1960s. Born in Joliet, Illinois, in 1909, Katherine Dunham was an African-
American anthropologist, dancer, choreographer, and activist who decided to use her 
anthropological findings in the Caribbean to create and put on stage a new, autonomous 
representation of African diasporic identities in the Americas through a series of shows 
or revues which toured worldwide between the late 1930s and the early 1960s. As 
noticed by Vèvè A. Clark, “[Dunham’s] major works, assembled in a variety of shows 
on and off Broadway, combined aspects of the American musical and techniques of 
European ballet with forms and rhythms of traditional cultures to produce dance drama 
of a characteristic and noteworthy kind.”819  While undertaking her training in dance 
with the renown dancer Ludmila Speranzeva in the late 1920s, Dunham studied 
philosophy and specialised in anthropology at the University of Chicago with Robert 
Redfield while coming in contact with prominent anthropologists of the time such as A. 
R. Radcliffe-Brown, Bronisław Malinowski, and Melville J. Herskovits who supported 
her application for the prestigious Rosenwald grant which allowed her to study Vaudun 
rituals and dance forms in the Caribbean for eighteen months. Her Master’s thesis was 
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published in 1983 under the title Dances of Haiti and held an introduction by Claude-
Lévi Strauss, the ‘father’ of French structural anthropology.  
After the period of specialised research in the Caribbean, Dunham decided to 
dedicate herself full time to theatre and dance following the advice given to her by 
Redfield. She accounts for her decision in a passage of Island Possessed juxtaposing 
Herskovits’ view of her as “the eternal chercheur, the eternal commentator on the flux 
of people in life”820 that she acknowledges as one personality trait of which she was not 
aware at the time with Redfield’s who saw “the step beyond the chercheur; another 
person.”821 She recounts how she was induced to choose dance as a profession when 
Redfield simply asked the question “What’s wrong with being a dancer?”822 which 
provoked the reaction described in the following paragraph: 
 
I suppose my mouth dropped open because I thought of what I 
considered the fortune the Rosenwald and Guggenheim Foundations had 
spent on me, of the first lady anthropologist to camp out with the Maroon 
people of Jamaica
823
, of my baptisms into the mysteries of the Haitian 
loa… It must not have taken long for my mouth to close, because soon I 
was in New York, not long after on Broadway, then Hollywood, then 
Europe and a large part of the rest of the world, with not only the cult of 
the Arada-Dahomey to serve, but the gods of Cuba, Brazil, and Africa to 
remind me that they had started it all.
824
 
 
Nonetheless, she continued to pursue her anthropological interests throughout her life 
and career and, as in Zora Neale Hurston’s case, it seems appropriate to say that her 
anthropological research shaped her artistic endeavours while maintaining a common 
focus on the representative aesthetics of African diasporic subjectivities. 
While her dance performances are at the centre of the works dedicated to her life 
by Vèvè A. Clark and Joyce Aschenbrenner
825
, this section is interested in the 
emergence of embodied representation and performance in her ethnographical writing. 
It is important to remember that, even if one of the main focus of the book is her 
fieldwork in the mid-1930s, Island Possessed had been written after years of touring 
with the Katherine Dunham Dance Company and the development of the Dunham 
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Technique, her own method of dance training; hence her text cannot be considered a 
basis for her performances, but rather a reflection on the relation between those 
performances and her fieldwork in post-occupation Haiti.
826
 Her role as an 
anthropologist and dancer in the Caribbean is here analysed according to Margaret 
Thompson Drewal’s definition of African performance as “a primary site for the 
production of knowledge, where philosophy is enacted, and where multiple and often 
simultaneous discourses are employed.”827 
Aschenbrenner has defined Island Possessed as an autobiography
828
, but it 
would be more appropriate to refer to it as an example of ‘autoethnography’ defined in 
social sciences as “an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and 
systematically analyze (graphy) personal experience (auto) in order to understand 
cultural experience (ethno).”829 In the field of literary studies, Pratt refers to 
‘autoethnography’ and ‘autoethnographic expression’ as  
 
instances in which colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in 
ways that engage with the colonizer’s own terms. If ethnographic texts are 
a means by which Europeans represent to themselves their (usually 
subjugated) others, autoethnographic texts are those the others construct in 
response to or in dialogue with those metropolitan representations.
830
 
 
Dunham, in fact, locates herself in relation to both anthropological theory and Haitian 
culture while creating a dialogue between the tradition of research in which she is 
practising and an autonomous representation of herself in the process of understanding 
that culture and becoming part of it. In her autoethnography, the diasporic element 
comes forth in a twofold way: at a first stage, in fact, her reason to visit Jamaica, 
Martinique, Trinidad, and Haiti specifically, is to study “[t]he dances of the West Indies, 
their primitive backgrounds, their choreographic and rhythmic patterns.”831 Once back 
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in the United States, though, what she creates and performs is a show made up of 
“primitive and Latin rhythms, Creole dances, and plantation dances”832 blended with 
jazz and modern dance as it is evident in some of her most famous shows, such as her 
1937 concert “Negro Dance Evening” or her Tropical Revue (1943). The contradictions 
she experienced between national affiliation and sense of racial belonging in the 
Caribbean find an echo in the reception of her dance performances once back in the 
United States. The shows she created were a synthesis of her American training and her 
Caribbean research, performative articulations of the anthropological concept of 
‘survivals’ albeit hybridized and ‘translated’, but the reviews commenting on her 
theatrical renditions insisted on her being an anthropologist who staged the savage and 
the exotic through dance. Clark observes that  
 
[m]any critiques of the Dunham shows fall into a dialectic that originates 
with Dunham’s own persona (serious or sexy)… The dialectic goes 
something like this: 1) A serious anthropologist is not expected to play 
erotic theatre roles in public; 2) folk dance and ballet technique do not 
mix; 3) folk culture should remain pure of any theatricalizing 
tendencies.”833 
 
What Dunham developed was a specific method in which elements of so-called 
primitive dances were actually the inspiration for innovation in modern dance, showing 
the transformative possibilities of folklore and its function in the present, but audiences 
and critics alike were not always ready to accept her reading of African-American and 
African diasporic cultures. 
The title of Island Possessed is reminiscent of this ambiguity as it is a clear 
reference to the myths surrounding the Vaudun rites object of anthropological interest 
and, at the same time, pejorative evaluation by both the élite governing the island and 
the supporters of an evolutionist view of cultures and civilization. Joan Dayan’s review 
of Island Possessed has highlighted the quite explicit reference to the 1929 travelogue 
The Magic Island by William B. Seabrook. Dunham herself acknowledges Seabrook as 
“the creator of the myth of the Magic Island”834, but Dayan’s thoughts on the dangers of 
Dunham’s recourse to “the strange and magical”835 do not suit her recuperation of 
Vaudun rituals very well. In fact, while Seabrook’s travelogue had a sensationalistic 
tone and widely used tropes and pictures which easily promoted the association of the 
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primitive with the savage and the aberrant, Dunham depicted herself as an initiate in 
Vaudun trying to understand its roots as a healing ritual in which the presence of lwa or 
spirits corresponded with a symbolic recuperation of Africa and the actual embodiment 
of ancestors through dance and possession performances. Furthermore, Dunham was 
working in the path traced by Herskovits’ Life in a Haitian Valley (1937), his 
ethnography of the small Haitian village of Mirebalais. In his study, Herskovits was 
trying to present Haitian Vaudun as ordinary practice with a precise historical and 
cultural function and in opposition to The Magic Island and other writings of the time 
which, as rightly noticed by Dayan, were “published for the delectation of readers in the 
United States who sought justification for the occupation of Haiti.”836 Herskovits’ 
depiction of Vaudun as everyday practice is counterbalanced by the acknowledgment of 
the degree of magic present in European religions in the attempt of making the ‘strange’ 
familiar while highlighting the ‘estranged’ core of Euro-American traditions.837 
As for the representation of the anthropologist’s body in Dunham’s ethnography 
of Haiti, it was functional in highlighting other contradictions inherent in the experience 
of conducting research in a country recently occupied by the nation of which the 
ethnographer was a citizen. In Island Possessed, the researcher comments on the 
peculiar position in which she found herself while conducting fieldwork on the island, 
suspended as she was between national and racial sense of belonging: 
 
Americans have remained a confusion in the Haitian mind ever since 
[occupation], and there seems little to do about it… Being a member of 
the race was a distinct advantage. Skin color, hair texture, facial 
measurements, yes, these are the external part of “race”; but, as Fay-
Cooper Cole so often pointed out, race is psychology… I am, however, 
sensitive to “kind”, to blackness in the sense of spirit, a charismatic 
intangible, and this is what the Haitians and Brazilians and Malaysians 
and Chinese and those Africans with whom I have had time really to 
discuss things must have felt, must feel... This “kind” that I speak of is of 
the human race…838 
 
Her arrival in the Caribbean, with letters of introduction by Herskovits, had already 
made her aware of her status as a black woman researcher and an American citizen in 
Haiti. In fact, she noticed: “[m]y passport would make me to some degree persona non 
grata. I counted on color to offset this, but then there was to offset that my sex and class 
                                                 
836
 Ibid. 
837
 See, for instance, Melville J. Herskovits, Life in a Haitian Valley (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener 
Publishers, 2012: 1937), 268. 
838
 Dunham, Island Possessed, 73-74. 
  
 
 
182 
– the student class, very hard to place.”839 Here the ethnographer’s body emerges at the 
intersection of several coordinates of subjectivity – race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, 
and class – all playing a role in her fieldwork and in the reading of her presence within 
the community under analysis. The alliances she was able to make during her stay 
further complicated her presence in Haiti; the reference is here to her friendship with 
Fred Alsop, a foreign resident in Haiti who was difficult to insert into the island’s 
social, racial, and class categories. Because of this relationship, Dunham suddenly finds 
herself “the object of discrimination inverse from what I had known in America, 
because of friendship with someone who was non-Haitian, ‘non’ any one of those forty 
razor-fine black-white mixtures of Moreau de Saint-Méry.”840  
Another relationship marking, in a different way, her fieldwork in Haiti is her 
romantic involvement with Dusarmais Estimé, an important political personality at the 
time and future President of Haiti from 1946 to 1950. As observed by Joyce 
Aschenbrenner, 
 
[a]lthough she was aware of the cultural exploitation inherent in much 
fieldwork, she has shown an ongoing commitment to Haiti and its 
people, sharing Estimé’s goals. Despite her social and economic 
advantages, she closely identified with the peasant class, thus defying 
conventions to pursue her commitment to the African cultural influences 
that were suppressed by the elite.
841
 
 
Apart from his political relevance, Estimé was, in Dunham’s words, “the first in 
defining the concept of negritude, the placing of the black race in its proper perspective 
and accord with the rest of the world, a prise de conscience.”842 Estimé’s closeness 
allows her to “[g]radually… [begin] to see things around me with his eyes, with his 
evaluations”843 although never forgetting what she defines as an “intense 
preoccupation”844 with the object of her anthropological research in the Caribbean, 
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namely “the vaudun and the complex surrounding it”845 in its connection with dance and 
performance. Actually, her exchange with Dusarmais Estimé adds a political dimension 
to her research and presence as an African-American student of anthropology because 
Estimé was concerned with social and political issues such as the ‘ti moune system (the 
employment of children as servants, the basis of the Haitian social structure of the time) 
and, as Dunham recalls, “education for the masses, and shoes for everyone, and 
sanitation in market places… and recognition of Haiti on an equal level in the rest of the 
world.”846 It is, in fact, in the process of learning from her difficulties in her relationship 
with Estimé and from the unavoidable misunderstandings resulting from the choices she 
accomplishes in her fieldwork that she tries “to turn this thirst for knowledge to a way 
of service.”847  
The political consciousness she acquired during her fieldwork in Haiti just after 
the ending of US occupation subsequently shaped both her activism through 
performance and her involvement in the education of American younger generations of 
dancers interested in the cultures and aesthetics of African diaspora. In fact, the 
fieldwork constituted for her an occasion to think about social issues in the Caribbean, 
envision a connection between this area and African Americans in the United States, 
explore the Herskovitsian idea of African continuities/retentions in the New World, but 
also and most importantly, through the recent experience of US occupation, “Haiti was 
good practice ground for what goes on now between black and white in the United 
States of America, excepting that the Southern Marines… were… [not] accustomed to 
differentiating between degrees of blackness”848 as it was common in the Haitian 
society of those days where, according to Dunham’s own memories, “the first social 
regulation… was to stay closely knit to your own color or degree of black-white blood-
mixture grouping – which was actually a caste, being exclusive, endogamous, inherent, 
nontransferable, immutable.”849 
Even more tellingly, the anthropologist herself has to find her own location 
within this social structure because, as observed by Sandra Harding, “[h]ow societies 
are structured has epistemological consequences… What people do – what kind of 
interactions they have in social relations and relations to the… World – both enables 
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and limits what they can know”850 and the anthropologist in fieldwork becomes part of 
these interactions shaping her research in its limits and potentials. In Dunham’s case, 
the ethnic, national, and class elements are keys to her reception in Haiti; in the 
description of how her presence there could be read by the local population, she passes 
from the first-person pronoun ‘I’ which is very common throughout her ethnography to 
a third-person pronoun
851
 which shows her distance from such a reading: 
 
I was in the Hotel Excelsior by personal introduction of Dr. Herskovits. It 
was just the right address for a young woman not yet placed 
sociologically or socially in the community she has invaded, but who 
was, more than likely, in the Moreau de Saint-Méry scheme of things, to 
be classed as mulatto and élite because of the letters of introduction she 
carried, her serious appearance, and her quantities of baggage. She was 
without question scholarly by credentials, excess of apparatus, and dress 
peculiarities – dress more casual even than for Americans, unless they 
happened to be tourists from the weekly boats, and these didn’t enter into 
the scheme of Haitian thinking or recognition, except as they affected the 
economy through sightseeing and at the Iron Market.
852
 
 
In order to acquire a standpoint in her research, she feels the need to interpret her own 
presence within such a social structure by observing the fact that she is ‘the first of her 
kind’, namely all the researchers who preceded her were white and male; Dunham is 
here underlining the fact that she was probably a novelty for the community in which 
she was planning to conduct research. She, in fact, observes: 
 
[o]f my kind I was a first – a lone young woman easy to place in the 
clean-cut American dichotomy of color, harder to place in the complexity 
of Caribbean color classifications; a mulatto when occasion called for, an 
in-between, or “griffon” actually, I suppose; most of the time an 
unplaceable, which I prefer to think of as “noir” – not exactly the color 
black, but the quality of belonging with or being at ease with black 
people when in the hills or plains or anywhere and scrambling through 
daily life along with them.
853
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Dorothea Fischer-Hornung comments on this episode noticing that 
 
[s]he claims she is a “first”, but specifically mentions that William 
Seabrook, Harold Courlander and Melville Herskovits had preceded her 
– but they were white and male, emphasizing race and gender as 
important analytical distinctions. More significantly in our context, she 
points to the complexity of intercultural understanding due to the 
significant differences between U.S. and Haitian society in general and 
racial classification in particular.
854
 
 
The self-definition of her presence in Haiti does not coincide with a fossilized 
identity, but constitutes a point of departure from which Dunham can have access to the 
Vaudun rituals and dances as an active participant, on the one hand, while complicating 
her position as ethnographer on the other. In a certain way, her involvement in Haitian 
Vaudun is a possibility for acknowledging those “tensions, even contradictions, 
between acting and action, life and theatre”855 through which, according to Fabian, 
“social and cultural relations are better understood.”856 What she experiences is, in fact, 
a “split in attitude”857, because – as the ethnographer herself realizes, she had always 
had difficulties “to reconcile [such an inner division] in any sort of research into private 
habits, whether of cult, religious practices, marriage customs, or otherwise. It is the 
feeling of being outsider within, or viceversa, as the occasion dictates.”858 These 
personal thoughts on her own Vaudun initiation show her mixed feelings about the 
possibility of being (or not being) possessed by a lwa. Her considerations on Vaudun 
rituals finally blend into an appraisal of the participant observation method in relation to 
her fieldwork experience: 
 
And when people ask me… what of those mystic or occult experiences I 
believe in, or why I spend so much time in their search and research, I 
find myself answering… that I honestly do not know. I am there to 
believe or not believe, but willing to understand and to believe in the 
sincerity of other people in their beliefs, willing to be shown, to 
participate, and where the participant begins and the scientist ends, I 
surely could not say.
859
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Such a “willingness to be shown” closely reminds us of what Fabian observes about 
“the theatricality and encounters between cultures”860, namely his thoughts about the 
fact that “[i]f allowed, people will let us get to know them by performing (parts of) their 
culture. Such knowledge – let us call it performative – demands participation (at least as 
an audience) and therefore some degree of mutual recognition.”861 
In this context, the body as “the intimate and internal condition of all 
knowledges”862 according to the definition provided by Elizabeth Grosz, emerges as a 
pivotal element in the production of ethnographic knowledge; in fact, if Dunham is 
unable to grasp the ultimate meaning and implications of Vaudun possessions at the 
intellectual level, her physical engagement in the rituals and ability in learning the 
dances are essential for another kind of understanding, a form of embodied 
knowledge.
863
 Such embodied knowledge is, according to Yvonne Daniel’s definition, 
“a knowledge found within the body, within the dancing and drumming body… [which] 
is rich and viable and should be referenced among other kinds of knowledge.”864 In fact, 
Daniel observes that the Haitian practitioners refer to a vast array of disciplines such as 
“history, philosophy, religion”865 and many others as articulated by the body “as it 
grows in spiritual practice over a lifetime.”866  
The role of the body for the acquisition of knowledge becomes particularly clear 
in the episode of the ceremony of Dunham’s marriage to Damballa, the serpent god. In 
this circumstance, the difficulty in adjusting anthropological theory and Haitian 
fieldwork lead to a climax in which the anthropologist is even more exposed than Ruth 
Behar’s ‘vulnerable observer;’867 she is actually a very vulnerable participant as 
performer. Dunham does not hide from the reader her vulnerability during the ceremony 
involving a male partner whom the god will also marry. His narrative presence contrasts 
with Dunham’s highlighting her inability to rise to the occasion by either intellectual or 
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cultural means.
868
 Her unsuccessful attempt at participation is related to succumbing to 
an old taboo, “a revulsion toward eating raw eggs”869 which she was supposed to ingest 
after crashing them with her lips or chin and having lapped at the flour in the sacrificial 
plate. This act would have guaranteed the presence of the god at the ceremony. She tries 
to master herself in this situation, but her reactions are marked by the awareness of the 
fact that she has no choice: 
 
I froze for a moment, then went into action, inching and undulating in 
rhythm toward my sacrificial plate. I reached into it and tilting my head 
away from the houngan [Vaudun priest] to cover my face, crushed the 
egg with my chin, praying to some Christian or at least non-vaudun god 
to come to my rescue, to work some miracle so that the dish would 
disappear or I would be able to overcome my repugnance, which was 
augmented by the fact that the egg was not quite fresh. The miracle did 
not happen… There was no way out… I stood up, my face smeared with 
flour and egg, Damballa’s offering untouched.870 
 
The role of dance in her anthropological practice emerges in the moment in which she 
shows utmost vulnerability: 
 
I stood where he [the houngan] had left me, feeling sick and helpless as 
tears streamed through the flour and egg. Someone handed me a kerchief, 
I wiped my face and started to dance. I danced more than I have ever in 
my life, before or after. I danced out all my anger at unknown things and 
at myself for trying to know them, frustration at the rotten egg and 
weariness with strange mores. I found myself alone with one, with 
another, or just by myself while others clapped and sang and it dawned 
on me that it was with affection and encouragement. I hadn’t dared look 
at Julien [the houngan], but at last I did. He was puzzled, speculative, but 
benign. He nodded to me, and seemed to be telling me that everything 
was well, that the gods were happy, that things were now in my hands, 
even the decision as to how long we should dance.
871
  
 
Ultimately, neither Christian nor Vaudun gods intervene, but it is her ability at dancing 
which finally saves her while favouring her insertion into the community. While 
Dunham was convinced that the repugnance towards raw eggs was one of her (personal) 
greatest taboos, this episode confronts the reader with the crumbling away of an 
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anthropological pillar. In fact, Behar observes that “[i]n anthropology, which 
historically exists to ‘give voice’ to others, there is no greater taboo than self-
revelation”872 as “[t]he tendency is to depersonalize one’s connection to the field, to 
treat ethnographic work (only a small part of which is done personally by the principal 
investigator) as that which is ‘other’ to the ‘self.’”873 Furthermore, through the depiction 
of the ceremony, Dunham is able to highlight the balance between control and apparent 
irrationality within the ritual; in fact, her own portrayal of herself in the act of 
channelling intellectual frustration through dance challenges the notion of “black 
dancing bodies as unthinking, uncivilized bodies;”874 the reworking of this idea through 
dance performance will constitute one of the main links between her anthropological 
research and her artistic endeavours. In this context, as Daniel notices, dance is not only 
an object of study, but also “a particularly rewarding mode of access to knowledge”875: 
this knowledge is not exclusively about the anthropologist’s ‘self’ or the 
anthropologist’s ‘others’, but it is a knowledge about the relationship which connects 
and separates them at the same time. The anthropological fieldwork, then, becomes a 
context in which relationships shape the form and content of knowledge, its creation, 
and regulate the modalities of admission to it. Throughout the episode, Dunham is 
confronted with what Bhabha defines as cultural ‘incommensurability’: 
 
[t]he difference of cultures cannot be something that can be 
accommodated within a universalist framework. Different cultures, the 
difference between cultural practices, the difference in the construction 
of cultures within different groups, very often set up among and between 
themselves an incommensurability… The assumption that at some level 
all forms of cultural diversity may be understood on the basis of a 
particular universal concept, whether it be ‘human being’, ‘class’ or 
‘race’, can be both very dangerous and very limiting in trying to 
understand the ways in which cultural practices construct their own 
systems of meaning and social organisation.
876
 
 
Fieldwork, in this instance, represents that “‘third (or hybrid) space’ which 
enables other positions to emerge”877 as “[r]esearch and performance… work 
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similarly… [in fact,] both are in a perpetual state of liminality and otherness;”878 this is 
true although both the conditions and assumptions of applied research and the personal 
presence of the anthropologist can easily favour imbalance between involved powers or 
inability to overcome the unavoidable tensions resulting from the encounter. Fieldwork 
as third space can be associated with the ‘liminal’ position of the anthropologist in the 
field according to the definition of the term provided by the anthropologist Victor 
Turner in The Ritual Process (1969): 
 
[t]he attributes of liminality or liminal personae (“threshold people”) are 
necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or 
slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and 
positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; 
they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, 
custom, convention, and ceremonial.
879
 
 
Dunham’s liminal state as an African-American woman anthropologist in the Caribbean 
is underlined by her being, within the community she is studying, an initiate in the 
Vaudun cult as recounted in detail in the several chapters dedicated to her lavé-tête or 
baptism in Vaudun.
880
  Her anthropological curiosity (what Dunham called “the eternal 
chercheur”)881 and her artistic interest in the aesthetic form of the rituals and dances are 
counterbalanced by the fact that her research is marked by the desire of discovering a 
history which she not only recuperates, but finally embodies as researcher and recreates 
as artist. In fact, as observed by Drewal, “performing itself is perpetual liminality, a 
condition of otherness that is at once repetition and transformation of the past.
882
 If 
“‘[l]iminars’… may be initiands or novices in passage from one sociocultural state and 
status to another, or even whole populations undergoing transition…”883, Dunham’s 
trajectory may parallel that of the people involved in the diaspora as a hybrid space in 
which different African cultures had to face their own incommensurability and become 
functional in the new American context independently from and in relation to Euro-
American and indigenous traditions. Dunham herself provides the reader with a careful 
consideration on the meaning of being initiated when she states that “[i]t is hard to 
describe to an uninitiated the process of becoming initiated. Harder still when one 
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remains for years on a fringe border of belief and nonbelief, because the two are so 
close.”884 This suspension between belief and nonbelief delineates what Anzaldúa 
described as an inner “lucha de fronteras, a struggle of borders”885 which defines an 
“‘alien’ consciousness… constantly in the making;”886 in fact, “liminality is not merely 
a medial stage in a rite of transition, but rather it is itself the ‘process of transformation 
at work.’”887 Zora Neale Hurston was similarly confronted with cultural 
incommensurability during her fieldwork in Haiti; in her case, this coincided with the 
deterioration of an ‘a priori’ (and apparently unproblematic) form of belonging to 
communities of African descent in the Americas, as we will see in the next and final 
section. 
 
4.5 “Let the stranger in”888: Zora Neale Hurston’s Caribbean in Tell My Horse 
 
Honey, de white man is de ruler of everything as fur as Ah been able tuh 
find out. Maybe it’s some place way off in de ocean where de black man 
is in power, but we don’t know nothin’ but what we see.889 
 
Long ago before he was twenty, he had found out that he was two beings. 
In short, he was everybody boiled down to a drop. Everybody is two 
beings: one lives and flourishes in the daylight and stands guard. The 
other being walks and howls at night.
890
 
 
All translation is only a provisional way of coming to terms with the 
foreignness of languages.
891
 
 
Tell My Horse: Voodoo Life in Haiti and Jamaica (1938) is Hurston’s account of her 
fieldwork in the Caribbean between 1936 and 1937. The book has been defined, from 
its first publication, as a hybrid text; Elmer Davis, in his 1938 review, described it as “a 
curious mixture of remembrances, travelogue, sensationalism, and anthropology.”892 
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The text is divided into three sections; the first one is dedicated to Hurston’s fieldwork 
in Jamaica, the other two are an account of her Haitian experience, distinguishing 
between her views on Haitian politics and history and her research on Voodoo. The 
comments on both Jamaican and Haitian societies have always been quite problematic 
for her readers because of her judgments on sexism and cultural subservience towards 
Great Britain in Jamaica, corrupted politics in Haiti, and her praise of the US occupation 
which had ended two years before her period of research in the island. 
 It is possible to trace at least two main elements of continuity between 
Hurston’s experience of research in the South of the United States as presented in Mules 
and Men and her subsequent ethnography of the Caribbean. Such continuities operate 
on two levels: at the level of political imagination, in relation to the possible association 
between the small-scale ideal of independence of the self-governing town of Eatonville, 
the place in which Hurston grew up, and the Republic of Haiti as echoed in Nanny’s 
words quoted at the beginning of this section; at the cultural level, the continuities can 
be traced in the practice of Hoodoo which connects Hurston’s experience in New 
Orleans with her further research in Haiti. At the beginning of the Hoodoo section in 
Mules and Men, Hurston defined New Orleans as “the hoodoo capital of America”893 
where “[g]reat names in rites that vie those of Hayti in deeds… keep alive the powers of 
Africa.”894 As for this second level, signs of connection can be found more easily if a 
wider framework and a more inclusive idea of religious experience are taken into 
account; in fact, if Hurston saw Hoodoo as a survival strategy of African legacy, she 
also envisaged elements of rebellion in the African-American experience of Christianity 
as shown in her 1940 report on the Seventh Day Church of God of Beau Fort, South 
Carolina, when she observes that the church represents “a revolt against the white man’s 
view of religion which has been so generally accepted by the literate Negro, and is 
therefore a version to the more African form of expression.”895 The connection Hurston 
envisaged between Hoodoo and Christianity is further articulated in the following 
passage taken from Mules and Men: 
 
Hoodoo, or Voodoo, as pronounced by the whites, is burning with a 
flame in America, with all the intensity of a suppressed religion. It has its 
thousands of secret adherents. It adapts itself like Christianity to its 
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locale, reclaiming some of its borrowed characteristics to itself, such as 
fire-worship as signified in the Christian church by the altar and the 
candles and the belief in the power of water to sanctify as in baptism.
896
 
 
Although areas of affiliation between Hurston and the subject of her research in 
the Caribbean are certainly traceable, the controversial issues of identity, difference, and 
sense of belonging already sketched in Mules and Men are further complicated in her 
ethnographic expedition to Jamaica and Haiti. In this context, Jamaica – as her first 
stage of research in the Caribbean – seems to have a double function in Tell My Horse: 
on the one hand, the English language shared with the United States locates the island 
as a sort of linguistic bridge which allows Hurston to cross the Gulf of Mexico towards 
Haiti; on the other, it complicates the question of racial belonging as it sketches 
Jamaican identity at a crossroad between a sort of invincible ‘Africanness’ as embodied 
in the Maroons of Accompong and the desire for ‘whiteness’ and ‘Britishness’ observed 
by Hurston in the urban centres of the island which she defines as “the land where the 
rooster lays an egg”897 where “the aim of everybody [is] to talk English, act English and 
look English.”898 Although this is a clear criticism directed towards the Jamaican society 
of the time, her thoughts on the similar position of the United States counterbalance her 
judgement. In fact, she states that Jamaica, “[b]eing an English colony, it is very British. 
Colonies always do imitate the mother country more or less. For instance some 
Americans are still aping the English as best as they can even though they have had one 
hundred and fifty years in which to recover.” Such a statement, as seen in the previous 
analysis of her essay “Characteristics of Negro Expression”899, has the power to revert 
the rhetoric ascribing to African Americans a derivational and imitative culture; 
moreover, it underlines a degree of uncertainty in the construction of the same Euro-
American identity
900
 which, in her view, was suffering from some kind of cultural 
dependence on its former colonizer. It is possible to characterise this initial statement as 
a sign of her awareness that what she wrote could be read in terms of racialised notions 
of blackness; throughout the text she will struggle to maintain a balance with mixed 
results.  
Because of its textual instability, the value of the analysis in Tell My Horse has 
been discussed by scholars of Hurston’s work: in his biography of Hurston, Hemenway 
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called it her “poorest book, chiefly because of its form”901 and set the tone of the debate 
around its duality in terms of its inadequate political analysis “often of a naïve sort, with 
superficial description of West Indian curiosities”902 opposed to ‘[t]he voodoo sections 
[which], by contrast, are vivid and exciting, despite the confusing accumulation of 
ceremonies and gods.”903 In the 1930s, the book had already been charged of dualism, 
but of another kind: focusing only on Voodoo, Davis saw in it a synthesis between 
Seabrook’s sensationalism and Herskovits’ presentation of the religion “in its coldest 
mathematical terms;”904 in such a hybrid attempt, the reviewer detected “a constant 
conflict between anthropological truth and taletelling.”905 The following year, the 
African-American historian Carter G. Woodson reviewed the work in positive terms 
underlining the fact that “Zora Neale Hurston as a writer is almost sui generis. She is 
regarded as a novelist, but at the same time she is more of an anthropologist than a 
novelist.”906 He described the book as “convincing evidence of the transplantation of 
African culture to America… an important chapter in the conflict and fusion of 
cultures.”907  
More recent critiques have mainly been moved from the two poles 
conceptualized by Hemenway after Hurston’s revival from the late 1970s by focusing 
on either her interesting work on Voodoo or on her patronising attitude towards Haiti. 
In the 1980s, Gwendolyn Mikell tried to envision a connection between the two aspects 
suggesting that “[i]t was her understanding of the mulatto/black class and culture 
conflicts which… [she] used as an introductory theme in her discussion of the role of 
Voodoo in Haitian society”908 while pointing to a third kind of dualism when she 
noticed that “Hurston’s Haitian ethnography is… a delicate balance between the calm 
insider’s and the agitated outsider’s perspective.”909 In the 1990s, while Dash saw some 
of Hurston’s comments as examples of “the black American imagination at its least 
generous”910, Wendy Dutton focused on the connection between Voodoo and 
invisibility commenting on Renato Rosaldo’s reading of Hurston’s two-sided status by 
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use of the figure of the “[t]wo-headed doctor… [or] voodoo doctor…[,] bocor…[,] 
houngan.”911 In even more recent times, Annette Trefzer has suggested other possible 
connections between the two poles of Hemenway’s analysis, by casting light on the 
polysemous nature of the text “[s]ituated among descriptive ethnography, political 
commentary, and colourful travelogue.”912 She finds an explanation for what she 
defines as a general and political ambiguity of the text in Hurston’s position “[a]s a 
black American ethnographer working on the cultures of the Caribbean… [who] seems 
caught between defending the U.S. imperial ‘possession’ of Haiti and simultaneously 
critiquing it by highlighting… Haitian voodoo rituals as a strategy of resistance to 
colonial politics.”913 Amy Fass Emery, on the other hand, identifies as “[t]he Other 
story told in Hurston’s Tell My Horse… that of the author’s struggle against being 
rendered voiceless.”914 Thus, the picture of a zombie in which Hurston took particular 
pride, would represent “the uncanny return in the text of fears that Hurston tries to 
repress – of the dispossession of voice and the loss of the self’s autonomy through 
submission to the will of others.”915 The possible loss of voice should be read from the 
perspective suggested by Ifeoma C. K. Nwankwo who, going back to Mikell’s 
insider/outsider argument, has read Tell My Horse as a text in which multiple voices 
intersect, “written simultaneously from the perspective of an initiated insider and an 
observing anthropologist as well as from the perspective of a national outsider and a 
racial insider.”916 Finally, Leigh Anne Duck has proposed a reading of Hurston’s 
political commentary as “a conscious… response to developments in Haitian cultural 
and political thought”917 with which she could not agree because of a substantial 
collusion between folklore and “an authoritarian and racially essentialist political 
ideology”918 emerging in the Haitian society of the time. In the present study, two 
attempts are made in order to articulate an analysis of Hurston’s Haitian ethnography: 
first the Caribbean, and Haiti in particular, is considered as the place where Hurston has 
to renegotiate her notion of blackness; second, the impossibility of sharing a common 
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language with the subjects of her study in Haiti seriously complicates her 
methodological approach in fieldwork.  
In her article “How It Feels to Be Colored Me” (1928), Hurston argued that she 
did not live her being black and American as an inner contradiction asserting that she 
experienced “no separate feeling about being an American citizen and colored.”919 She 
refused to consider herself as “tragically colored”920 while constructing her argument 
against the members of “the sobbing school of Negrohood who hold that nature 
somehow has given them a low-down dirty deal and whose feelings are all about it;”921 
according to her reading, these people saw blackness as an irreversible mark of social 
disadvantage and cultural deprivation. Duck has commented on Hurston’s claims as 
expressing a tension with Du Bois’ concept of ‘double consciousness’922, but if 
Hurston’s view is analysed in the context delineated in Chapter One, it is possible to 
think that she was referring to the representatives of the Chicago School of Sociology 
who saw African Americans as the bearers of a defective and deviant culture affected 
by the historical conditions of slavery and segregation and by the subsequent 
deprivations at the social and economical level. Her vision and knowledge of folklore 
sharply contrasted with this reading of the African-American experience; in light of all 
this, her claim of an unproblematic hyphenated identity could be the expression of a 
reading of black culture which she had tried to integrate successfully both in her public 
persona and in her art. Nonetheless, once she was confronted with a wider definition of 
both ‘Africa’ and ‘America’ in the Caribbean, the balance between racial and national 
sense of belonging was probably complicated by the international politics of her country 
and by her commitment to anthropology. As noticed by Mikell in reference to Tell My 
Horse, “[o]ne senses within Hurston’s work an inherent conflict which derives from the 
fact of her blackness: an identification with the people she studies… as well as an 
intellectual separation from them.”923 Although probably reluctant to admit it, it was 
probably in Haiti that she could not deny any longer the implications and the intimate 
meaning of ‘double consciousness;’ at least in the ways the idea could affect her own 
research and fieldwork. 
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In this regard, the linguistic element is pivotal in Haiti: language in Mules and 
Men was not only an object of interest for her, but also her method, her particular 
approach to African-American folklore. In relation to Mules and Men, Emery suggests 
that “[i]n… her ‘one recognized ethnography’..., Hurston presented black folklore of the 
South as a language system used to empower the black self in a cultural milieu where 
blacks were subordinate.”924 Content could not be separated by the form in which it had 
been originally conveyed without seriously compromising its meaning; the effort in 
representing the African-American oral speech from Florida in a written ethnography 
was sustained by both aesthetic and anthropological requirements. The same Boasian 
view of culture had been influenced by and modelled on language
925, but in Hurston’s 
case language was more than a cultural mould: apart from being the medium in which 
she artistically excelled, it was by sharing the same language with the community in 
which she studied that she guaranteed the presence of a bond in her fieldwork. 
‘Barnardese’926, the speech of academia, was a foreign language in Eatonville, Polk 
County, and the Everglades: her notion of whole African-American identity was based 
on a linguistic competence which included paralinguistic communication, Signifyin(g), 
and the understanding of the role that single tales had within the wider body of folklore. 
In Haiti this was not possible: although she studied Creole and could certainly work 
with it, it is unlikely that she could acquire the same kind of language proficiency she 
had had within the communities of Florida and Louisiana. If patterns of distance could 
be traced in those contexts as well
927
, language in Haiti probably constituted a barrier 
not only between Hurston and the subject of her analysis, but also between herself and 
her methodological approach to fieldwork research.  
From this perspective, Voodoo functions as an alternative language, the realm 
where her anthropological research can find a dimension bringing it closer to the one in 
Mules and Men.
928
 As observed by Dunham, in fact, in Voodoo, “[t]he language barrier, 
my rudimentary creole, was not as important as one would have thought, there having 
always been a language barrier between the widely conglomerate tribal groups of 
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slaves.”929 In his Foreword to the 1990 edition of Tell My Horse, Ishmael Reed focuses 
again on Voodoo as “less a religion than the common language of slaves from different 
African tribes;”930 this might be the reason why the Voodoo section of Tell My Horse 
has always been considered the most accomplished while the previous parts which 
present Hurston’s own commentary on the island are rather characterised from a not 
completely successful attempt at bonding with a group of people: differently than in 
Mules and Men, in fact, she represents herself not within a community, but often in 
dialogue with single informants with whom she sometimes finds herself at odds. The 
absence of folklore in the Haitian section of Tell My Horse is even more evident when 
the book is compared with Ainsi parla l’oncle (So Spoke the Uncle) written in 1928 by 
the prominent Haitian anthropologist Jean-Price Mars. Magdaline W. Shannon has 
defined the work as “a book demonstrating how the meaning of African origins and the 
New World environment had shaped the Haitian political and sociocultural system.”931 
In a way, Price-Mars was for Haiti what Hurston had been for Florida: a champion of 
folklore against the detractors who, in this case, belonged to the elite governing the 
island.
932
 As Hurston only partially shared a language with the subject of her research, 
tales are not central in her ethnography of Haiti. Performance and the body as 
experienced in the Voodoo rituals become her point of contact with the local culture and 
the main connection between the island and her background in the United States. In her 
case, though, the lack of bonding at the linguistic level as a shared, alternative way to 
read Haiti’s history and its politics, must have created that estrangement which favoured 
judgments from the nationalistic side of her personality.  
Her reading of Caribbean societies as chauvinistic, racist, and in the case of 
Haiti, in need of intervention from the United States, can be furthermore contextualized 
in the light of the literary works she wrote while in the Caribbean and just after her 
return in the United States. Their Eyes Were Watching God was conceived and written 
during Hurston’s fieldwork in Haiti933 while Moses Man of the Mountain was published 
in 1937; in the novel Moses’ Biblical figure becomes central for the African-American 
identity in the context of the African diaspora in the Americas. Moses is a man and a 
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god at the same time, a Voodoo doctor or houngan who acquires infinite power 
throughout the story and his power is strictly related to language. It could be 
appropriate, therefore, to read her statements regarding Caribbean society and politics in 
relation to what she realised in these two novels: in fact, although she bitterly criticised 
the treatment of women in Jamaican society and the divisions on the basis of colour in 
Haiti, in Their Eyes Were Watching God she represents these attitudes within African-
American communities in the South of the United States while rewriting themes 
specific to Haitian Voodoo.
934
 As for Moses Man of the Mountain, the novel epitomizes 
her positive view of Voodoo described in Tell My Horse as “the old, old, mysticism of 
the world in African terms… a religion of creation and life”935 in stark contrast with all 
the negative or exotic depictions of the cult which had been spread through social 
sciences and popular culture alike.
936
 By inserting her anthropological fieldwork and 
data in the context of these two novels, the boundaries between the Caribbean and Afro-
America start to appear as porous and blurred. 
An important statement about language and voice in fieldwork also seems to 
emerge from the analysis of Their Eyes Were Watching God in connection with Jonah’s 
Gourd Vine (1934), Hurston’s first novel, in the context of her anthropological research 
in Florida and Haiti. Mary Helen Washington has, in fact, analysed the two novels in 
relation to the emergence of the female hero and “two problematic relationships… in… 
[Their Eyes Were Watching God]: women’s relationship to the community and 
women’s relationship to language.”937 Washington particularly criticises feminist 
readings focusing on the novel as “an expression of female power”938 while she states 
that the text “represents women’s exclusion from power, particularly from the power of 
oral speech”939 in contrast with the character of John in Jonah’s Gourd Vine as a 
prototype of articulate folk hero.
940
 Although it is certainly correct to read the two 
novels in relation to the manifest coordinates of gender, my hypothesis is here that 
Hurston was actually ‘translating’ uncertainties in relation to both gender and race as 
experienced in her fieldwork; in this reading, then, John and Janie would both stand as 
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fictional alternatives to Hurston as ethnographer; John Pearson would represent an ideal 
of easy integration within the studied community by way of oral speech
941
 while Janie 
Crawford would mirror the position of the ethnographer in Haiti who, confronted with 
the oral foreignness of Creole, might have started to doubt “the relevance of oral 
speech”942 and opted for focusing on the importance of experience above words (as in 
the practice of Voodoo). This attitude would be articulated in Janie’s famous words to 
her best friend towards the end of the novel “Pheoby you got tuh go there tuh know 
there”943, a fictional echo of the concept of “being there” as later articulated by Clifford 
Geertz. In this regard, Geertz observes that 
 
[t]he ability of anthropologists to get us to take what they say seriously 
has less to do with either a factual look or an air of conceptual elegance 
than it has with their capacity to convince us what they say is a result of 
their having actually penetrated (or, if you prefer, been penetrated by) 
another form of life, of having, one way or another, truly “been there.”944 
 
As for Tell My Horse, the reader is left wondering if Hurston moved her 
comments and judgements on the ground of a racial bond she might have taken for 
granted while in the United States and had to learn to renegotiate while in Haiti as this 
connection was, at least in part, dependent on a very particular notion of language.
945
 As 
suggested above, Voodoo probably functions, therefore, as an alternative link between 
her experience in the South of the United States and her participation in Haitian rituals; 
nonetheless the cult is characterised, in its essence, by inchoate moments which cannot 
be conveyed into words.
946
 Hurston found herself dealing with langage, “a mixture of 
pure African languages and dialects of the surviving tribal groupings represented in 
Haiti”947, silence, and “the inchoate”948, that which cannot be “fully grasped”949, but can 
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find expression through performance. According to Drewal, inchoateness or 
“obscurity… is born of the duplicity of language, the conflict of social roles in life, and 
the idiosyncrasies of experience and its interpretation.”950 As for silence, Hurston, like 
Dunham, could probably have sensed that “[d]efining the indefinable is a precious 
waste of time”951 while, as a Voodoo initiate, there were things she was not supposed to 
tell because there were “things [which] were good to know and… things [which] were 
not.”952 
Even the most dreaded deed related to Voodoo, the cannibalism associating 
Haitians with savagery and heathenism, could have been a result of the 
misunderstanding of a metaphor. In her chapter dedicated to the Secte Rouge, one of 
Haiti’s secret societies, which Hurston explains to have been mistakenly associated with 
Voodoo, she is confronted with an explanation of Haitian uses of metaphor by a 
member of the elite: 
 
He… accepted the rum and then explained to me with all the charm that 
an upper class Haitian is so full of, that the peasants of Haiti were a 
poetical group. They loved the metaphor and the simile. They had 
various figures of speech that could easily be misunderstood by those 
who did not know their ways. For example: It was the habit of the 
peasant to say “mange’ moun” (eat a man) when he really meant to kill. 
Had I never heard the Haitian threat “map mange’ ou sans cel” (I’ll eat 
you without salt)? It is of course the same exaggerated threat that is 
commonly used in the United States by white and black. “I’ll eat you up! 
I’ll eat you alive; I’ll chew you up!” 
I acknowledged that I had heard the expression in the market several 
times. I added that we Negroes of America also employed figures of 
speech continuously. Very well then, he replied, I would understand, and 
not take the mode of speech of the peasants literally.
953
  
 
The whole episode is worth a close reading because it reveals many of the 
idiosyncrasies and tensions she was probably experiencing in her Caribbean fieldwork; 
it also produces an interesting picture of Hurston as ethnographer within the context of 
her Haitian fieldwork. The prologue to the passage quoted above is her confrontation 
with a young housekeeper named Joseph who had moved to Hurston’s house in Port-au-
Prince with his wife and baby in order to help her with the general management of the 
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place. The family lived in the basement, but Hurston recounts that one night, while she 
was writing, she smelled the unpleasant odour of something burning in her employee’s 
dwelling and, quite annoyed, asked the boy for some kind of explanation: 
 
I called down to Joseph and demanded to know what on earth was going 
on. He told me he was burning something to drive off bad things. What 
bad things, I wanted to know. I was good and angry about the thing. He 
said not to be angry, please. But cochon gris (gray pigs) qui mange’ 
moun (who eat people) were after his baby and he “was make a little 
ceremony to drive them away.”954 
 
As the young man does not want to leave his room until the following morning, she has 
to wait for the answer she is so eager to have. Their exchange during breakfast 
confronts us with a paradox highlighted in her dialogue with the member of the Haitian 
elite; in fact, she is reading Joseph’s words literally, as if she did not have any prior 
knowledge of figurative use of language (“I have never seen a grey pig… in robes of 
any sort…”) or never heard any rumours about possible cannibalistic practices in the 
island: 
 
He told me that he had seen figures in white robes and hoods, no, some 
of them had red gowns and hoods, lurking in the paraseuse (hedge) the 
night before. He thought the cochons gris knew that he had a very young 
baby and they wanted to take it and eat it. 
“Now Joseph”, I objected, “you are trying to excuse yourself for 
disturbing me by telling a fantastic lie. In the first place I have never seen 
a grey pig and do not believe they exist. In the second place, hogs do not 
go about in robes of any sort and neither they go about eating babies. Pas 
capab.’” 
 
Hurston is indeed making an effort at inserting Creole words in her account, but while 
in Mules and Men the frame in which the ethnographer’s voice was revealed had been 
inserted at a second stage and only under her publisher’s request955, here she is 
confronted with the impossibility of representing her interlocutor’s words in his own 
terms. While her voice could ideally melt with the characters in Mules and Men despite 
their possible recalcitrance, here she deliberately represents herself as incapable at the 
game which had been the pillar of both her art and research: she does not seem capable 
of Signifying anymore to the point of using for the first time the word ‘lie’ in the sense 
of ‘falsehood’ or ‘fraud.’ The distance between Joseph and herself is reaffirmed when 
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she decides not to see the risk of harming the boy and losing his trust for the fleeting 
pleasure to tell everything to “an upper class Haitian” who happens to interrupt their 
exchange: 
 
The discussion was broken off there because an upper class Haitian came 
at the moment for a morning visit. The Haitian peasant is very humble 
before his betters, so Joseph shut up quickly and went on back to 
cleaning up the yard. The gentleman and I went on the front gallery that 
commands such a magnificent view of Port-au-Prince and the sea, and sat 
down. I laughed and told him the fantastic explanation that Joseph had 
made. He laughed briefly, then he said he was thirsty. He would neither 
permit me to go for a glass of water for him, nor call Lucille [the maid] 
to bring it. He would just go out to the kitchen and let Lucille give it to 
him there. After he went to the rear, I thought I’d join him and offer him 
a drink of rum. When I reached the end of the salon I saw that he was not 
asking Lucille for water at all. He was on the back gallery speaking to 
Joseph in the yard. He was speaking in Creole and calling Joseph every 
kind of stupid miscreant. He ended his tirade by saying that since Joseph 
had been so foolish as to tell a foreigner, who might go off and say bad 
things about Haiti, such things, he was going to see that the Garde 
d’Haiti gave him a good beating with a coco-macaque. Knowing that I 
would embarrass my friend by letting him know that I had heard, I went 
back to the porch as quietly as I could and waited until he returned before 
I mentioned the rum.
956
 
 
This is only one of the possible readings of the episode, but in the context of the present 
analysis, the prevalent impression is that Hurston is commenting on the role of the 
anthropologist in Haiti who has to mingle with members of the elite while looking for 
answers among members of the lower classes. She seems to consider this member of the 
elite as a ‘friend’ although he has just called her ‘a foreigner’, but their association is 
only apparent: when he explains her, a writer, the meaning and use of ‘figures of 
speech’ used by the Haitian peasant, she finally uses the pronoun ‘we’: “I added that we 
Negroes of America also employed figures of speech continuously.”957  
Kevin Meehan has provided an analysis of Tell My Horse as “a critique of 
ethnography as a form of knowledge that sees Hurston as working to produce a 
dissenting form of transnational culture grounded in the logic of a decolonizing contact 
zone.”958 In Meehan’s analysis “ethnography becomes ‘possessed’”959, but the episode 
orchestrated by Hurston goes even further as it seems to function as an example of 
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possession by ethnography as “formalized curiosity… poking and prying with a 
purpose”960 and with little regard for the consequences of that curiosity on the lives of 
people touched by it. If Hurston, the ethnographer as character, seems to have forgotten 
how to Signify, it is just because Hurston, the writer, is probably successful at 
Signifying upon both the ethnographic method and her audience alike. 
Taking into account the particular location where ethnographic and artistic 
representations converge and distance from each other is a way to highlight a 
meaningful connection not only between Hurston and Dunham, but also between their 
different academic and artistic interests, and their particular ways of looking at the 
Caribbean and converting their ethnographic data into creative practice. Such a location 
can be considered as a significant conjunction where the two dimensions of ‘culture’ as 
the main object of interest for anthropology, on the one hand, and as a process of 
discovery and creative effort, on the other, are encountered in both Hurston’s and 
Dunham’s productions. The representation of the anthropologist’s body emerges here as 
the carrier of a movement connecting anthropological fieldwork, ethnographic texts, 
and artistic renditions of fieldwork data: starting from the presence of Hurston’s body in 
Mules and Men which becomes central in her Hoodoo initiation, the reader can trace the 
connection with the interest in Haitian Vodoun present in the texts of both 
anthropologists before finally reaching Dunham’s body dancing the diaspora in her 
shows and public performances. This embodied movement is not only in space, but in 
time as well, because although widespread anthropological categories and adjectives 
like ‘savage’, ‘primitive’, ‘peasant’, and ‘barbaric’ are kept alive in their ethnographies 
of the Caribbean; we also find their conscious effort to transpose so-called ‘primitive 
patterns’ onto modern forms of artistic representation in order to challenge the atavistic 
characterisation of the former and show their aesthetic rigor and cultural functionality.  
The presence of the anthropologist’s body in Haiti highlights the contradictions 
inherent in the experience of conducting research in a country recently occupied by the 
nation to which both ethnographers belonged. In the following passage, Dunham 
comments on the peculiar position in which she found herself while conducting 
fieldwork on the island, suspended as she was between national and racial sense of 
belonging: 
 
Americans have remained a confusion in the Haitian mind ever since 
[occupation], and there seems little to do about it… Being a member of 
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the race was a distinct advantage. Skin color, hair texture, facial 
measurements, yes, these are the external part of “race”; but, as Fay-
Cooper Cole so often pointed out, race is psychology… I am, however, 
sensitive to “kind,” to blackness in the sense of spirit, a charismatic 
intangible, and this is what the Haitians and Brazilians and Malaysians 
and Chinese and those Africans with whom I have had time really to 
discuss things must have felt, must feel.
961
 
 
National belonging also makes ambivalent Hurston’s presence in Haiti and her reading 
of Haitian political situation; as reminded by Duck, Tell My Horse has been accused of 
sensationalism and imperialistic rhetoric.
962
 Although Hurston was interested in and 
sincerely appreciated the connections between African-American folklore in the South 
of the United States and Caribbean popular culture, her American nationality and the 
foreign language complicated her notion of what being ‘African’ and ‘American’ could 
mean and marked her activities in post-occupation Haiti from which her presence in the 
island emerged as a complex negotiation “between the calm insider’s and the agitated 
outsider’s perspective”963, according to Mikell’s analysis. Although her support to the 
American occupation of the island has been often given for granted, Duck convincingly 
demonstrates that Hurston was well aware of the fact that “the occupation [had] 
disrupted the relationship between the state and the public in a particularly destructive 
way.”964 
Such contradictions between national affiliations and sense of racial belonging 
find an echo in the reception of Dunham’s works in the United States. The 
performances she created were a synthesis of her American training and her Caribbean 
research; the reviews that commented her theatrical renditions insisted on her being an 
anthropologist who staged the savage through dance. As we have seen, she developed a 
specific method in which elements of so-called primitive dances were actually the 
inspiration for innovation in modern dance, showing – as Hurston did in her turn – the 
transformative possibilities of folklore and its functionality in the present. 
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Conclusion 
 
The main conclusions reached in this thesis relate to the possibilities and limits offered 
by representational choices in the ethnographic texts under analysis. Anthropology uses 
an ocularcentric and visualistic ordering which became evident in the organisation of 
anthropological museums and world fairs between the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Fairs, together with the invention of photography 
and publicity, offered a first possibility for the popularization of anthropological 
theories which constructed differences on the basis of racial and temporal coordinates. 
All the people encountered through European colonisation and US imperialistic 
expansion were, in fact, ordered in relation to the supposed closeness to or distance 
from the white race seen as the only one able to achieve full civilization and material 
progress. The biological trait was, then, linked to the cultural trait as intellectual 
achievements and technical advancement were seen as an exclusive prerogative of 
Europe and North America. When Boas favoured a more democratic and inclusive 
concept of ‘culture’ as the basis of his anthropological project, both theories of race and 
other meanings of culture, mainly linked to a humanistic understanding of the term, 
constituted a problematic legacy to which anthropologists had to relate. In the case of 
African-American anthropologists, this meant having to deal with an ideal of 
authenticity, largely based on the reception of Native-American traditions, against 
which both African-American and Caribbean cultures risked falling short because of 
their more evidently hybridized character. In search of the authentic, Herskovitsian 
anthropology and black modernism embarked on a project of recuperation of Africa as a 
source of history and legitimisation for modern black American culture; at the same 
time the association between Africa and the primitive, seen as a defining element of 
modernity in general and of anthropology as modern science in particular, made the 
African-American project particularly challenging.  
For the Harlem Renaissance, it can be said without detracting anything from the 
creative and artistic achievements of the movement, that one of the most astonishing 
results for black intellectuals and artists was the possibility to acquire a critical voice. 
This critical voice is a direct link between black folkloric tradition, the Harlem 
Renaissance, and African-American anthropology; it could also explain why Hurston 
and Dunham generally chose not to distinguish the creative moment from the analytical 
one: Hurston probably sensed folklore to be both creation and interpretation, invention 
and analysis at the same time. In similar ways, Dunham’s performances reflected 
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‘traditional’ ways of producing knowledge, her dance company mirroring a community 
coming to grips with ‘old’ and ‘new’ materials in order to offer a creative synthesis 
ritualistically repeated and modified through time. This understanding of the 
entanglement between creation and criticism, fiction and analysis, also marked 
Hurston’s and Dunham’s autoethnographies: representations of body and Time in their 
texts should be read not only as examples of experimental writing, but also as conscious 
reflections on the ethnographic method and on the ways of establishing authority in 
writing. If Boas’ democratising move had favoured the entrance of different cultural 
groups into the realm of culture as subject of analysis, it had also favoured the 
emergence of anthropologists seen as part of or close to those same groups; in their case 
the physical element (understood as biological body and as a set of bodily possibilities 
given by specific training as, in the case of Dunham, by her dance education) was 
perceived as central to their chances of acceptance within the studied community, to 
their authority in the field. At the textual level, the centrality of the embodied element 
complicates the position of the ethnographer as author considered able to produce an 
objective and comprehensive analysis of an observed community according to scientific 
standards stable throughout time; the black woman body, thus, irrupts in the text 
disclosing the difficulty of being an anthropologist in fieldwork. The racial fact per se is 
not enough in order to be accepted within the studied community: both in Hurston’s and 
in Dunham’s case, belonging does not coincide with supposed racial roots, but with 
cultural routes marked by excellence at something perceived as functional within the 
communities in which they were conducting fieldwork, as for instance storytelling or 
particular uses of language in relation to Hurston’s presence in Florida or exceptional 
skills at dancing marking Dunham’s participation in Vodoun rituals in Haiti. This 
competence must be seen as the main chance for them to become insiders in spite of 
their gender and in spite of their training whereby education is perceived as a marker of 
class difference, but it also marks their texts through the representation of an embodied 
authority which is always at risk of being associated with controversial pictures of the 
black woman’s body seen as a marker of irrationality and unruliness in direct contrast 
with the invisible, yet present, mark of scientific reason and knowledge. 
It must be stressed that the representation of the ethnographer’s body in 
fieldwork is not a guarantee of a more democratic representation of the others of 
anthropology just as the democratising Boasian move towards cultural inclusion could 
not counterbalance the economic and political inequalities in the practice of 
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anthropology; yet the emergence of the ethnographer in the text favours the entry of the 
temporal element in the account of fieldwork experience making it more difficult to 
distance the analysed subject from the observer. Temporal distance is yet reaffirmed 
anytime the anthropologist is not able to renew her ‘right’ to belong to the community; 
this appears evident for Hurston in Haiti, the place where she loses the oral bond with 
the subject of her analysis.  
Going back to Walker’s question at the beginning of this thesis, “where is the 
black anthropologist?”965 I would say that in trying to analyse the meaning of Hurston’s 
and Dunham’s presence and fieldwork in the Caribbean and their creative renditions of 
ethnographic data, a pattern emerges through the dynamic relationship between the 
search for roots and rootedness and the black anthropologist’s identity as a route, 
namely “a process of movement and mediation” as suggested by Paul Gilroy’s reading 
of racial identity.
966
 This can find an echo in Dunham’s own thoughts about Herskovits’ 
cultural politics in the Caribbean: 
 
So often I have regretted not staying closer, not remaining faithful to the 
path Herskovits had chosen for me, but he was single-minded about an 
object, a thing, not the person and what the person was made up of and 
how much a person could take of one thing, no matter what great vistas 
would be opened. Herskovits’ one thing was Africa in terms of the New 
World – a fascinating, complex, never-ending study.967 
 
If Dunham’s view is compared to Hurston’s representation of the ‘horizon’ as a trope 
for her ethnographical research, we can finally delineate their location in the Caribbean 
as suspended between the search for roots and the envisioning of viable routes for a 
process of representation and recreation of identities; in their works, the Caribbean 
location becomes pivotal for this ‘dynamic’ relationship between roots and routes as the 
area represents a horizon of opportunities for exploring the meaning of being ‘African’ 
and ‘American.’  The Caribbean provided them with a space where racial and national 
affinities could be reconsidered in order to deal with the concept of double 
consciousness both in anthropology and in the arts; indeed, the search for African roots 
revealed a pattern of hybridized routes by which black people in the Americas actively 
engaged with tradition and modernity. Above all, the Caribbean gave them the certainty 
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of being endowed with a culture which anthropology finally considered worth studying 
in its own terms. 
At the beginning of her autobiography Dust Tracks on a Road (1942), in a 
chapter entitled “The Inside Search”, Hurston refers to her childhood longing towards 
the horizon in ways that seem to suggest the centrality of this image in her life and 
anthropological research: 
 
But no matter whether my probings made me happier or sadder, I kept on 
probing to know. For instance, I had a stifled longing. I used to climb to 
the top of one of the huge chinaberry trees which guarded our front gate, 
and look out over the world. The most interesting thing that I saw was 
the horizon. Every way I turned, it was there, and the same distance 
away. Our house then, was in the center of the world. It grew upon me 
that I ought to walk out to the horizon and see what the end of the world 
was like.
968
 
 
The horizon as a metaphor for the process of knowledge acquisition is sensed, at the 
same time, as unattainable and ever-present within the researcher’s consciousness. The 
contours of the path that transforms roots in routes in the anthropological works by 
Hurston and Dunham pass through the different uses of performance in anthropology 
and theatre and the possibility they offer as processes of creation and representation of 
identities. The interiorized horizon defines “how much one person can take of one 
thing” where, quoting Gloria Anzaldúa, the “‘alien’ consciousness is constantly in the 
making”969 – the consciousness of a frontier knowledge born on a frontier which lies, at 
the same time, within and outside, “una lucha de fronteras, a struggle of borders”, 
between texts and footnotes. 
 
Because I, a mestiza, 
continually walk out of one culture 
and into another, 
because I am in all cultures at the same time, 
alma entre dos mundos, tres, cuatro, 
me zumba la cabeza con lo contradictorio 
estoy norteada por todas las voces que me hablan 
simultáneamente.
970
 
                                                 
968
 Zora Neale Hurston, Dust Tracks on a Road: An Autobiography (New York: Perennial Library, 1990: 
1942), 27. 
969
 Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute Book 
Company, 1987), 77. My attempt at translation: “Because I, a mestiza,/ continually walk out of one 
culture/ and into another,/ because I am in all cultures at the same time,/ a soul between two worlds, three, 
four/ my head buzzes because of the contradiction/ I am disoriented by all the voices speaking to me at 
the same time.” 
970
 Ibid. 
  
 
 
209 
 
Bibliography 
 
Andersen, Margaret L., Hill Collins, Patricia (eds). Race, Class, and Gender: An 
Anthology. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2004 (1992). 
 
Andrews, William L., McFeely, William S. (eds). Narrative of the Life of Frederick 
Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself: Authoritative Text, Contexts, 
Criticism. New York: Norton, 1997 (1845). 
 
Anzaldúa, Gloria. Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. San Francisco, CA: 
Aunt Lute Book Company, 1987. 
 
Anzaldúa, Gloria (ed). Making Face, Making Soul Haciendo Caras: Creative and 
Critical Perspectives by Feminists of Color. San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute 
Books, 1990. 
 
Asad, Talal (ed). Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter. Amherst, NY: Humanity 
Books, 1998 (1973). 
 
Asad, Talal. “Anthropology and the Analysis of Ideology.” Man, New Series, Vol. 14, 
No. 4 (Dec., 1979), 607-627. 
 
Aschenbrenner, Joyce. Katherine Dunham: Dancing a Life. Champaign, Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press, 2002. 
 
Ashton, Susanna. “Du Bois’s Horizon: Documenting Movements of the Color Line.” 
MELUS, Vol. 26, No. 4, African American Literature (Winter, 2001), 3-23. 
 
Baker, Houston A., Jr. Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature: A Vernacular 
Theory. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
—Long Black Song: Essays in Black American Literature and Culture. Charlottesville 
and London: The University Press of Virginia, 1990 (1972). 
—Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1987. 
—“Review of Voodoo Dreams by Jewell Parker Rhodes.” African American Review, 
vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring 1995), 157-160. 
 
Baker, Houston A., Jr., Nelson, Dana D. (eds). Violence, the Body and “The South.” 
American Literature (Special Issue), vol. 73, no. 2, June 2001. 
 
Baker, Lee D. Anthropology and the Racial Politics of Culture. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010. 
—“Columbia University’s Franz Boas: He Led the Undoing of Scientific Racism.” The 
Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 22 (Winter, 1998-1999), 89-96. 
—“Franz Boas out of the Ivory Tower.” Anthropological Theory, Vol. 4(1), 2004, 29-
51. 
— From Savage to Negro: Anthropology and the Construction of Race, 1896-1954. 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1998. 
— “The Location of Franz Boas within the African-American Struggle.” Critique of 
Anthropology, Vol. 14(2), 1994, 199-217. 
  
 
 
210 
 
Baldwin, James. Notes of a Native Son. Boston: Beacon Press, 2012 (1955). 
 
Barkan, Elazar, Bush, Ronald (eds). Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project 
and the Culture of Modernism. Stanford, California: University of California 
Press, 1995. 
 
Bashkow, Ira. “A Neo-Boasian Conception of Cultural Boundaries.” American 
Anthropologist, Vol. 106, Issue 3, 2004, 443-458. 
 
Behar, Ruth. The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology that Breaks Your Heart. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1996. 
 
Behar, Ruth, Gordon, Deborah A. (eds). Women Writing Culture. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1995. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. New York: Schocken, 1969. 
 
Bercovitch, Sacvan, Patell, Cyrus R. K. “Chesnutt and Imperial Spectacle.” In 
Bercovitch, Sacvan (ed.). The Cambridge History of American Literature. 
Volume Three: Prose Writing, 1860-1920. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, 181-223. 
 
Berger, John. Ways of Seeing. London: British Broadcasting Corporation and Penguin 
Books, 1972. 
 
Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge, 2004 (1994). 
“Black & White and Read All Over.” Artforum International, Vol. 34, No. 2, October 
1995, 16-17, 114-116. 
 
Boas, Franz. “Anthropology.” In Seligman, E. A. and Johnson, A. (eds). Encyclopaedia 
of the Social Sciences, vol. 2, New York, McMillan, 1930. 
“Eugenics.” The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 3, No. 5 (Nov., 1916), 471-478. 
 
Boxwell, D. A. “‘Sis Cat’ as Ethnographer: Self-Presentation and Self-Inscription in 
Zora Neale Hurston’s Mules and Men.” African American Review, Vol. 26, No. 
4 (Winter 1992), 605-617. 
 
Brah, Avtar. Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities. New York: Routledge, 
2005 (1996). 
 
Braidotti, Rosi. “Embodiment, Sexual Difference, and the Nomadic Subject.” Hypatia, 
Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 1993), 1-13. 
—Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist 
Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
 
Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2009. 
 
  
 
 
211 
Bunzl, Matti. “Boas, Foucault, and the ‘Native Anthropologist’: Notes toward a Neo-
Boasian Anthropology.” American Anthropologist, Vol. 106, Issue 3, 2004, 435-
442. 
 
Butler, Judith. Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New York & 
London: Routledge, 1993. 
—Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York & London: 
Routledge, 1990. 
—“Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory.” Theatre Journal, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec. 1988), 519-531. 
 
Buttitta, Antonino I. “Cultura, segni e società.” Seminario Le solidarietà. La cultura 
materiale in linguistica e in antropologia, Dipartimento di Filologia, Linguistica 
e Letteratura, Università di Lecce, 1996, 7-16. 
—“Forme del tempo.” Archivio Antropologico Mediterraneo, anno X/XI (2007-2008), 
n. 10/11, 5-16. 
 
Cabrera, Lydia. Afro-Cuban Tales. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004 
(1936). 
 
Cagliero, Roberto, Ronzon, Francesco. Spettri di Haiti. Dal colonialismo francese 
all’imperialismo Americano. Verona, Italy: Ombre Corte, 2002.  
 
Camp, Stephanie M. H. “The Pleasures of Resistance: Enslaved Women and Body 
Politics in the Plantation South, 1830-1861.” The Journal of Southern History, 
68, no. 3 (August 2002), 533-572. 
 
Campbell, James T. Middle Passages: African American Journeys to Africa, 1787-
2005. New York and London: The Penguin Press, 2006. 
 
Canclini, Néstor García. Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving 
Modernity. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005 (1989). 
 
Carby, Hazel. “The Politics of Fiction, Anthropology, and the Folk: Zora Neale 
Hurston.” In Fabre, Geneviève, O’ Meally Robert (eds). History and Memory in 
African-American Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 28-44. 
 
Carpentier, Alejo. El reino de este mundo. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Lectorum, S. A. 
2010 (1949). 
 
Castellanos, Jorge. Pioneros de la etnografía afrocubana: Fernando Ortiz, Rómulo 
Lachatañere, Lydia Cabrera. Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 2003. 
 
Carroll, Anne Elizabeth. Word, Image, and the New Negro: Representation and Identity 
in the Harlem Renaissance. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2005. 
 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. “Adda, Calcutta: Dwelling in Modernity.” Public Culture 11(1), 
1999, 109-145. 
 
  
 
 
212 
Charles, John C. “What was Africa to Him?: Alain Locke, Cultural Nationalism, and the 
Rhetoric of Empire During the New Negro Renaissance.” In Tarver, Australia 
and Barnes, Paul C. (eds.). New Voices of the Harlem Renaissance: Essays on 
Race, Gender, and Literary Discourse. Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated 
University Presses, 2006. 
 
Clark, Vèvè A. “Katherine Dunham’s Tropical Revue.” Black American Literature 
Forum, Vol. 16, No. 4, Black Theatre Issue (Winter, 1982), 147-152. 
 
Clark, Vèvè A., Johnson, Sara E. (eds). Kaiso! Writings by and about Katherine 
Dunham. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. 
 
Clifford, James. The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, 
Literature, and Art. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 2002 (1988). 
 
Clifford, James, Marcus, George E. (eds.). Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997 
(1985). 
 
Cook, Ted (ed.). Katherine Dunham’s Journey to Accompong. Whitefish, MT: Literary 
Licensing LLC, 2013. 
 
Cotera, María Eugenia. Native Speakers: Ella Deloria, Zora Neale Hurston, Jovita 
González and the Poetics of Culture. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008. 
 
Courlander, Harold. The Drum and the Hoe: Life and Lore of the Haitian People. 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1960. 
 
Crease, Robert P. “Inquiry and Performance: Analogies and Identities Between the Arts 
and the Sciences.” Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2003, 266-
272. 
 
Cullen Rath, Richard. “Echo and Narcissus: The Afrocentric Pragmatism of W.E.B. Du 
Bois.” The Journal of American History, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Sep., 1997), 461-495. 
 
Daniel, Yvonne. Caribbean and Atlantic Diaspora Dance: Igniting Citizenship. Urbana, 
Chicago, and Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2011. 
—Dancing Wisdom: Embodied Knowledge in Haitian Vodou, Cuban Yoruba, and 
Bahian Candomblé. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005. 
 
Dash, J. Michael. Culture and Customs of Haiti. Westport, Connecticut and London: 
Greenwood Press, 2001. 
—Haiti and the United States: National Stereotypes and the Literary Imagination. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: The Macmillan Press, 1988. 
 
Davis, Angela. Women, Race & Class. London: Women’s Press, 2001 (1981). 
 
Dayan, Joan. “Review: Haiti’s Unquiet Past.” Transition, No. 67 (1995), 150-164. 
 
  
 
 
213 
Delois Jennings, Lavinia (ed). Zora Neale Hurston, Haiti, and Their Eyes Were 
Watching God. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2013. 
 
DeLombard, Jeannine. “‘Eye-Witness to the Cruelty’: Southern Violence and Northern 
Testimony in Frederick Douglass’s 1845 Narrative.” American Literature, vol. 
73, no. 2, June 2001, 245-275. 
 
Deren, Maya. Divine Horsemen: The Living Gods of Haiti. New York: McPherson & 
Company, 2004 (1953). 
—“Travels to Haiti.” Flair, October 1950, 98. Howard Gotlieb Archival Research 
Center, Maya Deren Collection, Boston University, Boston, MA. 
—“Women of Haiti.” Mademoiselle, May 1950, 134. Howard Gotlieb Archival 
Research Center, Maya Deren Collection, Boston University, Boston, MA. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. L’écriture et la différence. Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 2009 (1967). 
—Of Grammatology (trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak). Baltimore and London: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1997 (1967). 
 
Dianteill, Erwan, Swearingen, Martha. “From Hierography to Ethnography and Back: 
Lydia Cabrera’s Texts and the Written Tradition in Afro-Cuban Religions.” 
Journal of American Folklore 116 (461), 2003, 273-292. 
 
Dorst, John. “Rereading Mules and Men: Towards the Death of the Ethnographer.” 
Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Aug. 1987), 305-318. 
 
Douglass, Frederick. “Lecture on Haiti.” Delivered in Quinn Chapel, Chicago, on 2 
January 1893.  
Available at: http://www2.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/history/1844-
1915/douglass.htm. Last accessed on 21 June 2013. 
 
Drew, Julie. “Cultural Composition: Stuart Hall on Ethnicity and the Discursive Turn.” 
JAC, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1998, 171-196. 
 
Du Bois, W. E. B. Black Folk Then and Now: An Essay in the History and Sociology of 
the Negro Race. New York: Henry Holt, 1939. 
—The Souls of Black Folk. New York: New American Library, 1995 (1903). 
 
DuCille, Ann. The Coupling Convention: Sex, Text, and Tradition in Black Women’s 
Fiction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
 
Duck, Leigh Anne. “‘Go there tuh know there’: Zora Neale Hurston and the Chronotype 
of the Folk.” American Literary History, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), 265-
294. 
—“‘Rebirth of a Nation’: Hurston in Haiti.” The Journal of American Folklore, Vol. 
117, No. 464 (Spring, 2004), 127-146. 
 
Dunham, Katherine. A Touch of Innocence: Memoirs of Childhood. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994 (1959). 
—Dances of Haiti. Los Angeles: Center for Afro-American Studies, University of 
California, 1983. 
—Island Possessed, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994 
(1969). 
  
 
 
214 
 
Dutton, Wendy. “The Problem of Invisibility: Voodoo and Zora Neale Hurston.” 
Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1993), 131-152. 
 
Eisen, Kurt. “Theatrical Ethnography and Modernist Primitivism in Eugene O’Neill and 
Zora Neale Hurston.” South Central Review, Volume 25, Number 1, Spring 
2008, 56-73. 
 
Ellis, Carolyn, Adams, Tony E., and Bochner, Arthur P. “Autoethnography: An 
Overview.” Forum: Qualitative Social Research Sozialforschung, Vol. 12, No. 
1, Art. 10, January 2011. Available at: http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1589/3095. Last accessed on 9 August 
2013. 
 
Ellison, Ralph. The Invisible Man. London: Penguin Books, 2001 (1952). 
—Shadow and Act. New York: Vintage International, 1995 (1964). 
 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “Nature.” In William H. Gilman (ed.). Selected Writings of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson. New York: Signet-Penguin, 1965 (1836). 
 
Fabian, Johannes. Power and Performance: Ethnographic Explorations Through 
Proverbial Wisdom and Theater in Shaba. Madison, Wisconsin and London: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990. 
—“Presence and Representation: the Other and Anthropological Writing.” Critical 
Inquiry 16 (Summer 1990), 753-772. 
—“Theater and Anthropology, Theatricality and Culture.” Research in African 
Literatures, Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 1999, 24-31. 
—Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002 (1983). 
 
Fabietti, Ugo. Antropologia culturale. L’esperienza e l’interpretazione. Roma-Bari, 
Italia: Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1999. 
 
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press, 1967 (1952). 
—The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin, 1990 (1961). 
 
Farebrother, Rachel. The Collage Aesthetic in the Harlem Renaissance. Farnham, 
Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009. 
 
Farmer, Paul. Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the 
Poor. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2003. 
 
Fass Emery, Amy. “The Zombie In/As the Text: Zora Neale Hurston’s ‘Tell My 
Horse.’” African American Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Fall, 2005), 327-336. 
 
Faulkner, William. “Mountain Victory.” In Faulkner, William. Collected Stories of 
William Faulkner. New York: Vintage International, 1995 (1932), 745-777. 
 
Ferlinghetti, Lawrence. San Francisco Poems. San Francisco, CA: City Lights 
Foundation, 2001. 
 
  
 
 
215 
Fischer, Sybille. Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of 
Revolution. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2004. 
 
Fischer-Hornung, Dorothea. “An Island Occupied: An Interpretation of the U.S. Marine 
Occupation of Haiti in Zora Neale Hurston’s Tell My Horse and Katherine 
Dunham’s Island Possessed.” In Fischer-Hornung, Dorothea and Raphael-
Hernandez, Heike (eds.). —Holding Their Own: Perspectives on the Multi-
Ethnic Literatures of the United States. Tübingen, Germany: Stauffenburg 
Verlag, 2000. 
 
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 
London and New York: Routledge, 1989 (1966). 
 
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of Afro-American Literary 
Criticism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989 (1988). 
 
Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. (ed.). “Race”, Writing, and Difference. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1986. 
—with K. A. Appiah (eds.). Zora Neale Hurston: Critical Perspectives Past and 
Present. New York: Amistad Press, 1993. 
 
Geertz, Clifford. Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2008 (1988). 
 
Gelder, Ken. “Postcolonial Voodoo.” Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2000, 89-98. 
 
Gershenhorn, Jerry. Melville J. Herskovits and the Racial Politics of Knowledge. 
Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004. 
 
Ghosh, Amitav. In an Antique Land. London: Granta Books, 1998 (1992). 
 
Gilpin, William. Essay on Prints. London: Strahan, 1802 (1768). 
 
Gilroy, Paul. Small Acts: Thoughts on the Politics of Black Cultures. London: Serpent’s 
Tail, 1993. 
—Postcolonial Melancholia. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 
—The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. London: Verso Books, 
1993. 
 
Gomez, Michael A. “Of Du Bois and Diaspora: The Challenge of African American 
Studies.” Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, Special Issue: Back to the 
Future of Civilization: Celebrating 30 Years of African American Studies (Nov., 
2004), 175-194. 
 
Gracki, Katherine. “True Lies: Staging the Ethnographic Interview in Trinh T. Minh-
ha’s Surname Viet, Given Name Nam (1989).” Pacific Coast Philology, Vol. 36 
(2001), 48-63. 
 
Greenberg, Joseph C. “Melville J. Herskovits 1895-1963: A Biographical Memoir.” In 
Biographic Memoirs Volume 90. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of 
Sciences (1971), 65-93. 
  
 
 
216 
 
Grosz, Elizabeth. Architecture from Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Spaces. 
Cambridge, Massachussets: The MIT Press, 2001. 
—Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994. 
 
Grosz, Elizabeth (ed.). Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures. Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
 
Haraway, Donna J. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn, 
1988), 575-599. 
 
Harding, Sandra. Sciences from Below: Feminisms, Postcolonialities, and Modernities. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008. 
 
Harrison, Ira E., Harrison, Faye V. (eds.). African-American Pioneers in Anthropology. 
Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999. 
 
Hastrup, Kristen. “The Ethnographic Present: A Reinvention.” Cultural Anthropology, 
vol. 5, no. 1 (Feb. 1990), 45-61. 
 
Hemenway, Robert E. Zora Neale Hurston: A Literary Biography. Urbana, Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press, 1980 (1977). 
 
Herskovits, Melville J. Life in a Haitian Valley. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener 
Publishers, 2012 (1937). 
—Man and His Works: The Science of Cultural Anthropology. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1948. 
—The Myth of the Negro Past. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1958 (1941). 
 
Hibbs, Thomas. “W.E.B. Du Bois and Socratic Questioning.” Expositions, Vol. 2, No. 1 
(2008), 35-58. 
 
Hill, Lynda Marion. Social Rituals and the Verbal Art of Zora Neale Hurston. 
Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1996. 
 
Hill Collins, Patricia. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the 
Politics of Empowerment. New York: Routledge, 1991 (1990). 
 
Hoare, Quintin, Nowell Smith, Geoffrey (eds.). Selection from the Prison Notebooks of 
Antonio Gramsci, London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1998 (1929-1935). 
 
Holquist, Michael (ed.). The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin. 
Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1996. 
 
hooks, bell. Black Looks: Race and Representation. Boston: South End Press, 1992. 
—“Critical Interrogation: Talking Race, Resisting Racism.” Inscriptions, no. 5, 1989, 
159-162. 
—Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics. Boston: South End Press, 1990. 
 
  
 
 
217 
Hoving, Isabel. In Praise of New Travelers: Reading Caribbean Migrant Women’s 
Writing. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
 
Huggins, Nathan Irvin. Harlem Renaissance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973 
(1971). 
 
Huddart, David. Homi K. Bhabha. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. 
 
Hughes, Langston. The Big Sea: An Autobiography. New York: Hill and Wang, 1993 
(1940). 
 
Hurston, Zora Neale. Dust Track on a Road: An Autobiography. New York: Perennial 
Library, 1990 (1942). 
—“Letter to Franz Boas.” 20 October 1929, Franz Boas Papers, Zora Neale Hurston 
Folder 2 1929-1931, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, PA. 
—Moses Man of the Mountain. New York: HarperPerennial, 1991 (1939). 
—Mules and Men. New York: Quality Paperback Books, 1990 (1935). 
—“Ritualistic Expression from the Life of the Communicants of the Seventh Day 
Church of God. Beaufort, South Carolina” (circa 1940). Margaret Mead Papers 
and South Pacific Ethnographic Archives, 1838-1996, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
—Tell My Horse: Voodoo Life in Haiti and Jamaica. New York: Quality Paperback 
Books, 1990 (1938). 
—Their Eyes Were Watching God. New York: Quality Paperback Books, 1990 (1937). 
 
Jacobs, Karen. “From ‘Splyglass’ to ‘Horizon’: Tracking the Anthropological Gaze in 
Zora Neale Hurston.” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 30, no. 3 (Spring 1997), 
329-360. 
 
Jacobs, Harriet. Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 
2001. 
 
James, C. L. R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo 
Revolution. New York: Vintage House, 1989 (1938). 
 
Johnson, Barbara. “Thresholds of Difference: Structures of Address in Zora Neale 
Hurston.” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 12, No. 1, “Race”, Writing, and Difference 
(Autumn, 1985), 278-289. 
 
Johnson, James Weldon. The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man. Mineola, NY: 
Dover Publications, 1995. 
 
Jules-Rosette, Bennetta. “Decentering Ethnography: Victor Turner’s Vision of 
Anthropology.” Journal of Religion in Africa, vol. 24, Fasc. 2 (May 1994), 160-
181. 
 
Kristeva, Julia. Time and Sense: Proust and the Experience of Literature. New York 
and Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 1996 (1994). 
 
  
 
 
218 
Kraut, Anthea. “Between Primitivism and Diaspora: The Dance Performances of 
Josephine Baker, Zora Neale Hurston, and Katherine Dunham.” Theatre 
Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3 (October 2003). 
—Choreographing the Folk: The Dance Stagings of Zora Neale Hurston. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008. 
 
Lamothe, Daphne Mary. Inventing the New Negro: Narrative, Culture, and 
Ethnography. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 
 
Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1993 (1991). 
 
Levine, Robert Steven. Dislocating Race and Nation: Episodes in Nineteenth-Century 
American Literary Nationalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2008. 
 
Lewin, Ellen (ed.). Feminist Anthropology: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006. 
 
Limón, José E., Young, M. J. “Frontiers, Settlements, and Development in Folklore 
Studies, 1972-1985.” Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 15 (1986), 437-460. 
 
Liss, Julia E. “Diasporic Identities: The Science and Politics of Race in the Work of 
Franz Boas and W.E.B. Du Bois, 1894-1919.” Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 13, 
No. 2 (May, 1998), 127-166. 
 
Lock, Margaret. “Cultivating the Body: Anthropology and Epistemologies of Bodily 
Practice and Knowledge.” Annual Review of Anthropology 22 (1993), 133-155. 
 
Locke, Alain (ed.). The New Negro: Voices of the Harlem Renaissance. New York: 
Touchstone, 1997 (1925). 
 
Lowe, John. Jump at the Sun: Zora Neale Hurston’s Cosmic Comedy. Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997 (1994). 
 
Lyons, Mary E. Sorrow’s Kitchen: The Life and Folklore of Zora Neale Hurston. New 
York: Scribners, 1990. 
 
Madsen, Deborah L. (ed.). Beyond the Borders: American Literature and Post-Colonial 
Theory. London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2003. 
 
Manuel, Carme. “Mule Bone: Langston Hughes and Zora Neale Hurston’s Dream 
Deferred of an African-American Theatre of the Black Word.” African 
American Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), 77-92. 
 
Martín Alcoff, Linda. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
 
McCarthy Brown, Karen. Mama Lola: A Vodou Priestess in Brooklyn. Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, California and Oxford, England: University of California Press, 
1991. 
 
  
 
 
219 
McClintock, Anne. Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial 
Contest. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
 
McKay, Claude. A Long Way from Home: An Autobiography. San Diego, New York, 
and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970 (1937). 
 
McNeil, William K. “American Folklore Scholarship: The Early Years.” In Brunvand, 
Jan Harold, (ed.). American Folklore: An Encyclopedia. New York & London: 
Garland Publishing, 1996, 30-41. 
 
McWhorter, Ladelle. “Culture or Nature? The Function of the Term ‘Body’ in the Work 
of Michel Foucault.” The Journal of Philosophy, 86, no. 11 (November 1989), 
608-614. 
 
Meehan, Kevin. “Decolonizing Ethnography: Spirit Possession and Resistance in Tell 
My Horse.” Obsidian III, Special Issue on Zora Neale Hurston, 9:1 
(Spring/Summer 2008). 
 
Meisenhelder, Susan. “Conflict and Resistance in Zora Neale Hurston’s Mules and 
Men.” Journal of American Folklore 109, no. 433 (Summer 1996), 267-288. 
 
Métraux, Alfred. Voodoo in Haiti. New York: Schocken Books, 1989 (1959). 
 
Mignolo, Walter D. “Canons A(nd)Cross-Cultural Boundaries (Or, Whose Canon Are 
We Talking About?).” Poetics Today, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 1991), 1-28. 
—“Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of 
De-Coloniality.” Cultural Studies, Vol. 21, 2-3 (March-May 2007), 449-514. 
—Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border 
Thinking. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 
Mikell, Gwendolyn. “When Horses Talk: Reflections on Zora Neale Hurston’s Haitian 
Anthropology.” Phylon (1960-), Vol. 43, No. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1982), 218-230. 
 
Minh-ha, Trinh T. “Documentary Is/Not a Name.” October, Vol. 52 (Spring, 1990), 76-
98. 
—Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989. 
 
Mintz, Sidney W. Caribbean Transformations. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989 (1974). 
—“Enduring Substances, Trying Theories: The Caribbean Region as Oikoumene.” The 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), 289-
311. 
—“Whitewashing Haiti’s History.” Boston Review, 22 January 2010. Available at: 
http://www.bostonreview.net/world/whitewashing-haiti%E2%80%99s-history. 
Last accessed on 3 July 2013. 
 
Molesworth, Charles (ed.). The Works of Alain Locke. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 
 
Mondal, Anshuman A. Amitav Ghosh. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007. 
  
 
 
220 
 
Morrison, Toni. Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination. New 
York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1993 (1992). 
—Beloved. London: Vintage, 2005 (1987). 
 
Morton, Stephen. “Learning from the Subaltern.” In Morton, Stephen. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak. New York: Routledge, 2003. 
 
Nicholls, David G. “Migrant Labor, Folklore, and Resistance in Hurston’s Polk County: 
Reframing Mules and Men.” African American Review 33, no. 3 (Autumn, 
1999), 467-479. 
 
North, Michael. The Dialect of Modernism: Race, Language, and Twentieth-Century 
Literature. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Nwankwo, Ifeoma C. K. “Insider and Outsider, Black and American: Rethinking Zora 
Neale Hurston’s Caribbean Ethnography.” Radical History Review, Issue 87 
(Fall 2003): 49-77. 
 
Ong, Walter J. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. New York: 
Routdledge, 2002 (1982). 
 
Paddon, Anna R., Turner, Sally. “African Americans and the World’s Columbian 
Exposition.” Illinois Historical Journal, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), 19-36. 
 
Paravisini-Gebert, Lizabeth. “Colonial and Postcolonial Gothic: the Caribbean.” In 
Hogle, Jerrold E. (ed). The Cambridge Companion to Gothic Fiction. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 229-257. 
—“Women Possessed: Eroticism and Exoticism in the Representation of Woman as 
Zombie.” In Paravisini-Gebert, Lizabeth. Sacred Possessions: Vodou, Santeria, 
Obeah, and the Caribbean. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1997, 37-58. 
 
Peterson, Dale E. “Justifying the Margin: The Construction of ‘Soul’ in Russian and 
African-American Texts.” Slavic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Winter, 1992), 749-
757. 
—“Response and Call: The African American Dialogue with Bakhtin.” American 
Literature, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Dec. 1993), 761-775. 
 
Pokagon, Simon. “The Red Man’s Greeting” (originally “The Red Man’s Rebuke”, 
1893). In Seelye, James E., Jr., Littleton, Steven A. (eds). Voices of the 
American Indian Experience. Volume 2, 1878-Present. Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2013, 381-384. 
 
Pratt, Mary Louise. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. London and 
New York: Routledge, 2003 (1992). 
 
Price, Richard, Price, Sally. The Root of Roots: Or, How African-American 
Anthropology Got Its Start. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003. 
 
  
 
 
221 
Propp, Vladimir. Theory and History of Folklore. Minneapolis: The University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997 (1984). 
 
Reed-Danahay, Deborah (ed.). Auto/Ethnography: Rewriting the Self and the Social. 
Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers, 1997. 
 
Richter, Katrina. “Anthropology with an Agenda: Four Forgotten Dance 
Anthropologists.” Research in Dance Education, 11: 3, 2010, 223-237. 
 
Rodríguez-Mangual, Edna M. Lydia Cabrera and the Construction of an Afro-Cuban 
Cultural Identity. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 
2004.  
 
Rouch, Jean (dir.). Les maîtres fous. Les Films de la Pléiade, 1955. Film. 
 
Rudwick, Elliott, Meier, August. “Black Man in the ‘White City’: Negro and the 
Columbian Exposition, 1893.” Phylon (1960-), Vol. 26, No. 4 (4th Qtr., 1965), 
354-361. 
 
Rutheford, Jonathan. “The Third Space: Interview with Homi K. Bhabha.” In 
Rutheford, Jonathan (ed.). Identity: Community, Culture, Difference. London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1990. 
 
Rydell, Robert W. All the World’s a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International 
Expositions, 1876-1916. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
—“The Fan Dance of Science: American World’s Fairs in the Great Depression.” Isis, 
Vol. 76, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), 525-542. 
—World of Fairs: The Century-of-Progress Expositions. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993. 
 
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Random House, 1979 (1978). 
—“Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocutors.” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 
15, No. 2 (Winter, 1989), 205-225. 
 
Sánchez-Eppler, Karen. Touching Liberty: Abolition, Feminism, and the Politics of the 
Body. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. 
 
Schäfer, Axel R. “W.E.B. Du Bois, German Social Thought, and the Racial Divide in 
American Progressivism, 1892-1909.” The Journal of American History, Vol. 
88, No. 3 (Dec., 2001), 925-949. 
 
Schwartz, Peggy, Schwartz, Murray. The Dance Claimed Me: A Biography of Pearl 
Primus. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011. 
 
Seabrook, William B. The Magic Island. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1929. 
 
Shannon, Magdaline W. Jean-Price Mars, the Haitian Elite and the American 
Occupation 1915-1935. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. 
 
Siemerling, Winfried. “W. E. B. Du Bois, Hegel, and the Staging of Alterity.” Callaloo, 
Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter, 2001), 325-333. 
  
 
 
222 
 
Smith, Matthew J. Red & Black in Haiti: Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 
1934-1957. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009. 
 
Sollors, Werner. Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 
Sorisio, Carolyn. Fleshing Out America: Race, Gender, and the Politics of the Body in 
American Literature, 1833-1879. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 
2002. 
 
Sousa Santos, Eliana. “Changing Chance: A Walk Through the Landscape of Process in 
Design.” The Role of the Humanities in Design Creativity International 
Conference, University of Lincoln (2007), 2-10. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” In Cary Nelson and 
Lawrence Grossberg (eds.). Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Urbana: 
Urbana Illinois Press, 1988, 271-312. 
—“Civilization Folded Back: Poems by Stanley Diamond.” Dialectical Anthropology 
11 (2-4), 1986, 267-282. 
—“Harlem.” Social Text 81, Vol. 22, No. 4, Winter 2004, 113-139. 
—“Practical Politics of the Open End.” In Harasym, Sarah (ed.). The Post-Colonial 
Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues. London: Routledge, 1990, 95-114. 
 
Srivastava, Neelam. “Amitav Ghosh’s Ethnographic Fictions: Intertextual Links 
between In An Antique Land and His Doctoral Thesis.” The Journal of 
Commonwealth Literature, Volume 36, Issue 2, 2001, 45-64. 
 
Stocking, George W., Jr. “Franz Boas and the Culture Concept in Historical 
Perspective.” American Anthropologist, 68, 1966, 1-11. 
—“Matthew Arnold, E. B. Tylor, and the Uses of Invention.” American Anthropologist, 
New Series, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Aug., 1963), 783-799. 
—“The Turn of the Century Concept of Race.” Modernism/Modernity, 1.1. (1994), 4-
16. 
 
Stocking, George W., Jr. (ed.). A Franz Boas Reader: The Shaping of American 
Anthropology, 1883-1911. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982 
(1974). 
 
Stott, William. Documentary Expression and Thirties America. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1986 (1973). 
 
Thompson Drewal, Margaret. “The State of Research on Performance in Africa.” 
African Studies Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Dec., 1991), 1-64. 
 
Trefzer, Annette. “Possessing the Self: Caribbean Identities in Zora Neale Hurston’s 
Tell My Horse.” African American Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 2000), 299-
312. 
 
Tuhiwai Smith, Linda. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous People. 
London: Zed Books Ltd, 2008 (1999). 
  
 
 
223 
 
Turner, Victor. Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983 (1974). 
—The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure. New York: Aldine, 1969. 
 
Tylor, Edward Burnett. Primitive Culture. New York: J. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1920 
(1871). 
 
Visweswaran, Kamala. Fictions of Feminist Ethnography. Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003 (1994). 
 
Wall, Cheryl A. “Mules and Men and Women: Zora Neale Hurston’s Strategies of 
Narration and Visions of Female Empowerment.” Black American Literature 
Forum 23, no. 4 (Winter 1989), 661-680. 
—“Zora Neale Hurston’s Essays: On Art as Such.” The Scholar and Feminist Online. 
Volume 3, Number 2. Available at: 
http://sfonline.barnard.edu/hurston/wall_01.htm. Last accessed on 28 August 
2013. 
—Women of the Harlem Renaissance. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1995. 
 
Wall, Cheryl A. (ed). Zora Neale Hurston: Folklore, Memoirs and Other Writings. New 
York: Library of America, 1995. 
 
Walker, Alice. In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose by Alice Walker. 
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983. 
 
Walker, Alice (ed.). I Love Myself When I Am Laughing… And Then Again When I Am 
Looking Mean and Impressive: A Zora Neale Hurston Reader. New York: The 
Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 1979 (1999). 
 
Walters, Keith. “‘He can read my writing but he sho’ can’t read my mind’: Zora Neale 
Hurston’s Revenge in Mules and Men.” Journal of American Folklore 112 
(445), 1999, 343-371. 
 
Washington, Booker T. “Address to the Atlanta Cotton States and International 
Exposition”, 1895. Available at: http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/39/. Last 
accessed on 15 May 2013. 
 
Weinberg, Meyer (ed.). W.E.B. Du Bois: A Reader. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. 
 
Wells, Ida B. “The Reason Why the Colored American Is Not in the World’s 
Columbian Exposition: The Afro-American’s Contribution to Columbia 
Literature” (1893). Available at: 
http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/wells/exposition/exposition.html. Last 
accessed on 20 June 2013. 
 
Whitfield, Stephen J. “Franz Boas: The Anthropologist as Public Intellectual.” Paper 
presented at the First Annual Conference on Public Intellectuals “Speaking 
Truth to Power”, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 23-24 April 2010. 
Available at: www.firstofthemonth.org/archives/2012/04/culture_hero.html. 
  
 
 
224 
Accessed online as “Culture Hero: The Anthropologist as Public Intellectual” on 
11 May 2012. 
 
Williams, Raymond. “Culture is Ordinary.” In Williams, Raymond. Resources of Hope: 
Culture, Democracy, Socialism. London: Verso, 1989 (1958). 
 
Wisker, Gina. Postcolonial and African American Women’s Writing: A Critical 
Introduction. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: MacMillan 
Press, 2000. 
 
Woodson, Carter G. “Review: Tell My Horse by Zora Neale Hurston.” The Journal of 
Negro History, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan. 1939), 116-118. 
 
Yelvington, Kevin A. “Melville J. Herskovits’s Theory of Folklore.” Paper presented to 
the Workshop on Folklore and the Politics of Belief in the Caribbean, Mellon 
Seminar on Caribbean Cultural History, Department of History, University of 
California at Los Angeles, 14 May 2009. Available at: 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/media/files/Yelvington-Melville-J-Herskovits-
Theory-of-Folklore.pdf. Last accessed on 5 September 2013. 
—“The Anthropology of Afro-Latin America and the Caribbean: Diasporic 
Dimensions.” Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 30 (2001), 227-260. 
 
Yelvington, Kevin A. (ed.). Afro-Atlantic Dialogues: Anthropology in the Diaspora. 
Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 2006. 
 
Zinn, Howard. A People’s History of the United States. New York: HarperCollins, 2003 
(1980). 
 
Žižek, Slavoj. The Parallax View, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
